T.C. Memo. 1999-412
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WAYNE M. AND JANET L. JOHNSON, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 21955-97. Filed December 20, 1999.
Wayne M. Johnson, pro se.
Judith Cohen, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined
a deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax in the amount of
$1,379 for the taxable year 1994. Respondent also determined
petitioners were liable for an accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662(a) in the amount of $148 for the taxable year 1994.
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Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
After concessions by the parties,1 the issues for decision
are: (1) Whether petitioners are entitled to deduct an aggregate
partnership loss carryover in the amount of $3,313,240 for the
1994 taxable year;2 (2) whether petitioners are entitled to
deduct charitable contributions in the amount of $2,024 for the
1994 taxable year; and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) for 1994.3
Petitioners filed a timely petition with this Court. At the time
of filing the petition, petitioners resided in Yarmouth, Maine.
1
Petitioner Wayne Johnson concedes he is liable for
self-employment tax, and respondent concedes petitioners are
entitled to a credit for one-half the self-employment tax paid.
2
Neither party has questioned the Court’s jurisdiction
to adjudicate the partnership loss in this deficiency proceeding,
and we therefore assume that the partnerships are small
partnerships within the meaning of sec. 6231(a)(1).
3
The notice of deficiency contains adjustments to
petitioners' medical expense deduction and earned income credit.
These are computational adjustments which will be affected by the
outcome of the other issues to be decided, and we do not
separately address them.
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Background
Petitioner Wayne Johnson (hereinafter petitioner) is an
attorney. Prior to the year in issue, petitioner was one of
three general partners in several partnerships organized under
the laws of the State of Maine. Additionally, petitioner was one
of three principal shareholders in two subchapter C corporations
incorporated under the laws of the State of Maine.4 These
entities were established in 1986 and 1987 for the purpose of
purchasing, rehabilitating, and managing inner-city structures in
Portland, Maine. The entities incurred substantial recourse debt
for the purchase and rehabilitation of the structures, which was
financed through Maine Savings Bank and also through section 312
of the Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769, 790,
codified at 42 U.S.C. sec. 1452(b) (1988) (repealed by Act of
Nov. 28, 1990, Pub. L. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4128). The general
partners and shareholders, petitioner included, were required to
execute personal guaranties on the debt financed.
After the entities failed to pay the debt incurred, the
properties which were purchased by the separate entities were
foreclosed upon. An outstanding debt remained after the
foreclosure, and the entities defaulted on the debt in 1992. The
4
A fourth partner held a 2-percent interest in the
partnerships and corporations.
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following table illustrates the amount of the debt outstanding
after foreclosure of the properties:
Amount Date of
Entity Type Owed Default
D'Ambra Merc. Enterprises Subchapter C corp. $399,394.48 7/15/92
D'Ambra Corp. Subchapter C corp. 323,845.77 7/15/92
Portland Parris Street Partnership 200,916.17 8/14/92
Associates
Marshview Point Partnership 254,868.96 7/18/92
Partnership
Three-Sixty & One Partnership 760,818.57 6/18/92
One Associates
Fifty-Nine Bramhall St. Partnership 243,291.23 8/14/92
Associates
Cumberland Hanover Partnership 56,561.28 8/14/92
Associates
Cumberland Hanover Partnership 117,832.76 7/31/92
Associates
Park Avenue One Partnership 974,468.22 6/18/92
Associates
Total debt owed ---------- $3,331,997.44 --------
Petitioner claimed the following losses on his Federal income tax
returns as his share of the partnership losses incurred:5
Tax Year Loss Claimed
1991 $72,050
1992 3,376,497
1993 3,331,997
1994 3,313,241
5
For convenience, all subsequent amounts are rounded to
the next highest dollar.
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Respondent issued petitioners a notice of deficiency for
their 1994 tax year. In the notice of deficiency, respondent
disallowed petitioners' claimed partnership loss carryover and
their charitable contribution deduction. Respondent adjusted
petitioners' claimed medical expense deduction and earned income
credit due to the increases in petitioners' adjusted gross
income. Respondent determined that petitioners were liable for
the self-employment tax and for the accuracy-related penalty.
Respondent also determined that petitioners were entitled to a
self-employment tax credit.
While no deficiency was determined for 1993, the statement
of adjustments attached to the notice of deficiency included
adjustments to petitioners' 1993 Federal income tax return. The
adjustments for 1993 consisted of the disallowance of
petitioners' claimed partnership loss carryover from 1992,
charitable contribution deduction, and medical expense deduction.
Respondent also made an adjustment to petitioners' claimed earned
income credit for 1993 as a result of the adjustment to
petitioners' adjusted gross income.
Discussion
We begin by noting that the Commissioner's determinations
are presumed correct. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Deductions are a matter of legislative
grace, and the taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are
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entitled to the claimed deduction. See Rule 142(a); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
At the outset, we have determined that we do not have
jurisdiction with respect to the adjustments made to petitioners'
1993 Federal income tax return. Respondent did not determine a
deficiency in tax for petitioners' 1993 tax year and did not
issue a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioners for the
1993 tax year. See secs. 6212, 6213, 7442; Rules 13, 20; Monge
v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27 (1989); Normac, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988). However, we shall
consider the adjustments to the 1993 tax year to the extent they
affect the deficiency for the 1994 tax year.
1. Loss Deduction
We note that the parties’ arguments as to the deductibility
of the alleged losses are based on the assumption that all the
losses are related to petitioner's partnership interests. As the
entities involved also include subchapter C corporations, we
shall discuss the applicable law and analysis as applied to these
entities separately.
A. Partnership Losses
Petitioners claimed a partnership loss in the amount of
$3,376,497 for the 1992 taxable year. Petitioners claimed a
partnership loss carryover in the amount of $3,331,997 for the
1993 taxable year, and a partnership loss carryover in the amount
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of $3,313,241 for the 1994 taxable year. Of these amounts,
$723,240 consists of claimed losses related to petitioner's
interests in two subchapter C corporations. We shall decide
whether petitioners are entitled to a partnership loss carryover
in the amount of $2,590,001 in 1994.
Section 6001 requires that a taxpayer liable for any tax
shall maintain such records, render such statements, make such
returns, and comply with such regulations as the Secretary may
from time to time prescribe. To be entitled to a deduction,
therefore, a taxpayer is required to substantiate the deduction
through the maintenance of books and records.
Petitioner has not established that the entities in question
incurred a loss in 1992, or any other year. At most, petitioner
has established that the partnership entities defaulted on the
debt in the amount of $2,590,001 in 1992. Even if petitioner had
established that the partnerships had incurred a loss, petitioner
would not be entitled to a flow-through loss deduction as
petitioner has not established his bases in his partnership
interests.
The determination of a partner’s basis in his or her
partnership interest must be made before a partner can deduct his
or her share of partnership losses because losses cannot reduce a
partner’s basis below zero. See sec. 704(d); Sennett v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 825, 829 (1983), affd. 752 F.2d 428 (9th
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Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-141; sec.
1.704-1(d)(1), Income Tax. Regs. Petitioner has failed to
provide any documentation to establish his basis in the
respective partnerships. Most of the partnership returns (Forms
1065) have not been filed since the partnerships' inception, nor
have the partnerships issued Schedules K-1, Partner's Share of
Income, Credits, Deductions, etc., to the partners. The returns
that were filed have not been provided to this Court and made
part of this record.
Petitioner next argues that he is entitled to deduct a loss
based on the worthlessness of his partnership interests. In
order for petitioner to be entitled to a loss, he needs to
establish the worthlessness of his partnership interest and
further must substantiate the value of his partnership interests.
Even if petitioner’s partnership interests became worthless in
1992, he would not be entitled to a loss deduction because he has
not established the value of his partnership interests. As we
have previously concluded, petitioner did not present any
evidence to establish the amount of his bases in the
partnerships. In addition, petitioner did not account for any
income, loss, gain, credits, or deductions that are his
distributive share as a partner in the partnerships. As
petitioner has not established his basis by accounting for his
initial and any subsequent contributions to the partnerships, his
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share of any partnership income, credits, loss, or deductions, he
is not entitled to deduct a loss, as provided by sections 702(a)
and 704(d), nor is he entitled to any loss for the alleged
worthlessness of his partnership interests. We hold petitioners
are not entitled to a partnership loss carryover in the amount of
$2,590,001 for 1994.
B. Subchapter C Corporation Losses
The remainder of petitioners' claimed loss, $723,240,
originated from petitioner's interests in two subchapter C
corporations. As stated previously, petitioner has not
established a loss was incurred by the entities in question.
Even if he had, petitioner is not entitled to deduct a loss
sustained by the corporation as a subchapter C corporation is not
a pass-through entity, such as a partnership.
As to the deductibility of the worthlessness of a taxpayer's
stock in a subchapter C corporation, section 165(g) provides for
a constructive sale or exchange for worthless stock, which
results in the loss’ being treated as a capital loss. No such
constructive sale or exchange is provided for a partnership
interest. See La Rue v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 465, 484 n.22
(1988). The deductibility of the loss is limited by the
provisions of section 1211(b). However, petitioner has not
established his basis in the stock. See sec. 6001; Rule 142(a).
Therefore, respondent is sustained on this issue.
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2. Charitable Contribution Deduction
Petitioners claimed a charitable contribution deduction in
the amount of $2,024 on their 1994 tax return. Section 170(a)
allows as a deduction any charitable contribution which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution is a
contribution or gift to or for the use of an organization
described in section 170(c). Charitable contributions are
deductible pursuant to section 170 only if verified under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary. See sec. 170(a)(1).
If a charitable deduction is made in property other than
money, the amount of the contribution is, generally, the fair
market value of the property at the time of the contribution.
See sec. 1.170A-1(c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Further, any taxpayer
who makes a charitable contribution of property other than money
shall maintain for each contribution written records from the
donee showing the name and address of the donee, the date and
location of the contribution, and a description of the property
in detail reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. See
sec. 1.170A-13(b), Income Tax Regs. The fair market value of the
property is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in
determining the amount of detail to be included on the receipt.
See id.; Thorpe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-123.
Petitioner testified that petitioners normally make noncash
contributions to Goodwill. Petitioner provided no specific
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testimony as to whether the contributions in issue were in fact
made to Goodwill, what the donations specifically consisted of,
and the value thereof. Although petitioner repeatedly asserted
that respondent's Appeals Officer "did not give [him] a chance to
submit Form 8283", petitioner did not submit Form 8283, or any
other type of documentation, to substantiate the claimed
deduction.
Petitioner's uncorroborated, vague testimony does not
satisfy the substantiation requirements of section 170(a)(1) and
section 1.170A-13(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, we
sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
3. Accuracy-Related Penalty
The final issue for decision is whether petitioners are
liable for the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section
6662(a). Respondent determined petitioners were liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 1994. The
accuracy-related penalty is equal to 20 percent of any portion of
an underpayment of tax required to be shown on the return that is
attributable to the taxpayer's negligence or disregard of the
rules or regulations. See sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1). "Negligence"
includes of any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 6662(c).
"Disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard. Id.
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An exception applies to the accuracy-related penalty when
the taxpayer demonstrates (1) there was reasonable cause for the
underpayment, and (2) he acted in good faith with respect to such
underpayment. See sec. 6664(c). Whether the taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith is determined by the relevant
facts and circumstances. The most important factor is the extent
of the taxpayer's effort to assess his or her proper tax
liability. See Stubblefield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-
537; sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Section 1.6664-
4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., specifically provides: "Circumstances
that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an
honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in
light of * * * the experience, knowledge and education of the
taxpayer."
It is the taxpayer's burden to establish he is not liable
for the accuracy-related penalty imposed by section 6662(a). See
Rule 142(a); Tweeddale v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 501, 505 (1989).
Petitioner claimed a loss carryover in the amount of $3,313,240
and a charitable contribution deduction in the amount of $2,024
in 1994 and failed to substantiate the claimed deduction under
the requirements of section 6001 and the applicable regulations.
Petitioner is an attorney with knowledge of the law. On the
basis of the entire record, we conclude that petitioners have not
established the underpayment was due to reasonable cause and that
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they acted in good faith. Accordingly, we hold petitioners are
liable for the accuracy-related penalty as determined by
respondent.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.