IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TAMEKE WRIGHT, §
§ No. 307, 2019
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1802015485
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 10, 2019
Decided: January 24, 2020
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule
26(c), her attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the State’s response, the Court
concludes that:
(1) In May 2018, a grand jury indicted the appellant, Tameke Wright, for
Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree. The charge arose from the death
of a fifteen-month-old child in her care. On February 1, 2019, Wright pled guilty in
exchange for the State agreeing not to ask for a life sentence. The Superior Court
ordered a pre-sentence investigation. On June 24, 2019, the Superior Court
sentenced Wright to forty years of Level V incarceration, suspended after thirty-five
years for decreasing levels of supervision. This appeal followed.
(2) On appeal, Wright’s counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, based upon a
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable
issues. Counsel informed Wright of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided
Wright with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.
(3) Counsel also informed Wright of her right to identify any points she
wished this Court to consider on appeal. Wright has submitted points for this Court’s
consideration.1 The State has responded to Wright’s arguments and has moved to
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(4) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an
adversary presentation.2
(5) Wright’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows: (i)
Counsel was ineffective; (ii) she was coerced to plead guilty and tried to withdraw
her guilty plea; and (iii) the State violated its discovery obligations under Superior
1
A relative of Wright submitted a letter with points. Counsel confirmed with Wright that she
wished for the Court to consider the points.
2
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).
2
Court Criminal Rule 16 and Brady v. Maryland.3 We do not address Wright’s
ineffective assistance of claims because we do not consider such claims for the first
time on direct appeal.4 After careful consideration of the remaining claims, we find
no merit to Wright’s appeal.
(6) Contrary to Wright’s contentions, the record reflects that her plea was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form,
Wright indicated that she freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty and that she
understood she was waiving certain constitutional rights. During the plea colloquy,
Wright affirmed that she had reviewed the plea agreement and Truth–In–Sentencing
Guilty Plea form with Counsel, no one threatened or forced her to plead guilty, she
understood she was facing a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment, and no
one promised her what the sentence would be. As Wright notes, she initially
answered “no” when the Superior Court asked her if she recklessly caused the death
of a child through abuse or neglect. She changed her answer to “yes” when the
Superior Court asked her the question again. When the Superior Court asked Wright
if her first answer was a mistake, she answered affirmatively. Absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, which she has not identified, Wright is bound
3
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4
Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).
3
by her representations during the plea colloquy and in the Truth-in-Sentencing
Guilty Plea Form.5
(7) Wright also contends that she attempted to withdraw her guilty plea as
permitted by Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d). That rule provides:
If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made
before imposition or suspension of sentence or disposition without entry of a
judge of conviction, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea
may be set aside only by motion under Rule 61.6
The Superior Court did not receive the letter in which Wright stated that she had
changed her mind and wished to go to trial until the day after her sentencing. At
sentencing, Wright did not say anything to the Superior Court judge about
withdrawing her guilty plea. There was no basis, therefore, for the Superior Court
to consider Wright’s wish to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing. Wright
may still pursue this claim under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 subject to
appellate review by this Court of any denial of postconviction relief.
(8) As to her discovery violation claims, Wright fails to identify the
discovery that was allegedly withheld from her. In any event, her knowing and
5
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d) (emphasis added).
4
voluntary guilty plea waived any objection to alleged errors and defects before entry
of the plea.7
(9) Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Wright’s
appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We
also are satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record
and the law and has properly determined that Wright could not raise a meritorious
claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
7
Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003); Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312–13 (Del.
1988).
5