T.C. Memo. 1998-120
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES W. VONDYL, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12774-97. Filed March 26, 1998.
James W. VonDyl, pro se.
Milton B. Blouke, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GERBER, Judge: Respondent determined income tax
deficiencies for petitioner’s 1991 and 1992 taxable years in the
amounts of $13,775 and $8,176, respectively, and additions to tax
as follows: Section 6651(a),1 $3,443.75 for 1991 and $2,044.00
1
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
(continued...)
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for 1992; section 6654(a), $787.23 for 1991 and $356.58 for 1992.
Petitioner has conceded that he received all of the wages and
other items that respondent determined were income. His position
is that he did not earn a profit from any of the sources
determined to be income. More particularly, the questions for
our consideration are: (l) Whether petitioner’s wages or
compensation from services, interest, dividends, gambling
winnings, and proceeds from the sale of stock are income, and (2)
whether petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under
sections 6651(a) and 6654(a) for each of the taxable years 1991
and 1992.
Petitioner resided at Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time his
petition was filed in this case. At trial, petitioner appeared,
but did not wish to testify or offer evidence. He requested that
we decide his case based on a document presenting his position
with respect to respondent’s determination. Petitioner’s
argument as to why the determined items were not income to him
may be summarized as follows: (1) The section 61 definition of
income is inconsistent with Supreme Court opinions that contain
the statement that income equates with the concept of profit, and
petitioner contends that his exchange of services for wages or
compensation is not a profit situation. (2) The right to receive
1
(...continued)
effect for the years in issue, and Rule references are to this
Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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earnings is “not a privilege that can be taxed.” (3) Only income
earned outside of the 50 United States is subject to Federal tax.
(4) Section 6211 “presupposes that an original assessment has
been made.”
Petitioner, by selectively analyzing statutes, regulations,
and case precedent out of context, has reached the conclusion
that amounts he received from any and all sources do not
constitute income. Petitioner, following in the footsteps of
numerous others who have unsuccessfully attempted to rationalize
a way to avoid paying Federal income tax, must also fail. We
find petitioner’s arguments to be either wholly without merit and
not worthy of further analysis and/or previously addressed by
this and other courts. See, for example, opinions addressing the
question of whether compensation for labor is not subject to tax,
such as Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1982), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1981-506; Broughton v. United States, 632 F.2d 706,
707 (8th Cir. 1980); Hayward v. Day, 619 F.2d 716, 717 (8th Cir.
1980); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1120 (1983).
Further, we are not obligated to exhaustively review and/or rebut
petitioner’s misguided contentions. Crain v. Commissioner, 737
F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination that
certain items set forth in the notice of deficiency are income
for petitioner’s 1991 and 1992 years. We note that respondent
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determined the amount of each income adjustment from information
provided by reporting third parties, and the amounts were
established by means of deemed admissions under Rule 90. One of
the items of income may be the gross proceeds of a security sale;
however, petitioner did not wish to provide any evidence,
including whether he had any basis in the security sold so as to
reduce the amount of tax liability.
Respondent also determined additions to tax in each year
under sections 6651(a) (failure to file) and 6654(a) (failure to
pay estimated tax). It is clear from the information available
in this case that petitioner failed to file a return. In
addition, petitioner has offered no evidence or sound
explanations as to why these additions to tax should not be
imposed. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the additions to
tax under sections 6651(a) and 6654(a) are sustained for the
taxable years 1991 and 1992. Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co.
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.