[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 19, 2008
No. 07-14214 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00714- CV-ODE-1
MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-
Appellees,
versus
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-
Appellants,
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendant.
_______________
No. 07-14235
_______________
D. C . Docket No. 06-00714-CV-1
MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-
Appellees,
versus
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants,
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant-
Appellant.
________________
No. 07-15200
________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00714 CV-ODE-1
MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-
Appellees,
versus
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-
Appellants.
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_______________
No. 07-15865
_________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00714 CV-ODE-1
MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION,
MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Claimants-
Defendants-Appellees,
versus
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC,
ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC.,
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(September 19, 2008)
Before DUBINA, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Alcatraz Media, LLC, Alcatraz Media, Inc. (collectively
“Alcatraz”), and William Windsor appeal the district court’s grant of Appellee
Maid of the Mist’s (“Maid”) motion for summary judgment. Additionally,
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Alcatraz and Windsor appeal the district court’s order granting permanent
injunctive relief against them. Alcatraz and Windsor also appeal the district
court’s order granting Maid attorney’s fees and costs.
We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo,
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. See Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr, 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). We
review the scope of a district court’s order granting permanent injunctive relief for
abuse of discretion. See Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. March & McLennan Cos. Inc., 404
F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
After reviewing the record, reading the parties’ briefs, and having the
benefit of oral argument, we conclude the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Maid on its claim for tortious interference with business operations
and properly issued a permanent injunction against Alcatraz and Windsor. The
record demonstrates that Alcatraz and Windsor: (1) acted improperly and without
privilege; (2) acted purposely and maliciously with the intent to injure Maid; (3)
induced third parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with
Maid; and (4) caused Maid financial injury. Thus, the permanent injunction was
properly granted because Maid demonstrated success on the merits, continuing
irreparable injury, and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.
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We also conclude from the record that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in Maid’s favor on Alcatraz’s counterclaims for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, and slander, in violation of the Georgia Fair
Business Practices Act. Alcatraz’s counterclaims were meritless, and Alcatraz
asserted these claims to cause Maid unnecessary financial hardship. Because we
see no merit to any of the arguments Alcatraz or Windsor make in this appeal, we
affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment and its order granting
permanent injunctive relief.
Similarly, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Maid
is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses for its successful tortious
interference claim under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 based on Alcatraz and Windsor’s
stubbornly litigious pre-suit conduct that gave rise to this litigation. See Paul v.
Destito, 250 Ga. App. 631, 642, 550 S.E.2d 739, 749-750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that a plaintiff can recover fees and expenses for successful claims and
cannot recover fees and expenses for unsuccessful claims, abandoned claims, or
counterclaim defenses).
We have concerns, however, about the district court’s lack of explanation as
to the amount of fees and expenses it awarded. Although the district court has
considerable latitude in formulating attorney’s fee awards, it must describe its
calculation of attorney’s fees and expenses to provide this court an adequate and
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informed basis for review. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 931 F.2d 811, 814 (11th
Cir. 1991). Conclusory statements about the appropriateness of fees and expenses
awarded do not allow for meaningful review. See Norman v. Hous. Auth. of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The court’s order on
attorney’s fees must allow for meaningful review–the district court must articulate
the decisions it made, give principled reasons for those decisions, and show its
calculation.”).
Here, the district court’s limited explanation of its award of attorney’s fees
and expenses precludes meaningful review. The district court stated the amount of
fees and expenses it awarded and described them as “reasonable” considering
Alcatraz and Windsor’s conduct and “the billing judgment exercised in similar
cases in the Atlanta market for comparable legal services.” On appeal, Alcatraz
and Windsor argue that certain specific time and expense entries are not
recoverable because many do not relate to Maid’s successful tortious interference
claim and because those that do are excessive. Because the district court provided
such a limited explanation of its calculations, we cannot address these arguments
adequately on appeal.
Although the district court properly found that the hourly rates were
reasonable, it did not delineate which hours and entries were excluded or reduced
as relating to (1) the unsuccessful claims, (2) the defense of counterclaims, and (3)
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the numerous hours that Alcatraz alleges were excessive for the tasks performed.
A blanket twenty-five percent reduction, without explanation as to why such
reduction was appropriate under the circumstances and what hours in the above
categories were excluded, does not resolve our concerns. Further, the district
court failed to address the appropriateness of certain expense entries that Alcatraz
and Windsor claim are inappropriate or excessive, including, among other things,
approximately $19,000 for private jet flights, $25,000 for photocopying, and bills
from Brooks Brothers.
Nothing herein should imply that the total amounts awarded were
unreasonable. Rather, we simply cannot conduct meaningful review of whether or
not they were. Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and expenses
and remand to the district court for reconsideration of the award with a full,
explicit explanation of the reasons for the district court’s determination of these
amounts.
AFFIRMED, IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED, IN PART.
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