[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-14063 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar APRIL 2, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-14020-JEM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAWAYNE OWENS,
a.k.a. Tawane Owens,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 2, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Owens appeals her total 30-month sentence after pleading guilty to 12
counts of making false, fictitious or fraudulent claims to the government in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Owens contends that her sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the court did not state any fact-specific reason why it
sentenced her at the top of the guideline range in violation of § 3553(c)(2).
Additionally, she contends that no evidence suggests that the district court
considered the nature and circumstances of the offense or whether the sentence is
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the § 3553(a)(2) factors.
Owens also argues that her 30-month sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the court placed undue emphasis on her dishonesty to the
court about her education and medical condition. Placing an unreasonable weight
on a single factor made the court neglect the nature and circumstances of her
offense, leading to a sentence that was greater than necessary to achieve the
§3553(a)(2) factors. Also, she accepted responsibility, apologized for her
wrongdoing, and her crimes were not egregious.
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “The party
challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable in light of the
record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 674 (2010).
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In reviewing the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we ensure the
district court has taken steps such as considering the § 3553(a) factors and
adequately explaining the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597.
Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires, “The court, at the time of sentencing,
shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”
By so doing, the district court helps us to assess (along with other considerations)
whether the district court has imposed a reasonable sentence. Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-58, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69, 168 L.Ed.2d 203, 217-18
(2007). The appropriateness of the brevity or length of a district court’s reasons
for accepting or rejecting an argument depends upon the circumstances, leaving
much to the court’s judgment. Id., 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S.Ct. at 2468. Where the
context and the record make clear that the sentencing judge listened to each
argument and found the circumstances to warrant a sentence in the guideline
range, lengthy explanation is not necessarily required. Id., 551 U.S. at 356-57,
127 S.Ct. at 2468.
Concerning substantive reasonableness, we have “repeatedly held that the
weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is within the sound discretion of the district
court and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1161 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
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denied, 131 S.Ct. 1813 (2011). The district court is not required to state on the
record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2005). Notwithstanding, a district court abuses its discretion when it balances
the § 3553(a) factors unreasonably or places unreasonable weight on a single
factor. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1192-93.
We examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of
the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although
we do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline range to
be reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence imposed well
below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of a reasonable
sentence. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We
reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm. Owens has failed to show that the district court committed procedural
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error. To understand the fact-specific reasons why the court sentenced at the top
of the guideline range, one can review the record as a whole. The court
considered the nature and circumstances of her offense when it emphasized that
she was stealing from the government and that the taxpayers were hurt as a result.
Owens has not met her burden to prove that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence of imprisonment.
Since Owens continued to lie to the court, the district court could have reasonably
concluded that a sentence at the top of the guideline range was sufficient to deter
Owens from her commitment to crimes of fraud. The 30-month sentences of
imprisonment are only half of the statutory maximum allowed for each count of
Owens’s crime, making the sentences plausibly reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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