Case: 20-60484 Document: 00516197099 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/09/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 9, 2022
No. 20-60484
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Jaime Raul Almaguer Munoz,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A206 616 958
Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Jaime Raul Almaguer Munoz petitions for review of the order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the
immigration judge (IJ) denying his motion to reopen and rescind his in
absentia removal order. Almaguer Munoz brought his motion to reopen
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60484 Document: 00516197099 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/09/2022
No. 20-60484
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), asserting that he did not receive proper
notice of his removal proceedings because his attorney at the time did not
inform him of the hearing.
When the BIA affirms the IJ without opinion we review the IJ’s
decision. See Moin v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2003). A denial of
a motion to reopen is reviewed under “a highly deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Ramos-Portillo v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir.
2019). We review factual findings under the substantial evidence test,
meaning that we may not overturn factual findings unless the evidence
compels a contrary conclusion. Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994).
We review questions of law de novo. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 594 (5th
Cir. 2007).
Notice of Almaguer Munoz’s removal hearing was provided to his
attorney at the time, which constitutes constructive notice on Almaguer
Munoz. Men Keng Chang v. Jiugni, 669 F.2d 275, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1982).
Almaguer Munoz’s allegation that his then-attorney failed to advise him of
the removal hearing does not render the constructive notice defective. See
id. (rejecting alien’s claim that he did not receive notice of the BIA’s actions
because his counsel failed to advise him of such). Thus, the BIA did not abuse
its discretion in denying his motion to reopen for lack of notice. See Ramos-
Portillo, 919 F.3d at 958; see also § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a).
No other issues are adequately argued in the petitioner’s brief.
Accordingly, any other issues the brief attempts to raise are abandoned. See
Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Beasley v.
McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that, unlike pro se briefs,
counseled briefs are not entitled to liberal construction). The brief’s
statements that the BIA misused its summary affirmance procedure, that
exceptional circumstances prevented Almaguer Munoz from attending his
2
Case: 20-60484 Document: 00516197099 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/09/2022
No. 20-60484
hearing, and that Almaguer Munoz’s prior attorney was ineffective lacked
intelligible arguments and contained sparse citations to relevant authorities
and parts of the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Similarly, the
brief’s conclusory requests to amend or supplement the petition and to stay
Almaguer Munoz’s removal are abandoned.
Accordingly, Almaguer Munoz’s petition for review and the
incorporated motions are DENIED.
We add a further note of concern that the required statement of the
standard of review in the petitioner’s brief was limited to one issue and was
incorrect. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(B). The brief also lacked an
adequate statement of the issues, statement of the case, or summary of the
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5)-(7). Finally, disjointed arguments
were distributed under various headings without rhyme or reason. Counsel
is therefore WARNED that future frivolous filings could subject her to
sanctions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927; Fed. R. App. P. 38.
3