FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 11 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHABBIR AHMED FUAD, No. 15-73201
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-911-272
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 9, 2022**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges, and REISS,*** District Judge.
Petitioner Shabbir Ahmed Fuad, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks
review of a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the
District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of Petitioner’s application for
asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny
the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner did not
suffer past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Plancarte
Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (reviewing for substantial
evidence the factual findings that underlie the BIA’s denial of asylum and CAT
relief). Petitioner testified that a member of a rival political party beat him with a
flashlight and, afterwards, that Petitioner received several threats. But the single
beating did not result in any visible injury or medical treatment, and the threats
were not fulfilled. Without more, therefore, Petitioner’s cumulative experience in
Bangladesh does not compel a finding of past persecution. See Sharma v. Garland,
9 F.4th 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that the cumulative effect of
unfulfilled threats and beatings that resulted in no injury did not compel a finding
of past persecution); see also Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020–21 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that a single beating that required no medical treatment did not
compel a finding of past persecution); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that unfulfilled threats constituted “harassment rather than
persecution”).
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In addition, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner
failed to prove that he could not relocate safely within Bangladesh. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), 1208.16(b)(3)(i). After rival political members came to his
house and threatened him, Petitioner left home. But Petitioner remained in the
vicinity for the next ten months, staying within thirty kilometers of his home and
even returning home “from time-to-time” to live with his father. Petitioner never
experienced any other attacks or confrontations. Thus, Petitioner’s fear that he will
be targeted throughout Bangladesh some nine years after he left is not objectively
reasonable. See Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that speculative fear of future harm cannot support an asylum claim).
Accordingly, the BIA permissibly concluded that Petitioner did not meet his
burden of proof for asylum.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner
failed to show that he will “more likely than not” face torture by, or with the
consent or acquiescence of, the government if returned to Bangladesh. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). No evidence in the record shows that Petitioner
had been tortured previously. And a petitioner’s generalized fear of the possibility
of harm in the future, no matter how sincere, cannot compel a conclusion contrary
to that reached by the agency. See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th
3
Cir. 2018) (holding that a generalized threat of future harm “does not provide a
sufficient basis to conclude that any harm . . . would rise to the level of torture”).
Thus, the BIA permissibly denied CAT relief.
PETITION DENIED.
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