Slip. Op. 99 - 12
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: RICHARD W. GOLDBERG, JUDGE
MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Court No. 96-06-01529
Defendant,
and
LG SEMICON CO., LTD., and
LG SEMICON AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
[Final Results in the first administrative review of an antidumping
duty order of the U.S. Department of Commerce is sustained in part,
and remanded in part.]
Dated: January 28, 1999
Hale & Dorr, LLP (Gilbert B. Kaplan, Michael D. Esch, Paul W.
Jameson, Cris R. Revaz, and John M. Ryan), for plaintiff Micron
Technology, Inc.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice (Cynthia B. Schultz); Office of the
Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United States
Court No. 96-06-01529 Page 2
Department of Commerce (Patrick V. Gallagher, Jr. of counsel,for
defendant.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP (Michael P. House
and Raymond Paretzky), for defendant-intervenors LG Semicon Co.,
and LG Semicon America, Inc.
OPINION
GOLDBERG, Judge: In this action, the Court reviews certain
aspects of the Department of Commerce’s ("Commerce") Notice of
Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review: Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above From
the Republic of Korea, 61 Fed. Reg. 20216 (May 6, 1996) ("Final
Results"). More specifically, plaintiff, Micron Technology, Inc.
("Micron"), petitioner in the underlying administrative review,
contests five aspects of the Final Results.
The Court exercises jurisdiction to review this motion for
judgment on the agency record pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)
(1994). The Court sustains the Final Results in part, and
remands in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
Micron, a U.S. manufacturer of dynamic random access memory
semiconductors ("DRAMS"), filed a petition with Commerce in April
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1992, alleging that Korean producers of DRAMS were selling
subject merchandise in the United States at less than fair value.
Following an antidumping investigation, Commerce published an
antidumping order on DRAMS from Korea in May 1993. See 58 Fed.
Reg. 27520 (May 10, 1993).
In the first anniversary month of the order, three Korean
respondents, including LG Semicon Co., Ltd. and LG Semicon
America, Inc. (collectively "LG Semicon"), and Micron requested
an administrative review of the DRAMS order.1 On June 15, 1994,
Commerce initiated a review of the three Korean manufacturers,
covering the period October 29, 1992 through April 30, 1994. See
Notice of Initiation of Antidumping Administrative Review, 59
Fed. Reg. 30770, 30771 (1994). In the Final Results of the
review, Commerce assigned a dumping margin of 0.00% to LG
Semicon. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 20222.
Micron objects to five aspects of Commerce’s Final Results
as they pertain to LG Semicon. It asserts that Commerce erred
1
The underlying administrative review was conducted prior
to January 1, 1995. Consequently, the applicable law in this
case is the antidumping statute as it existed prior to the
amendments made by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). See Torrington Co. v. United
States, __ Fed. Cir. (T) __, __, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352 (1995).
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(1) when it calculated LG Semicon’s research and development
("R&D") costs; (2) in its treatment of LG Semicon’s royalty
payments; (3) when it decided to allocate certain indirect
selling expenses reported by LG Semicon; (4) in its treatment of
LG Semicon’s reported loan fees; and (5) in its treatment of LG
Semicon’s U.S. trading company. Commerce agrees with Micron only
insofar as it requests that the first issue, the calculation of
R&D expenses, should be remanded for further review. Commerce
opposes the remaining challenges to the Final Results. LG
Semicon opposes all challenges.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Commerce’s determination will be sustained if it is
supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise
in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1994).
To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation of the
statute is in accordance with law, the court applies the two-
prong test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron first
directs the court "to determine whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842-43
(internal quotations and citations omitted). In doing so, the
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court must inquire "whether Congress’s purpose and intent on the
question at issue is judicially ascertainable." Timex V.I., Inc.
v. United States, __ Fed. Cir. (T) __, , 157 F.3d 879, 881 (1998)
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9). Congress’s purpose
and intent must be divined using the traditional tools of
statutory construction. Id. at 882 (citation omitted). Of
course, the "first and foremost tool to be used is the statute’s
text," and "if the text answers the question, that is the end of
the matter." Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted). In
addition to the plain language of the statute, the other tools
include, the statute’s structure, canons of statutory
interpretation, and legislative history. See id. (citing Dunn v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 117 S.Ct. 913, 916-20 (1997);
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-63; Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. United
States, 123 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). If, using these
tools, Congress’s intent is unambiguous as to the issue at hand,
then the court must give effect to the intent of Congress.
On the other hand, if Congress’s intent is "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at
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843 (footnote omitted). Thus, the second prong of the Chevron
test directs the court to consider the reasonableness of an
agency’s interpretation.
If asked to review Commerce’s factual findings, the court
will uphold the agency if its findings are supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence is something more
than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support
a conclusion." Ceramica Regiomenta, S.A. v. United States, 10
CIT 399, 405, 636 F. Supp. 961, 966 (1986) (citations omitted),
aff’d, 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987). In applying
this standard, the court affirms Commerce’s factual
determinations so long as they are reasonable and supported by
the record as a whole, even if there is some evidence that
detracts from the agency’s conclusions. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd.
v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 130, 744 F.2d 1556, 1563
(1984).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Calculation of R&D Expenses
Micron first argues that Commerce’s calculation of LG
Semicon’s research and development ("R&D") expenses is incorrect.
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Micron points in particular to Commerce’s statement that it
"relied on LGS’s accounting system to determine the total R&D
figure applicable to the analysis: it amortized any R&D expenses
that LGS amortized in its own books and records and it expensed
any R&D expenses that LGS expensed." Final Results, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 20219. Micron contends that Commerce acted contrary to this
statement in the Final Results: it correctly included R&D
expenses from LG Semicon’s financial statements that were
incurred in 1993, yet erroneously failed to include other R&D
expenses that were also expensed in 1993, though incurred and
amortized prior to 1993. Micron asserts that the nature of this
error is clerical. Therefore, Micron requests that the Court
remand to Commerce with instructions to include in its R&D
calculation all costs expensed in 1993, regardless of whether the
R&D expenses were actually incurred in 1993.
Commerce agrees that a remand is appropriate on this issue.
More specifically, Commerce requests that the Court remand "to
reconsider its calculation of LG Semicon’s R&D costs incurred in
1993 in light of this Court’s remand to Commerce in the LTFV
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investigation,2 ordering Commerce to amortize LG Semicon’s R&D
expenses, rather than expense them in its calculation." See
Def.’s Br. In Opp. to Mot. for J. on the Agency R., at 2.
The Court first notes that a remand request by Commerce
should not dictate the action subsequently taken by the court.
See Gulf States Tube Div. of Quanex Corp. v. United States, 21
CIT __, __, 981 F. Supp. 630, 647 (1997). Nonetheless, the Court
deems that a remand is appropriate in this instance, but for
reasons other than those articulated by plaintiff and defendant.
As noted above, Micron cites to Commerce’s Final Results for
the proposition that Commerce intended to "amortize[] any R&D
expenses that LGS amortized in its own books and records and []
expense[] any R&D expenses that LGS expensed." Final Results, 61
Fed. Reg. at 20219. Micron’s citation, however, obscures the
context of Commerce’s statement. As evidenced below, the
statement excerpted by Micron falls, not within a discussion of
how to calculate total R&D expenses, but rather how to calculate
a specific type of R&D expense, purchased R&D.
2
The parties appealed various aspects of Commerce’s final
determination in the less-than-fair-value investigation,
including certain R&D issues. See Micron Technology, Inc. v.
United States, 19 CIT 829, 893 F. Supp. 21 (1995) ("Micron I").
Court No. 96-06-01529 Page 9
Comment 6: LGS asserts that the Department should accept
amortization of purchased R&D amounts over the relevant
contract period. LGS argues that the Department’s
decision in the preliminary determination to expense
purchased R&D in the year incurred is inconsistent with
the CIT decision in the less-than-fair-value
investigation. See Micron I. LGS asserts that the
Micron decision requires the Department to amortize R&D
expenses over the life cycle of the product.
The petitioner argues that LGS’s own financial statements
expensed purchased R&D in the year incurred. Therefore,
all payments related to the purchased R&D should be
acknowledged in the year in which they were incurred,
since this is how the expenses were recorded in the
company’s books and records.
DOC Position: We agree with petitioner that LGS’s
purchased R&D expenses should be acknowledged in the year
in which they were incurred, since this is how the
expenses were recorded in the company’s books and
records. See LGS COP/CV Verification Report of July 26,
1995 at page 8. Moreover, the [Micron I] decision
requires the Department to allow the allocation of R&D
expenses over time, when the allocation is made in
accordance with generally accepted accounting practices
in effect in the home country, and when Commerce is
satisfied that those principles reasonably reflect the
costs associated with the production of the subject
merchandise. In this case, although the Korean GAAP may
allow LGS to amortize its purchased R&D over a given
period, LGS did not do so. Rather, LGS expensed
purchased R&D for its financial statements, and amortized
it over a longer period for the antidumping response. In
these calculations, the Department relied on LGS’s
accounting system to determine the total R&D figure
applicable to the analysis: it amortized any R&D expenses
that LGS amortized in its own books and records and it
expensed any R&D expenses that LGS expensed.
Final Results, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20219. Contrary to what Micron
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would have the Court believe, when placed in context it is not
apparent whether Commerce intended the excerpted statement, i.e.,
the last sentence, to serve as a methodology for calculating all
R&D expenses, or only purchased R&D expenses. That is, it can be
inferred that the phrase "[i]n these calculations," from the last
sentence refers to the calculation of purchased R&D expenses, not
total R&D expenses, thereby implying that the R&D expenses
referred to later in the sentence are also purchased R&D
expenses.3
On the other hand, the Court agrees that the last sentence
could also be construed as an attempt to establish Commerce’s
methodology for calculating all R&D expenses, not just purchased
R&D expenses. Because the Court does not presume to opine on
which view Commerce actually holds, it is appropriate to remand
this issue so that Commerce may clarify the meaning of this last
sentence from Comment 6. In doing so, Commerce should clarify
3
If this is the case, the existing margin calculation,
i.e., where purchased R&D costs are expensed in the year
incurred, makes sense. In other words, when Commerce relied on
LG Semicon’s accounting system to calculate purchased R&D
expenses, it effectively excluded the option of amortizing
purchased R&D expenses because, as Commerce points out, LG
Semicon’s records acknowledged its purchased R&D expenses in the
year in which they were incurred, not on an amortized basis.
Court No. 96-06-01529 Page 11
the precise methodology it has used to calculate total R&D
expenses. This is not a simple remand to correct for a clerical
error; because Commerce failed to articulate clearly whether the
methodologies used to calculate total R&D expenses as opposed to
purchased R&D expenses are the same or different, it must do more
than correct for a clerical error.
The Court also cautions that Commerce should ensure that its
clarified methodology is non-distortive and that it accurately
and reasonably reflects costs. In particular, the Court notes
that if Commerce continues to base its total R&D figure on those
costs expensed in 1993, it should refrain from including in this
figure those R&D costs expensed in 1993, yet incurred prior to
1993. Basing the total R&D figure on costs actually incurred and
expensed in 1993 plus costs expensed in 1993, yet incurred prior
to 1993 conflates the amortizing and expensing methodologies and
is plainly distortive. It effectively results in double counting
and, as such, should be rejected. See, e.g., Hussey Copper, Ltd.
v. United States, 17 CIT 993, 999-1000, 834 F. Supp. 413, 420
(1993) (ordering remand to correct for possible double counting
of credit expense).
Court No. 96-06-01529 Page 12
B. Treatment of Royalty Payments
Micron contends that Commerce erred when it declined to make
a circumstance of sale ("COS") adjustment to account for alleged
differences in LG Semicon’s royalty payments. Specifically,
Micron argues that because different royalties were paid to two
customers depending on whether the merchandise was sold in the
United States or home market and because the royalties were paid
on the basis of sales value, a COS adjustment to U.S. and home
market prices should have been made to account for the alleged
discrepancy. This claim is without merit.
First, contrary to Micron’s argument, the evidence of record
plainly establishes that LG Semicon made royalty payments to one
of the customers at the same rate in both the United States and
Korea. More precisely, LG Semicon produced a royalty agreement
for the customer, showing that the royalty rate was the same on
both U.S. and Korean sales. See LG Semicon’s Supplemental Sales
Resp. (Oct. 19, 1994), C.R. Doc. 33, at App. SS-13 (providing a
royalty agreement that defined "NET SALES BILLED" as DRAM sales
"in the United States and Korea" and setting an identical fixed
percentage for the royalty rate on the "NET SALES BILLED").
Thus, with respect to one of the two royalties at issue, the
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Court has reviewed the record evidence in detail and determined
there is no factual basis for Micron’s argument.4
More generally, Commerce’s decision to treat the royalty
payments as a cost of manufacture, rather than as a selling
expense that required a COS adjustment, was in accordance with
law. As stated in the Final Results, "it has been [Commerce’s]
longstanding practice to treat royalty payments for production
technology as [a] cost of manufacturing, even in circumstances
where the royalty payments were based on sales revenue." 61 Fed.
Reg. at 20218-19 (citing Extruded Rubber Thread from Malaysia;
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 57 Fed.
Reg. 38465 (Aug. 25, 1992) ("Rubber Thread"); Certain Hot-Rolled
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada; Final Determination of
4
Micron also argues that Commerce erred when it failed to
verify the information contained in the royalty agreement. This
argument does not withstand scrutiny. The terms of the royalty
agreement provided to Commerce are plain, and there is no
suggestion that the agreement itself is bogus. As such, the
evidence presented to Commerce amounted to uncontroverted record
evidence that the royalty rate for this customer was the same in
the United States and Korea. Moreover, it is well established
that Commerce has the discretion not to verify each piece of
evidence made part of the record. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
United States, 12 CIT 937, 944, 698 F. Supp. 275, 281 (1988).
Commerce certainly acted within its discretion when it decided
that limited resources should not be allocated to verify the
foundation of a royalty agreement.
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Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 58 Fed. Reg. 37099 (July 9, 1993)
("Canadian Steel")). In both Rubber Thread and Canadian Steel,
Commerce expressly determined that a royalty fee paid for
production technology should be treated as a cost of
manufacturing, not as a selling expense.5 See 57 Fed. Reg. at
38479-80; 58 Fed. Reg. at 37118. Similarly here, LG Semicon’s
royalty obligation was based on the purchase of production
technology and, therefore, Commerce treated the expenses as a
cost of manufacture. The Court finds Commerce’s established
practice reasonable, as it is based on sound logic: quite simply,
a payment made for production technology more properly
corresponds to the cost of manufacturing certain merchandise,
than to expenses associated with the sale of the merchandise.
Accordingly, Commerce’s treatment of the royalty payments at
issue was in accordance with law and supported by substantial
5
Micron counters that there is not an established practice
because Commerce declined to treat royalties as a cost of
manufacture in a 1988 determination. See Color Televisions from
Korea; Final Results of Administrative Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 24975
(July 1, 1988) ("Color TVs"). Yet, as Commerce correctly points
out, unlike the case at bar, it was unclear in this earlier
determination whether the royalty expenses were for production
technology or other obligations. Thus, the lone Color TVs
determination does not serve to undermine the more recent
practice established in Rubber Thread and Canadian Steel.
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evidence.
C. Allocation of Home Market Indirect Selling Expenses
Typically, Commerce requires indirect selling expenses to be
allocated on a sales value basis. See Carbon Steel Butt-Weld
Pipe Fittings from Thailand, 57 Fed. Reg. 21065, 21067 (May 18,
1992); Sweaters of Man-made Fibers from Taiwan, 55 Fed. Reg.
34585, 34596 (Aug. 23, 1990); see also Def.’s Br. In Opp. to Mot.
for J. on the Agency R., at 17 n.6 (acknowledging that Commerce
usually allocates indirect selling expenses on a sales value
basis). In this case, LG Semicon identified its home market
selling expenses by subdivision of the company’s overall sales
division, and reported these expenses on a sales value basis. LG
Semicon also reported certain "common expenses," which were not
broken out by subdivision. For these additional expenses, LG
Semicon offered alternative allocation methodologies to account
for the indirect selling expenses. Commerce accepted LG
Semicon’s alternative allocation methodologies. Micron contends
that Commerce erred when it allowed LG Semicon to report certain
indirect selling expenses using allocation methodologies other
than sales value. Micron particularly complains that a
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respondent should not be allowed to "pick and choose among
allocation methodologies." Pl.’s Br. In Supp. of Mot. for J. on
Agency R., at 24.
Responding to Micron’s challenge on this issue at the
administrative level, Commerce stated as follows:
It is not our policy to require allocation of indirect
selling expenses based upon relative sales value in every
instance. More specifically, in the final results of the
less-than-fair-value investigation we clearly noted that
we would accept an allocation basis other than relative
sales value provided the methodology was reasonable.
Moreover, we note that Hyundai and LGS used three
separate bases of allocation for different selling
expenses, one of which was relative sales value. In
addition, Hyundai used manpower hours in allocating labor
expenses and the number of invoices in allocating
accounting department expenses. LGS used a similar
methodology to allocate its indirect selling expenses
that were not identified by subdivision. We believe that
it is more appropriate to allocate human resource and
accounting department expenses on the basis of manpower
and number of invoices than on the basis of sales value
because human resource is a function of the number of
employees, and accounting department expense is a
function of the volume of invoices prepared. Thus, we
believe that these allocation bases are reasonable and
have continued to accept them for purposes of these final
results of review. Furthermore, we verified HEA[’s] and
LGS’s allocation bases for its [sic] indirect selling
expenses during our U.S. sales verifications and found no
discrepancies or inaccuracies in Hyundai[’s] or LGS’s
allocation methodology.
Final Results, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20217 (internal citations
omitted). From this statement, it is plain that Commerce did not
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blindly accept LG Semicon’s alternative methodologies. Rather,
Commerce explained that the circumstances in this case made it
more appropriate to allocate certain indirect selling expenses
using methodologies other than sales value.
The Court agrees. While it is true that Commerce typically
allocates indirect selling expenses based on sales value,
"[Commerce] is given discretion in its choice of methodology as
long as the chosen methodology is reasonable and [Commerce’s]
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record."
Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 18 CIT 785, 807-08, 862 F.
Supp. 384, 405 (1994), aff’d, 810 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(upholding the acceptance of an alternative allocation
methodology used to account for indirect selling expenses). As
Commerce noted in the Final Results and as evidenced by the
confidential record, the allocation methodologies offered by LG
Semicon are more appropriate. In particular, each alternative
allocation methodology bears a direct relation to the manner in
which the common expense is incurred. See LG Semicon’s Section V
Resp. (Aug. 29, 1994), C.R. Doc. 14, at 31; LG Semicon’s Home
Market Verification Report (Apr. 13, 1995), C.R. Doc. 90, at 13.
In addition, when Commerce verified LG Semicon’s alternative
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methodologies, it "tested the arithmetic accuracy of the
allocation, and found no discrepancies." See id.; see also INA
Walzlager Schaeffler KG v. United States, 21 CIT __, __, 957 F.
Supp. 251, 275 (1997) (upholding the reporting of indirect
selling expenses where Commerce verified the accuracy of the
reporting and where there was no indication that the verification
was deficient or incomplete). The Court has reviewed the
alternative methodologies in the confidential record and finds
them reasonable in light of the nature of the common expenses at
issue.
Accordingly, because Commerce’s decision to accept LG
Semicon’s indirect expenses was reasonable and properly verified,
the Court sustains the determination as supported by substantial
evidence and in accordance with law.
D. Adjustment for Loan Guarantee Fees
Micron next claims that Commerce failed to account for all
the costs associated with LG Semicon’s loan guarantees. In
particular, Micron argues that in the absence of loan guarantee
fees paid by LG Semicon, Commerce should have imputed expenses
for hypothetical costs associated with the loans. Micron
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contends this error was not excused by the fact that under Korean
law, a guarantor is not required to charge a fee for related
company guarantees unless there is a default. By allowing LG
Semicon to report its costs in accordance with the Korean law at
issue, Micron maintains that Commerce erroneously elevated a
"dubious" foreign law over the strictures of U.S. antidumping
law. Pl.’s Br. In Supp. of Mot. for J. on Agency R., at 29.
The Court does not agree. First, Commerce extensively
verified LG Semicon’s financial expenses and determined that LG
Semicon made no payments with respect to loan guarantees. See
Final Results, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20218; Lg Semicon’s Home Market
Verification Report (Apr. 13, 1995), C.R. Doc. 90, at 18. And,
as Micron noted, Commerce found that Korean law does not require
the guarantor of a loan to charge a fee for related party
guarantees unless there is a default. Id. Commerce also
verified that LG Semicon complied with the Korean law in
reporting its loan guarantees. Id. Commerce’s decision is
therefore supported by substantial evidence.
Second, the notion that Commerce should reject LG Semicon’s
reporting because the Korean law is at odds with U.S. antidumping
law is without merit. In this instance, there is no evidence to
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suggest that LG Semicon actually incurred expenses for the loan
fees or would have incurred such expenses were it not for the
law. As Commerce points out, without some evidence that actual
expenses were incurred or even might have been incurred, Micron’s
request to impute costs for loan fees is entirely too speculative
and is therefore unreasonable. Cf. Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v.
United States, 22 CIT __, __, 15 F. Supp.2d 834, 848 (1998)
(noting that the fundamental purpose of the antidumping statute
is to ensure the accurate calculation of dumping margins, and in
pursuing this goal, Commerce has the discretion to reject
information that does not reflect actual costs). Commerce’s
decision to accept the reporting of the loan guarantee data is
therefore not at odds with the antidumping law.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Commerce’s accounting of
the costs associated with loan guarantees was supported by
substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.
E. Adjustment to U.S. Price for Trading Company Expenses
Finally, Micron claims that Commerce ignored the role that a
U.S. trading company played in processing sales for LG Semicon.
Micron maintains that Commerce must account for the trading
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company’s role by making a deduction to U.S. price for expenses
LG Semicon incurred as a result of the relationship. Again,
Micron’s claim is without merit.
At the administrative level, Commerce addressed Micron’s
concerns in the following passage:
DOC Position: We [] examined LGS’s relationship with its
trading company. See LGS Home Market Sales Verification
Report, pp. 18-19. We verified that LGS did not incur
costs for the use of its trading company’s name.
Moreover, we verified that this trading company did not
provide any services to sales of subject merchandise to
LGS.
Final Results, 61 Fed. Reg. at 20218. Micron does not contest
the veracity of the verification report on this issue. Instead,
Micron essentially insists that, notwithstanding verification,
the trading company played a more integral role in the U.S. sales
process than LG Semicon acknowledges, and it is therefore
inconceivable that LG Semicon did not incur additional costs
relating to the relationship. The record again belies Micron’s
assertion.
At verification, Commerce and LG Semicon engaged in an
extensive dialogue pertaining to the role of the trading company,
and Commerce verified the nature of this stated relationship.
See LG Semicon’s Home Market Verification Report (Apr. 13, 1995),
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C.R. Doc. 90, at 18-19. In addition, Commerce verified that LG
Semicon incurred no costs for the use of the trading company’s
name and that the trading company provided no services related to
the sale of subject merchandise. Id. In view of this
uncontroverted and exhaustive record, it is unclear what more
Micron would have Commerce verify. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Commerce’s decision on this issue is supported by
substantial evidence.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court remands the Final
Results to Commerce to clarify its position with regard to
calculation of R&D expenses, and sustains the Final Results in
all other respects. A separate Order will be entered
accordingly.
_________________________________
Richard W. Goldberg
JUDGE
Dated: January 28, 1999
New York, New York.