RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4041-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.A.M.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 21, 2021 – Decided April 29, 2021
Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-04-0344.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).
Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
1
We use initials for defendant's name to protect the identity of the minor victim.
See R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.A.M. appeals from the March 19, 2019 denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We
affirm for the reasons stated by Judge Regina Caulfield, P.J.Cr., in her
thoughtful, cogent, and well-reasoned fifty-one-page written decision.
Judge Caulfield was also the trial judge. Ultimately, defendant was
convicted by a jury of a lesser-included count of third-degree aggravated
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (count three); two counts of lesser-
included fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) (counts six
and nine); and second-degree child endangering, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) (count
ten). He was acquitted of six other counts, which included two counts of first -
degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2) (counts one and two);
two counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) (counts four
and five); and two counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2(c)(4) (counts seven and eight). Judge Caulfield sentenced defendant on
February 5, 2016, to concurrent terms—six years of imprisonment on the
second-degree endangering, count ten; four years on the third-degree sexual
assault, count three; and one year each on the fourth-degree criminal sexual
contact, counts six and nine. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct
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2
appeal; the only issue he raised was ineffective assistance of counsel, and it was
reserved for PCR. State v. C.A.M., No. A-2938-15 (App. Div. May 15, 2018)
(slip op. at 7).
Now on appeal, defendant raises the following:
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
PREPARE ADEQUATELY FOR TRIAL.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [THAT TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY TO OPPOSE THE
STATE'S MOTION TO ADMIT FRESH
COMPLAINT EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
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PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY TO OPPOSE THE
STATE'S MOTION TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENT IN EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY TO LITIGATE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PERMIT . . .
DEFENDANT TO CROSS-EXAMINE [THE
VICTIM] ABOUT [HER] PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY.
POINT V
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY TO LITIGATE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE
OF [THE VICTIM]'S PRIOR BAD ACTS.
POINT VI
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE [THAT TRIAL COUNSEL] DID NOT
PREPARE SUFFICIENTLY TO LITIGATE
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PERMIT THE
DEFENSE TO CROSS-EXAMINE [THE VICTIM]
ABOUT [HER] IMMIGRATION STATUS.
POINT VII
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL ON THE BASIS OF THE CUMULATIVE
EFFECT OF [TRIAL COUNSEL]'S ERRORS AND
LACK OF DILIGENCE.
As we have said, we rely on Judge Caulfield's comprehensive decision on
the merits of each and every point. We add only the following very brief
comments.
The proofs against defendant were strong. Not only did the victim testify,
during the trial defendant acknowledged purchasing a sex toy for the victim, his
then fourteen-year-old biological daughter, as he had in a previous statement
made to police. In addition to that statement, the State moved into evidence the
receipt for the purchase.
Defendant's trial counsel was disbarred on March 12, 2018, some three
years after the trial. But as Judge Caulfield thoroughly explained, whatever the
reasons for his disbarment, trial counsel obtained an excellent outcome for
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defendant in this particular case. In the opinion, Judge Caulfield mentioned
some of the strategic decisions that counsel made, to which he referred on the
record during the trial.
Counsel's effectiveness is established by the following. Instead of being
convicted of either of the two first-degree offenses, exposing him to ten to
twenty years of imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(1), defendant was found
guilty of one lesser-included third-degree crime, and sentenced to four years.
Instead of being convicted of any of the three counts of second-degree offenses,
exposing him to five to ten years of imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2),
defendant was found guilty of two lesser-included fourth-degree crimes, and
sentenced to concurrent one-year terms.
Affirmed.
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