[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16356 MAY 17, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00072-CV-5-CLS
JERRY WAYNE HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
R. L. BROWNLEE,
Acting Secretary of the Army,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 17, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jerry Wayne Hill, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army
(“Army”), his employer, on his claim that the Army failed to complete an
investigation of the discrimination claims alleged in his Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
“A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Rojas
v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 2002). A court shall grant summary
judgment when the evidence before it shows “that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “When deciding whether summary judgment is
appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom are
reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rojas, 285 F.3d at
1341-42 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
A federal employee plaintiff may bring an action in district court after 180
days from the filing of an EEO complaint if final action has not been taken by the
agency within that time period. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
Title VII confers no right of action against the enforcement agency. See Gibson v.
Missouri P. R. Co., 579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1978).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court properly
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determined that no cause of action exists for an agency’s failure to investigate an
EEO complaint within 180 days. Further, to the extent that Hill raises arguments
related to his remaining substantive claims, he did not establish that the district
court erred by granting summary judgment because his objection to the deputy
director to his job reassignment was insufficient to exhaust his claim. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Additionally, Hill provided no evidence to support his
allegation that two other white males were rejected for promotions by the U.S.
Army Material Command based on a policy favoring the promotion of females and
minorities or that Hill’s own applications for promotions were rejected based on
this policy. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for the Army on those claims.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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