J-S25001-19
2019 PA Super 318
S.M.C. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
C.A.W.
Appellant No. 1802 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered October 12, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
Domestic Relations at Nos: 4115-2016
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019
Appellant, C.A.W., an adult male, lived together with Appellee, S.M.C.,
an adult female, and Appellee’s daughter (“Child”) for almost twelve years.
Appellant held himself out as Child’s father, supported Child financially and
claimed Child as a dependent on many of his tax returns. After Appellant and
Appellee ended their relationship, Appellant refused to continue providing
Child with financial support and cut off virtually all contact with Child. Appellee
filed an action for child support, and the trial court ordered Appellant to pay
support under the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. Based on the test for
paternity by estoppel articulated in K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2012),
we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by requiring
Appellant to pay support. Accordingly, we affirm.
Following evidentiary hearings that included testimony from, Appellant,
and a child psychologist, Mark Peters, the court found the following facts. In
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2002, Child was born to Appellee and H.N., the natural mother and father,
respectively. Appellee and H.N. never married, H.N. had virtually no contact
with Child, and H.N. never provided financial support or performed parental
duties for Child. Appellee filed a child support action against H.N., but it was
dismissed because he could not be located.
In January 2003, Appellee began an intimate relationship with
Appellant. From April 2003 through January 2015, Appellee and Child lived
together with Appellant in Appellant’s home. Appellant held himself out to be
Child’s father and performed parental duties on Child’s behalf, treating Child
the same as his own biological daughters. Appellant referred to Child as his
daughter when introducing her to third parties, and Child referred to Appellant
as her father and/or her daddy. Appellant claimed the child dependency tax
exemption on his federal income tax returns for Child in tax years 2003, 2004,
2005, 2006, 2007, 2011 and 2012. Appellee was employed outside the home
from 2007 through 2010, but her income was insufficient to support Child.
In January 2015, the relationship between Appellee and Appellant
ended. Appellee and Child left Appellant’s house, and Appellant stopped all
financial support to Child and all contact with Child, except for a few visits.
Appellant also began a new relationship with another woman. Appellee
obtained public assistance but has been unable to do anything financially for
Child, such as celebrate Christmas.
After meeting with Child four times, child psychologist Peters opined that
Child viewed Appellant as her de facto emotional parent and had a positive
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and stable relationship with him while they resided together. Child reported
that their relationship changed after she left Appellant’s house. During the
first hearing in this case, Appellant walked by Child without acknowledging
her, leaving Child hurt and confused. Peters diagnosed Child as experiencing
an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression.
Based on Peters’ testimony, the court determined that Child suffered a
serious adverse emotional impact. The court also concluded it was in Child’s
best interests to apply the paternity by estoppel doctrine against Appellant
and require Appellant to pay support. The Huntingdon County Domestic
Relations Section calculated Appellant’s support obligation, and an interim
support order was entered. Appellant filed a timely de novo objection to the
interim order, which the trial court dismissed. This timely appeal followed.
The sole question in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in concluding that Appellant owed a duty of support under the paternity by
estoppel doctrine.
We review support orders for abuse of discretion. V.E. v. W.M., 54
A.3d 368, 369 (Pa. Super. 2012). We cannot reverse the trial court’s support
determination unless it is unsustainable on any valid ground. Kimock v.
Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 853–54 (Pa. Super. 2012). “An abuse of discretion is
not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by
the evidence of record.” V.E., 54 A.3d at 369 (internal quotation marks and
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brackets omitted). “The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the
best interests of the children through the provision of reasonable expenses.”
Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Super. 2007).
As our Supreme Court has explained, the paternity by estoppel doctrine
permits a trial court to determine a child’s parentage for support purposes
based on the actions of the child’s mother and/or putative father.
Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that
because of a person’s conduct (e.g., holding out the child as his
own, or supporting the child) that person, regardless of his true
biological status, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will
the child’s mother who has participated in this conduct be
permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third
party is the true father. . . . [T]he doctrine of estoppel in paternity
actions is aimed at achieving fairness as between the parents by
holding them, both mother and father, to their prior conduct
regarding the paternity of the child.
Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Freedman v.
McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Pa. 1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Estoppel rests on the public policy that “children should be secure
in knowing who their parents are. If a certain person has acted as the parent
and bonded with the child, the child should not be required to suffer the
potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that the father
he had known all his life is not in fact his father.” T.E.B. v. C.A.B., 74 A.3d
170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2013).
The paternity by estoppel doctrine may apply in circumstances where
the child’s mother was never married to the putative father. See R.K.J. v.
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S.P.K., 77 A.3d 33 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 84 A.3d 1064 (Pa. 2014)
(affirming the finding of paternity by estoppel where the mother was married
to another man at the time of the child’s birth, and where the mother and the
putative father resided together for six years but never married). Moreover,
the paternity by estoppel doctrine may apply even where the putative father’s
relationship with the mother began years after the child’s birth and where it
was undisputed that the putative father was not the biological father. See
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 2002) (affirming the finding
of paternity by estoppel where the putative father did not begin a relationship
with the child’s mother until approximately three years after the child’s birth
and where it was undisputed that the child was not the putative father’s
biological child). In Hamilton, this Court made clear that the undisputed lack
of a biological relationship does not defeat the application of paternity by
estoppel. We explained,
[w]hile it is clear, and indeed was never in dispute, that [the
putative father] is not [the child’s] biological father, he has truly
acted as the child’s father and “the law cannot permit a party to
renounce even an assumed duty of parentage when by doing so,
the innocent child would be victimized.”
Id. at 407 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d
416, 419 (Pa. Super. 1976)).1
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1The putative fathers in R.K.J. and Hamilton both signed acknowledgements
of paternity despite knowing that they were not biological parents. R.K.J., 77
A.3d at 40; Hamilton, 795 A.2d at 404. Neither opinion explored the legal
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More recently, our Supreme Court held in K.E.M. that the paternity by
estoppel doctrine continues to remain good law in Pennsylvania. There, the
child’s mother sought child support from the alleged biological father, P.C.S.,
with whom she had an extramarital affair. The trial court held that the
mother’s husband, H.M.M., had held himself out as the child’s father and thus
was the father for support purposes under paternity by estoppel principles.
The majority decision, authored by then-Justice, and now-Chief Justice Saylor,
held that “paternity by estoppel continues to pertain in Pennsylvania” at
common law, but “only where it can be shown, on a developed record, that it
is in the best interests of the involved child.” Id., 38 A.3d at 810. The Court
remanded for further proceedings to determine whether paternity by estoppel
was in the child’s best interests. In a footnote, the Court suggested that courts
have been “most firm” in sustaining a finding of paternity based on the child’s
“need for continuity, financial support, and potential psychological security
arising out of an established parent-child relationship.” Id. at 810 n.12.
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relevance, if any, of those acknowledgments. Instead, the opinions focused
on the fact that the putative fathers held out the children to be their own and
acted as parents would act. See R.K.J., 77 A.3d at 40 (“[The putative father]
held himself out as [the child’s] father for almost six years, lived with [the
child] and his mother in his home, told [the child] that he was his father, and
provided all financial support for [the child.]”); Hamilton, 795 A.2d at 406
(quoting Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/01, at 3) (“[The putative father] has acted
as the [c]hild’s father . . . . The [c]hild calls [the putative father] “Dad” . . . .
[The putative father] refers to himself as the [c]hild's dad in the presence of
the [c]hild, [the m]other[,] and third parties.”).
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Following K.E.M., in a case with facts similar to the present case, we
held that paternity by estoppel applied to the appellant, who held himself out
as the child’s father despite not being the biological parent. R.K.J. v. S.P.K.,
77 A.3d 33 (Pa. Super. 2013). Unlike the child’s biological father, who had no
relationship with the child and who never met him, the appellant had held
himself out as the child’s father, lived with and interacted with the child for
nearly six years, told the child he was his father, and supported the child
financially. The evidence further demonstrated that it was in the child’s best
psychological interests for his relationship to continue with the appellant.
Following K.E.M., we held that paternity by estoppel obligated the appellant
to pay child support. Id., 77 A.3d at 38-40.
As in the foregoing decisions, the evidence in the present case supports
the trial court’s ruling of paternity by estoppel. Appellant had a long-term in
loco parentis relationship with Child that began when Child was an infant.
Child and Appellee lived in Appellant’s home for virtually the first twelve years
of Child’s life, during which time he held himself out as Child’s father, provided
most of Child’s financial support, listed Child as a dependent on seven years
of tax returns, and formed a close emotional bond with Child. After Appellee
and Child left Appellant’s residence, Child had a continued need for financial
support, as Appellant stopped all financial support and Appellee had to obtain
public assistance. Child also continued to need Appellant’s emotional support,
but Appellant stopped all contact with Child except for several isolated visits,
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causing Child to suffer an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
depression. Based on the fact that Appellant held out Child to be his own for
well over a decade, together with Child’s need for continued financial and
psychological support, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that it was in Child’s best interests for Appellant to be liable for child
support based upon paternity by estoppel.
Appellant argues that he is not required to pay support in view of our
Supreme Court’s decision in A.S. v. I.S., 130 A.3d 769 (Pa. 2013). We
disagree, as A.S. is both factually and legally distinguishable from this case.
In A.S., Mother had twin sons with the children’s biological father in
1998. In 2005, Mother married stepfather (“Stepfather”). Mother, Stepfather
and the children relocated to Pennsylvania. Stepfather never held children
out as his own, and the children clearly knew that Stepfather was not their
biological father. In 2009, Mother and Stepfather separated, and Stepfather
filed for divorce. When Mother announced her plan to relocate to California,
Stepfather filed a custody complaint and an emergency petition to prevent
Mother from relocating, asserting that he stood in loco parentis to the children.
Mother filed a complaint seeking child support. The trial court granted shared
custody, but without holding a hearing on the support issue, it held that
Stepfather did not owe support. Mother appealed.
Despite its observation that “in loco parentis status alone and/or
reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation relationship with stepchildren
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are insufficient to obligate a stepparent to pay child support for those
children,” id., 130 A.3d at 770, the Supreme Court held that Stepfather was
required to pay child support. Critical to the Court’s conclusion was the finding
that Stepfather took “far greater” steps “than that of a stepparent desiring a
continuing relationship with a former spouse’s children.” Id. He engaged in
a “relentless pursuit” of parental duties by “[haling] a fit parent into court,”
“litigat[ing] and obtain[ing] full legal and physical custody rights,” and
“assert[ing] those parental rights to prevent a competent biological mother
from relocating with her children.” Id. Consequently, “Stepfather has taken
sufficient affirmative steps legally to obtain parental rights and should share
in parental obligations, such as paying child support. Equity prohibits
Stepfather from disavowing his parental status to avoid a support obligation
to the children he so vigorously sought to parent.” Id. at 770-71. The
majority was careful to emphasize
that we are not creating a new class of stepparent obligors and
our decision today comports with the line of cases that have held
that in loco parentis standing alone is insufficient to hold a
stepparent liable for support. The public policy behind
encouraging stepparents to love and care for their stepchildren
remains . . . relevant and important today[.] However, when a
stepparent does substantially more than offer gratuitous love
and care for his stepchildren, when he instigates litigation to
achieve all the rights of parenthood at the cost of interfering with
the rights of a fit parent, then the same public policy
attendant to the doctrine of paternity by estoppel is
implicated: that it is in the best interests of children to have
stability and continuity in their parent-child relationships. By
holding a person such as Stepfather liable for child support, we
increase the likelihood that only individuals who are truly
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dedicated and intend to be a stable fixture in a child’s life will take
the steps to litigate and obtain rights equal to those of the child’s
parent.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
As can be seen, A.S. is factually distinguishable from the present case
in at least three important respects. First, unlike Stepfather in A.S., who
never held children out as his own, Appellant here held Child out as his own
and supported her financially for virtually her entire life, beginning when Child
was an infant and continuing for almost the next twelve years. Second, unlike
the children in A.S., who knew that Stepfather was not their natural parent, 2
Child and Appellant bonded in the same way a child bonds with her natural
parent, and Child became both psychologically and financially dependent upon
Appellant. Third, Stepfather in A.S. took affirmative action post-separation
from Mother to assert parental rights to the children. Because of these factual
differences, A.S. narrowly falls outside the contours of paternity by estoppel,
a point recognized in the dissent authored in A.S. by now-Chief Justice Saylor.
Id. at 772 (“the common law has recognized a presumption of paternity and
the doctrine[] of paternity by estoppel . . . neither of which appears to be the
basis for the majority’s decision”) (citation omitted). As a result, even though
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2 The fact a child may become aware that his putative father is not his
biological father, as here, is not necessarily fatal to a finding of paternity by
estoppel. While the law cannot prohibit a putative father from informing a
child of their true relationship, it can prohibit him from avoiding the obligations
that their assumed relationship would otherwise impose. K.E.M. 38 A.3d at
808.
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A.S. was not per se a paternity by estoppel case, the remedy applied in that
case was consistent with paternity by estoppel because it advanced the
same public policy, i.e., ensuring stability and continuity in the parent-child
relationship. The present case is distinguishable from A.S. because
Appellant’s duty to pay child support rests squarely upon paternity by
estoppel.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/22/2019
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