IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0935
Filed October 7, 2020
JACKIE JERMAINE LANE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. Kepros,
Judge.
Jackie Jermaine Lane appeals the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Lanny M. Van Daele of Van Daele Law, LLC, North Liberty, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Jackie Jermaine Lane appeals the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). He contends his trial counsel was ineffective in
several respects. Because Lane has failed to prove counsel was ineffective, we
affirm the dismissal of his application.
Lane was convicted of first-degree robbery. See State v. Lane, No.
14-0065, 2015 WL 162070, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2015). On direct
appeal, this court found Lane had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights before giving a statement to Police Officers Jeremy Bossard and
Tom Hartshorn that “he had robbed the Creekside Market, named his accomplices,
and gave several details about the offense.” Id. at *1, *3.
On October 20, 2015, Lane filed a PCR application, asserting trial counsel
was ineffective in a number of ways. To prove counsel was ineffective, Lane had
the burden to prove trial counsel (1) “performed below the standard demanded of
a reasonably competent attorney” and (2) “‘that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142–43 (Iowa 2001)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). “If the claim lacks
prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the
attorney performed deficiently.” Id. at 142.
The PCR trial was held on February 28, 2019. The district court admitted
exhibits and heard testimony from Lane concerning his claims that trial counsel
was generally ill-prepared, failed to file a notice of the defense of diminished
responsibility, failed to seek to suppress an apology letter Lane wrote during his
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interview with the officers, and failed to request a jury instruction on the necessity
of corroborating evidence for a confession.1 The district court considered each of
these claims and concluded Lane failed to prove trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance. Trial counsel’s testimony was presented via deposition.
The district court first found: “A review of the record as a whole
demonstrates that [defense counsel] was adequately prepared throughout his
representation of Lane.”
Next, because defense counsel had Lane evaluated to assess the
possibility of a defense of diminished responsibility and obtained an opinion that
there was no basis to assert the defense, the court found defense counsel “did not
fail to perform an essential duty by not submitt[ing] notice of a defense which was
unsupported by the facts. However, even if [defense counsel] had such a duty,
there is no showing of prejudice.” The court noted that the rules of professional
conduct prohibit asserting an issue without basis in law and fact.
Third, as for the apology letter, the court wrote:
The only argument for suppression of the apology note not
encompassed in the findings that Lane’s Miranda waiver and
statements during interview were voluntary is Lane’s argument that
the officers used deception and coercion by asserting and/or
implying that the alleged victim was adversely psychologically
affected by the incident and that Lane’s letter would help her, which
in turn deceived Lane into assuming that the letter would only be
used for the purpose of helping the victim. However, there is no proof
that the officer’s comments were deceptive or coercive. The
statements made about the victim are consistent with the testimony
presented at trial. In other words, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that law enforcement’s statements to defendant about the
victim were in any way false. . . . Likewise, Lane has not cited any
1Lane raised new claims of ineffective assistance at trial that were not included in
his application. The State objected but the court overruled the objections and
considered the additional claims.
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case law in support of his proposition that the line of questioning
relating to the apology letter amounts to unlawful coercion. . . . Any
indirect implication that the letter used would be limited to providing
a benefit for the victim falls far short of being unlawfully coercive such
that the statements contained therein were involuntary.
Finally, with respect to the corroboration instruction, the court noted trial
counsel was aware of the instruction at the time of the trial but did not have any
specific recollection of his analysis about whether to request the instruction. In any
event, the district court ruled:
More importantly, there is no showing of prejudice in relation to the
failure to give a corroboration instruction because more than
adequate evidence was received at trial corroborating Lane’s
confession.
The court notes that Lane confessed to the offense and does
not argue that his confession was false. The jury received video of
the offense being committed and heard eyewitness testimony from
the victim of the robbery. The surveillance video showed a man
jumping over the counter who had a distinctive plaid hooded
sweatshirt, similar to the one Lane was seen wearing on
February 16, 2012. When Lane went to Mercy Hospital on March 6,
2012, officers observed that the tread on Lane’s shoes matched the
footprints found at the scene of the crime. Also, it was observed that
Lane’s pants were similar to those worn by the man who jumped over
the counter as shown on the surveillance video.
On our de novo review, see id. at 141, we come to the same conclusions
as did the district court. The district court provided a thorough statement of the
facts, issues, and the law, and a well-reasoned analysis. Further opinion by this
court would add little value. We therefore affirm. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d), (e).
AFFIRMED.