UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4698
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS LEE TERRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:00-cr-00162-F-1)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Lee Terry appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. He contends that the sentence was unreasonable because
the district court did not address his assertion that his
deafness caused him problems in prison. We affirm.
We will not disturb a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for [G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Although a district court “ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider
the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Sentencing
Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and
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factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006).
During the revocation hearing, Terry’s counsel
informed the court that in the past, Terry “has had [ ] a
difficult time in the prison system,” and that he had “a
difficult time in county jails.” He informed the court that, in
the county jail, they were not aware that he was deaf, and
thought he was ignoring directions and orders. Counsel also
asserted that many of Terry’s institutional infractions may have
been due to Terry’s deafness. Although counsel asked the court
to “take into consideration the fact that [Terry] is deaf and
has a hard time in the prison system,” he did not request any
particular sentence.
In determining Terry’s revocation sentence, the
district court considered the Chapter Seven policy statements,
the statutory requirements, and the relevant factors in
§ 3553(a). The court concluded that a twenty-four-month
sentence was appropriate based on how quickly Terry returned to
criminal conduct upon his release, the dangerousness of his
criminal conduct, and his criminal history. The court found
that a twenty-four-month sentence would promote respect for the
law and deter criminal conduct. In light of Terry’s deafness,
the court recommended that he be confined in a correctional
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institution that will afford him treatment for his hearing
disorder.
This sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 437-39. The court complied with the requirements of
sentencing and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
twenty-four-month sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the
revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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