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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11429
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00034-AW-GRJ
RONALD SATISH EMRIT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
DEFAULT RESOLUTION GROUP,
NELNET,
ACTION FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(October 7, 2020)
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ronald S. Emrit, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging constitutional and statutory violations arising out
of his student loans having been placed in default, as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as an abuse of the judicial process and for improper venue. On
appeal, Emrit argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his
complaint because he is not a vexatious filer, but instead, a zealous advocate. After
careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Emrit filed a pro se complaint against Betsy DeVos, the Secretary of the
United States Department of Education; Default Resolution Group; Nelnet; and
Action Financial Services (collectively, the “defendants”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Emrit invoked diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the defendants are residents
of Washington, D.C. (Secretary DeVos, Department of Education); Greenville,
Texas (Default Resolution Group); Lincoln, Nebraska (Nelnet); and either Central
Point or Medford, Oregon (Action Financial Services). Emrit claimed his residence
was Sarasota, Florida, and that he was filing the complaint in the three district courts
in Florida because he attended Saint Thomas University School of Law in Miami
Gardens and took the bar exam in Florida.
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Emrit generally alleged various constitutional and statutory violations as a
result of his student loans being placed in default, causing a 15% garnishment of his
Social Security disability checks. Emrit alleged that the garnishment amounted to
(1) breach of contract; (2) violation of his equal-protection rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments; (3) violation of his due-process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments; (4) violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; (5)
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; (7) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; (8) negligence; (9)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) tortious interference of privacy.
Emrit sought to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) granting
Emrit leave to proceed IFP and recommending that the complaint be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to the sua sponte screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The magistrate judge noted that this was Emrit’s fourth lawsuit
filed in the Northern District of Florida, he had been recognized as a serial pro se
filer of frivolous complaints in federal court, he had filed 260 pro se civil cases in
federal courts across the country, and he had filed this case simultaneously in seven
other districts. The magistrate judge found that it was improper and an abuse of the
judicial process to pursue identical claims in multiple jurisdictions.
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The magistrate judge agreed with the reasoning of a magistrate judge in the
Southern District of Texas, where Emrit filed an identical pleading, noting that his
claims should be dismissed as conclusory and frivolous. The magistrate judge
quoted the analysis of the Southern District of Texas that Emrit did not identify a
contract that was breached, did not connect his race to the garnishment of his
disability checks or to his Title VII claim, and did not connect his factual allegations
to the elements of his tort claims, and that Emrit’s claim that his disability precludes
garnishment was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.
The magistrate judge also found that Emrit failed to establish that the Northern
District of Florida was the proper venue for his case. The magistrate judge found
that Emrit failed to allege that any of the defendants would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the Northern District of Florida, and that the Middle District of Florida
might be the proper venue instead given Emrit’s claim of residency in Sarasota,
Florida. The magistrate judge acknowledged that under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) it could
transfer the case to the Middle District of Florida in the interest of justice, but it
declined to do so “in view of the patent frivolity of Plaintiff’s claims.”
Emrit filed a “Notice of Appeal” from the R&R. In his Notice of Appeal,
Emrit argued that his lawsuit was not frivolous because his credit score had been
hurt due to his defaulted loans and he had been homeless because of the garnishment
of his disability checks. Emrit further argued that his “national lawsuits” against a
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litany of other parties (none of which are part of this current lawsuit) were not
frivolous because the defendants in those suits had all undertaken some activity that
had negatively impacted him financially.
Construing Emrit’s Notice of Appeal as objections to the R&R, the district
court conducted a de novo review of the issues and adopted the R&R, granted Emrit
IFP status, and dismissed his complaint as frivolous for the reasons set forth by the
magistrate judge in the R&R.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2001). Dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is
appropriate where the complaint alleges legal theories that are without arguable
merit either in law or fact. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which governs in forma pauperis
proceedings, provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal - (i) is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
A plaintiff ordinarily should get one opportunity to amend his complaint
before dismissal with prejudice. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th
Cir. 2005). Amendment need not be granted, however, if the complaint would still
be subject to dismissal. Id.
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For pro se plaintiffs, courts are to liberally construe their pleadings and hold
them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Notwithstanding this relaxed standard, a party must
still “specifically and clearly” identify all issues on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.
Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). “[I]ssues not briefed on appeal
by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008). A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly
and prominently raise it. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
(11th Cir. 2014). “To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on
multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated
ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.” Id. at 680.
III. ANALYSIS
Here, at the outset, Emrit has abandoned any appellate challenge to the
multiple, independent grounds for the district court’s judgment because he failed to
address them in his brief. While Emrit asserts in his brief that he is a zealous
advocate, rather than a vexatious filer, he makes no argument that his claims are not
conclusory and frivolous or that it was not an abuse of the judicial process to pursue
identical claims in eight different jurisdictions. Emrit also completely fails to
address the issue of improper venue in his brief, nor does he argue that the district
court should have transferred his case to the Middle District of Florida. Emrit uses
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the remainder of his brief to discuss issues unrelated to the present case, such as his
relationships with numerous friends and acquaintances, his educational, medical,
and work histories, and various claims against other parties. Because Emrit has
abandoned any challenge to the multiple, independent grounds for the district court’s
judgment by failing to address those issues on appeal, it follows that the judgment is
due to be affirmed. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
Even if Emrit did not abandon his challenge to the grounds of the district
court’s judgment, the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing his claims as
frivolous. “A claim is frivolous if it is made without arguable merit in either law or
fact.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349. “[B]ecause district judges remain more familiar with
and are more experienced to recognize potentially frivolous claims . . . [a]
determination of frivolity is best left to the district court.” Id. Nevertheless, this
Court can consider a “litigant’s history of bringing unmeritorious litigation” when
analyzing the question of frivolousness. Id. at 1350.
Emrit identifies several claims but is unable to establish a connection between
the factual allegations in his complaint and any of the necessary elements of those
claims. Even construing his pleading liberally, his claims lack merit in either fact or
law. See id. at 1349. As the magistrate judge stated, Emrit’s allegations were
conclusory and lacked any legal basis for the claims. He also filed this case
simultaneously in multiple districts, thus abusing the judicial process. Although
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Emrit disputes that he is a “vexatious filer,” his multiple simultaneous and identical
filings belie that argument, as do his filings of some 260 pro se civil cases in federal
courts across the country. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Emrit’s complaint as frivolous and malicious under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Finally, because Emrit’s claims were frivolous and an abuse of judicial
process, the district court appropriately declined to transfer this case to a different
venue. The district court similarly did not err in not granting Emrit leave to amend,
since his amended pleading would still be subject to dismissal. Corsello, 428 F.3d
at 1014.
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Emrit’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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