concurring.
I agree that, under the statutory provisions existing at the time of GHovanont's termination, he was not discharged for good cause and thus was entitled to unemployment benefits. I am concerned, however, that some readers may mistakenly apply the reasoning employed today to invalidate recent changes to the applicable statute. Today's analysis works for the prior statute, but not necessarily for the current revised statute,
The majority's analysis is based largely upon the legislature's initial declared purpose of the Act, which included providing payments to persons unemployed "through no fault of their own." Indiana Code § 22-4-1-1. But the General Assembly's 2009 amendments to the Act included "provisions directly addressing the issues raised by this litigation," as noted in footnote 3 of the majority opinion. Among the amendments was the expansion of the definition of "Discharge for just cause" to now include "knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer, including a rule regarding attendance." Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2). This provision appears to apply even if an employee is absent for reasons beyond the employee's control. In contrast, the subsection immediately following, which applies "if an employer does not have a rule regarding attendance," will now allow an employee to "show good cause for absences or tardiness." Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(8) (emphasis added).
While footnote 3 in today's opinion declares "We express no opinion as to the statute as amended," I am concerned that readers may nevertheless mistakenly apply the majority's reasoning to future cases construing the 2009 amendments. The majority's broad application of the "no fault" aspect of the declared legislative purpose to the prior statutory provisions that govern the present case may be misunderstood to govern the 2009 amendments, which supersede the initial "no fault" policy. These recent changes clearly express the legislature's intention to include within "Discharge for just cause" a discharge for a knowing violation of a proper attendance rule that includes application to absences without employee fault. While prior law, applicable here to Giova-noni, precludes a no-fault attendance poli-ey, such result will not be required under current law.
SHEPARD, C.J., joins.