[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
No. 06-11130 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-14058-CR-JEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VLADIMIR ISIDOR ST. LOUIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 15, 2007)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Vladimir Isidor St. Louis appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute,
and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846
and 841(a)(1) respectively. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
properly denied the motion to suppress drugs found in the vehicle in which St.
Louis was a passenger after finding that the police officer had probable cause to
stop the vehicle for driving after dark without its tail lights illuminated.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard,
“reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of
law to those facts de novo.”1 United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1035 (2005). All facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Heard, 367 F.3d 1275,
1278 (11th Cir. 2004).
On appeal, St. Louis argues that Florida law only requires that tail lights be
illuminated after sunset, and the officer’s testimony that it was 8:51 p.m. and dark
at the time of the stop was insufficient to prove that sunset had occurred.
Furthermore, according to St. Louis, the driver of the vehicle testified at trial that
he was driving with only fog lights, which leads to the conclusion that it was not
sufficiently dark to require head lights. Therefore, the stop was unreasonable, and
the court should have granted his motion to suppress.
1
Although generally the failure to file objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation requires us to review the issue for plain error, United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d
1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983), we note that St. Louis cannot succeed under either standard of
review.
2
An officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when there is probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
occurred. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999). The
subjective purpose of the officer is irrelevant, and we will only consider whether a
reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle. Id.
Florida law requires vehicles to be equipped with tail lights, which must be
illuminated at all times between sunset and sunrise. Fla. Stat. §§ 316.221,
316.217(1)(a). Under Florida law, “[a]ny police officer may at any time, upon
reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by
law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the driver of
the vehicle to stop.” Id. § 316.610(1).
Upon review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, we conclude that the district court’s factual findings
are supported by the undisputed testimony at the suppression hearing that the stop
occurred after dark. Heard, 367 F.3d at 1278. Accordingly, the district court did
not clearly err when it denied St. Louis’s motion to suppress and found that the
officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which St. Louis was riding for
driving at night without illuminated tail lights. Thus, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3