NUMBER 13-20-00513-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF INGLESIDE, TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
Appellant the City of Corpus Christi, Texas appeals the trial court’s judgment in
favor of appellee the City of Ingleside, Texas, which permits Ingleside to exercise
jurisdiction over and tax “wharves, piers, docks, and similar man-made structures that (a)
originate on certain land which is either within [its] city limits or is within its extra territorial
jurisdiction and that (b) project into adjacent waters of Nueces Bay and Corpus Christi
Bay.” By one issue, Corpus Christi contends the trial court improperly concluded that
structures attached to the shoreline, which extend into the water, belong to Ingleside. We
affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS
Ingleside filed suit against Corpus Christi on December 14, 2011, seeking a
declaration that it was permitted to exercise jurisdiction over and tax “wharves, piers,
docks, and similar man-made structures that (a) originate on certain land which is either
within [Ingleside’s] city limits or is within its extra territorial jurisdiction and that (b) project
into adjacent waters of Nueces Bay and Corpus Christi Bay.” On May 22, 2019, Ingleside
filed a motion for a partial traditional summary judgment arguing that because it had
annexed the northern shoreline of the bays, it had jurisdiction over the structures and
property in the waters of the bays.
On June 24, 2019, Ingleside’s live pleading alleged that the issue before the trial
court had been “definitively resolved” in In re Occidental Chemical Corp. 561 S.W.3d 146
(Tex. 2018) (“Oxy”) Ingleside argued that “The fast land area of San Patricio County in
which the Oxy structures and related facilities at issue are affixed are within the city limits,
or boundary, of Ingleside.” According to Ingleside, the facilities include “all the structures
at issue that extend outward from Ingleside’s mainland over the waters of the La Quinta
Channel/Corpus Christi Bay, [and] are part of Ingleside for the same reasons Oxy’s Alpha
and Beta Piers were determined in [Oxy] to be part of San Patricio County.” Ingleside,
therefore requested that the trial court issue a summary judgment
declaring as a matter of law that “shoreline” as used in the Shoreline
Ordinances includes structures attached to the fast land in Ingleside,
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including the entirety of those structures which extend into and over the
water, and therefore (1) the Ingleside Shoreline Area is squarely within the
meaning of “shoreline” as used to define Ingleside’s municipal jurisdiction,
and (2) the Ingleside Shoreline Area, including the Structures, is within
Ingleside’s municipal boundary.
Ingleside sought a declaration: (1) construing the legal meaning of the term “shoreline”
as a jurisdictional boundary”; (2) clarifying the areas landward and seaward of the
“shoreline” in which Ingleside and Corpus Christi have the respective rights, duties and
obligations of municipal governance, including, without limitation, the duties and
obligations to provide essential municipal services” including, among other things, street
maintenance, medical, law enforcement and fire department services; and (3)
[that] as a matter of law . . . “shoreline” as used in the Shoreline Ordinances
includes structures attached to the fast land in Ingleside, including the
entirety of those structures which extend into and over the water, and
therefore (1) the Ingleside Shoreline Area is squarely within the meaning of
“shoreline” as used to define Ingleside’s municipal jurisdiction, and (2) the
Ingleside Shoreline Area, including the Structures, is within Ingleside’s
municipal boundary. The Court’s summary judgment should of course
include a declaration that Ingleside, not Corpus Christi, is entitled to receive
ad valorem taxes generated from the Structures at issue here, including,
without limitation, Oxy’s Alpha and Beta Piers.
Corpus Christi, likewise, filed a competing motion for summary judgment, and on
July 2, 2019, the trial court held a summary judgment hearing. On July 8, 2019, the trial
court granted Ingleside’s motion for summary judgment and denied Corpus Christi’s
motion. Ingleside moved for entry of partial judgment on August 12, 2019 requesting an
“interlocutory judgment.” Corpus Christi filed objections to the proposed partial
“interlocutory judgment” and a motion to set aside and vacate the prior summary judgment
arguing that Oxy does not apply to the facts of this case. Ingleside responded on
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December 6, 2019 arguing that Corpus Christi never disputed the material facts of this
case; thus, Oxy applies.
On December 13, 2019, the trial court signed an “interlocutory judgment” in favor
of Ingleside. The trial court recognized that “the cities share a common boundary, which
is at the shoreline of Corpus Christi Bay,” and it declared, in pertinent part that (1)
Ingleside “has not annexed any territory already within the city limits or extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the City of Corpus Christi,” (2) Ingleside’s jurisdiction “extends to the
shoreline and includes all piers, docks, bulkheads, wharves, and similar facilities and
structures that are attached to the ‘fast land’ or as they become attached to the ‘fast land’
and includes the entirety of any such facility or structure which extends into and over the
waters of Corpus Christi Bay,” and (3) “all such structures are within the municipal
boundary of the City of Ingleside,” which can tax those properties. On October 27, 2020,
the trial court signed a final judgment stating, “By its own terms, the Interlocutory
Judgment ‘disposes of all claims in this lawsuit with the exception of City of Ingleside’s
claim for costs under the [Uniform] Declaratory Judgments Act, including reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees and expenses.’” The trial court noted that it held a hearing on
September 30, 2020, on the issue of attorney’s fees and expenses and awarded
attorney’s fees to Ingleside. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court’s granting of a traditional motion for summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. Franks v. Roades, 310 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2010, no pet.) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215
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(Tex. 2003); Branton v. Wood, 100 S.W.3d 645, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2003, no pet.)). “We must determine whether the movant met its burden to
establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. When both parties move for summary judgment on the
same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we consider the
summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determine all questions presented,
and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Tarr v. Timberwood Park
Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
By its sole issue, Corpus Christi contends that Ingleside improperly annexed an
area of water containing structures attached to the shoreline that is within Corpus Christi’s
jurisdiction and that because the structures in the water are partly in its jurisdiction,
Corpus Christi is entitled to received ad valorem taxes generated by these structures.
Ingleside argues that the trial court properly determined that the structures should be
treated as part of the land as held by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Occidental
Chemical Corp., 561 S.W.3d at 150. It is undisputed that the boundary between Corpus
Christi and Ingleside is located at the natural shoreline and that the structures, which
include piers and similar facilities, are constructed on Ingleside land but extend into and
over water that is within Corpus Christi’s jurisdiction.
In Oxy, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed “whether piers and similar facilities
constructed along a shoreline that forms the boundary between two local jurisdictions
should be treated as part of the land or part of the water.” Id. at 163. The parties, San
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Patricio County and Nueces County disputed the boundary between them.1 Id. at 150.
Both counties had for years “taxed the same piers, docks, and other facilities affixed to
the land—San Patricio County—but extending out into the water—Nueces County.” Id.
Oxy owned “two massive commercial piers extending from the mainland of San Patricio
County into the waters of Corpus Christi Bay that lie in Nueces County.” Id. Oxy had paid
taxes to both San Patricio and Nueces Counties and did not take a side wishing merely
to be relieved of double taxation. Id.
Persuaded by authority from other jurisdictions, the Oxy court agreed that “piers
should be treated as an extension of the shoreline rather than as a part of the [water].” Id.
at 163–64. The Oxy court reasoned that “[t]his result is consistent with the common law
and statutory rights of littoral and riparian owners. The right to construct docks, piers, and
similar facilities is subservient to the ownership of property abutting the natural shoreline.”
Id. at 164. The Oxy court stated that “Nueces County cannot practically render services
such as fire and police protection to Oxy’s Piers, while San Patricio County can easily
access the Piers from the land” and “Nueces County can do little, if anything, to improve
the value of Oxy’s Piers, and nothing to provide public conveniences, as San Patricio
County can.” Id. at 163. The court further pointed out that “[t]he common law . . . firmly
recognizes that the right to construct docks, piers, and similar facilities from the shore into
the water springs from the ownership of the upland property bordering the shore, rather
than from the submerged lands on which portions of those facilities are constructed,” and
therefore, the common law “supports treating docks, piers, and similar permanent
1 Ingleside is located in San Patricio County and Corpus Christi is located in Nueces County.
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facilities that are connected to the mainland of San Patricio County as a part of that
county.” Id. at 165. Ultimately, the supreme court determined that Nueces County could
not tax Oxy. Id. (directing “the Nueces County Appraisal District to withdraw and cease
from issuing tax assessments to Oxy for its Piers and other facilities which we have held
to be part of San Patricio County”).
This dispute is analogous to the dispute in Oxy. See id. Here, the undisputed
evidence shows that the structures located on the water are connected to the mainland
located in Ingleside. Some are the very same structures that were the subject of the Oxy
dispute. See id. Therefore, for the reasons stated in Oxy, we similarly conclude that the
“piers, docks, bulkheads, wharves, and similar facilities and structures that are
constructed and attached to the ‘fast land’” are part of Ingleside’s jurisdiction as a matter
of law.2 See id. We overrule Corpus Christi’s sole issue.3
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
16th day of June, 2022.
2 The Oxy court stated that it was not “reasonable “to consider Oxy’s piers as spine-like extensions
of San Patricio County's boundary.” In re Occidental Chem. Corp., 561 S.W.3d 146, 163 (Tex. 2018).
Likewise, here we do not consider the structures at issue as extensions of Ingleside. See id. Thus, our
decision does not change the boundary between Corpus Christi and Ingleside. As in Oxy, we are merely
clarifying which side may tax the structures on the water, which is undisputedly in Corpus Christi’s
jurisdiction. See id. Moreover, we emphasize that a city’s boundary cannot be infringed upon by another
city annexing property in another city’s jurisdiction.
3By a sub-issue to its first issue, Corpus Christi argues that if we reverse the trial court’s judgment,
then we must reverse its award of attorney’s fees to Ingleside. Because we have not reversed the judgment,
we need not address this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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