In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-18-00398-CV
_______________________
IN THE INTEREST OF N.S.
On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-231,656
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child,
1
N.S. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2018). 2 The trial court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination
and termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (M), (2) (West Supp. 2018).
1
To protect the identity of the minor, we use initials to refer to the child. See
Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
We cite the current statute as subsequent amendments do not affect our
disposition.
1
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which
counsel contends there are no meritorious issues for appeal. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the
record, discusses the evidence at trial and the applicable legal standard, the trial
court’s ruling, and why the trial court’s ruling is supported by sufficient evidence.
Counsel concludes there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.
Counsel certified that Appellant was served with a copy of the Anders brief.
This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the
deadline for doing so. This Court received no pro-se response from the Appellant.
We have independently reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and
we conclude that there are no arguable grounds for review, that no reversible error
exists, and the Appellant’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
(emphasizing that the reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full
examination of proceedings, whether the appeal is wholly frivolous). As a result, we
affirm the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights. We further find no
arguable error requiring us to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief this
appeal. Compare Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
2
But, we deny the motion to withdraw because this is a parental termination
case and counsel’s motion to withdraw does not show “good cause” for withdrawal.
See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (In a parental termination case when
the attorney files an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, “an Anders motion to
withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for
withdrawal, may be premature.”). An attorney appointed under section
107.013(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code continues to represent an indigent parent as
outlined under section 107.016 of the Texas Family Code until the earliest of either
the date the suit is dismissed, the date that all appeals in relation to any final order
terminating parental rights are exhausted or waived, or the date the attorney is
relieved of the attorney’s duties or replaced by another attorney after a finding of
good cause is rendered by the court on the record. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§§ 107.013(a)(1), 107.016(3) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.3
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
3
We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review by the Supreme Court of
Texas, counsel may satisfy her obligations to the Appellant “by filing a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at
27-28.
3
Submitted on January 7, 2019
Opinion Delivered January 24, 2019
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
4