[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 19, 2008
No. 07-12836 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00977 CV-BBM-1
TEMIDAYO AJAKA,
FEHINTOLA AJAKA,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants,
versus
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING CORPORATION,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee,
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
BROOKSAMERICA MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(May 19, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and VINSON,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before us for the second time. The question presented is
whether plaintiffs’ claim for rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 se seq., and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639, is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel – because
plaintiff Temidayo Ajaka failed to reveal the claims to the bankruptcy court in his
Chapter 13 wage earner case with the intent to conceal them from the court in
order to gain an unfair advantage over his creditors. In Ajaka v. Brooksamerica
Mortgage Corporation et al., 453 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006), the plaintiffs
challenged the district court invocation of the doctrine to bar their claims on
summary judgment. We vacated the summary judgment, and remanded the case
for trial, because a material issue of fact that needed to be resolved: “whether
Ajaka had the motivation and intent to manipulate the judicial system under the
circumstances presented.” Id. at 1346.
On remand, the district court, following a bench trial, once again held that
the doctrine barred plaintiffs’ claims. As indicated in its dispositive order, the
*
Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
2
court found, on the basis of the testimony adduced, that Ajaka intended to
manipulate the judicial system: “Mr. Ajaka had both the knowledge of the claim
early enough, as well as motivation sufficient enough, to make a mockery of the
judicial system circumstances here . . . . Mr. Ajaka knew of his TILA claims well
before when he finally revealed them to the bankruptcy court, and . . .
affirmatively intended to conceal those claims in his bankruptcy proceeding, in
order to gain an unfair advantage over his lenders.” Order at 36. The evidence
fully supported these findings. The district court’s judgment is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED.
3