Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
February 17, 2010 Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice
136731 & (47) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
SARA GRIESBACH, as Next Friend of Diane M. Hathaway,
PATRICK GRIESBACH, Minor, and Justices
TIMOTHY GRIESBACH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v SC: 136731
COA: 275826
Oakland CC: 2004-062028-NH
ROBERT R. ROSS, P.A.-C.,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
and
FRANK L. FENTON, D.O. and WALLED
LAKE MEDICAL CENTER, P.C.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2008
judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-
appellant are considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we REMAND this case
to the Oakland Circuit Court for reconsideration of defendant’s motions in light of Bush v
Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), and Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397 (2009).
HATHAWAY, J. (concurring).
The record reveals disputed facts regarding whether the notice of intent provided
sufficient and timely notice to defendant Ross. Given the factual dispute, it is necessary
to remand this case to the trial court for consideration of these issues in light of our
decisions in Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), and Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich
397 (2009).
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the order vacating the Court of Appeals judgment and remanding to
the trial court for proceedings consistent with Bush v Shabahang1 and Potter v McLeary.2
1
484 Mich 156 (2009).
2
484 Mich 397 (2009).
2
First and foremost, plaintiff did not meet the requirements plainly described in MCL
600.2912b(3). Therefore, he is not entitled to the additional notice period provided in
that statute. Moreover, the current case is factually inapposite to Bush and Potter and is
based on an altogether different statutory provision. Accordingly, the standards provided
in Bush and Potter are inapplicable to this case and cannot save plaintiff’s claims. This
remand represents another effort of the new majority to deconstruct the medical
malpractice tort reform statutes.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Frank L. Fenton and
Walled Lake Medical Center, P.C. based on their alleged failure to diagnose a bone
infection. The only health care professional to examine plaintiff during his two visits at
the medical center was a physician’s assistant named Robert Ross. Although plaintiff
concedes that he knew the identity of the treating physician’s assistant, he chose neither
to serve a notice of intent (NOI) on Ross, as required by MCL 600.2912b(1), nor to name
Ross as a defendant in the subsequently filed complaint. Given plaintiff’s failure to serve
an NOI on a known potential defendant, the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff’s
claim against Ross is not subject to tolling under MCL 600.5856(c).3 Plaintiff waited
until the named defendants filed a notice of nonparty at fault identifying Ross before
attempting to serve an NOI on Ross or amending the complaint to add Ross as a named
defendant. The statute of limitations had expired by that time.
In general, a plaintiff who “discovers” the identity of a defendant through a notice
of nonparty at fault after the expiration of the statute of limitations is entitled to file an
amended complaint within 91 days of receiving the notice.4 MCL 600.2912b(3) more
specifically addresses the addition of defendants in medical malpractice actions, and it
allows for the addition of a defendant only under the following circumstances:
3
This provision states:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the
following circumstances:
***
(c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable
notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a claim would be
barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is
tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days
remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given.
[MCL 600.5856.]
4
MCR 2.112(K)(4).
3
The 182-day notice period required in subsection (1) is shortened to
91 days if all of the following conditions exist:
(a) The claimant has previously filed the 182-day notice required in
subsection (1) against other health professionals or health facilities
involved in the claim.
(b) The 182-day notice period has expired as to the health
professionals or health facilities described in subdivision (a).
(c) The claimant has filed a complaint and commenced an action
alleging medical malpractice against 1 or more of the health professionals
or health facilities described in subdivision (a).
(d) The claimant did not identify, and could not reasonably have
identified a health professional or health facility to which notice must be
sent under subsection (1) as a potential party to the action before filing the
complaint.[5]
Plaintiff claims that he could not reasonably have identified Ross as a party
entitled to notice before receiving the notice of nonparty at fault. Given plaintiff’s own
admissions, this claim is absurdly false. Plaintiff concedes that he actually knew the
identity of the treating physician’s assistant before serving his NOIs on the other
defendants and before filing his complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff has not met, and
cannot meet, the plain and unambiguous requirements to be entitled to the additional
notice period provided in MCL 600.2912b(3). Thus, MCR 2.112(K)(4) is inapplicable to
the instant case.
Moreover, although I continue to believe that Bush and Potter were wrongly
decided, the standards described in those cases are clearly irrelevant and inapplicable
under the circumstances. The Bush majority held that the amendments to MCL
600.5856(c) provide that the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is
tolled even if an NOI is substantively defective, and the NOI may thereafter be amended
as provided by MCL 600.2301.6 The majority based this holding on the introductory
5
Emphasis added.
6
This provision states:
The court in which any action or proceeding is pending, has power
to amend any process, pleading or proceeding in such action or proceeding,
either in form or substance, for the furtherance of justice, on such terms as
are just, at any time before judgment rendered therein. The court at every
4
phrase in subsection (c): “At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable
notice period under section 2912b.” In Bush, that notice period was provided in the
general 182-day provision—MCL 600.2912b(1).
The Bush majority then relied on MCL 600.2301, which allows amendments to
pleadings “for the furtherance of justice” if the amendment will not affect the “substantial
rights” of the other party.7 The majority concluded that it would not be in the furtherance
of justice to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint when he “has made a good-faith attempt to
comply with the content requirements”8 of MCL 600.2912b(4). Such good-faith attempt
to comply with the requirements of the statute is admittedly absent here. The majority
conveniently ignores this fact.
In Potter, the issues raised do not have even marginal relevance to the facts now
before us. Potter involved whether a professional corporation is entitled to service of an
NOI when the plaintiff alleges vicarious liability for the conduct of a servant health
professional. Potter also implicated questions regarding the adequacy of the content of
an NOI under MCL 600.2912b(4) when the NOI omits the standard for vicarious liability
or fails to specifically identify the relationship between the professional corporation and
the servant doctor.
The notice provided in this case did not comply with the applicable notice period
under section 2912b. As stated, MCL 600.2912b(3) provides an additional 91-day notice
period to add an individual as a named defendant when that person could not be
“reasonably identified” beforehand. Plaintiff’s failure to serve an NOI on Ross along
with the original named defendants cannot be considered a “good-faith attempt to
comply” with the statutes under Bush. First, the failure to name Ross as a defendant does
not implicate the content provision of MCL 600.2912b(4). The failure to serve an NOI
on a required party goes straight to the heart of the “notice period”; it does not implicate
concerns regarding the adequacy of the notice actually provided. Nothing in MCL
600.5856(c), Bush, or Potter excuses a plaintiff who fails to meet the time limitation for
providing notice.
And centrally, as noted above, plaintiff admitted that he knew the identity of the
treating health care professional before filing his complaint and that person was
physician’s assistant Ross. In the face of this admission, even if the “good-faith attempt”
standard could apply to these circumstances, plaintiff cannot honestly argue that he “did
stage of the action or proceeding shall disregard any error or defect in the
proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
7
Bush, supra at 177.
8
Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
5
not identify, and could not reasonably have identified” Ross as required by MCL
600.2912b(3)(d).
Because Bush and Potter have absolutely no relevance to this case, by invoking
them in its remand order, the new majority is essentially using them as a code whose
meaning should be lost on no one: We no longer enforce the medical malpractice reform
statute. The remand of this case can not be otherwise justified.
This court should not waste judicial resources by forcing the trial court to
reconsider a case involving such a blatant disregard of this medical malpractice statute. I
cannot make the statement any plainer: plaintiff acknowledges that he knew the identity
of the treating medical professional from the outset of these proceedings. Even so,
plaintiff chose not to serve an NOI on that individual—the only known treating medical
professional. In light of plaintiff’s admission, the suggestion that there are questions of
fact remaining in this case is both preposterous and false, and the new majority’s refusal
to uphold the dismissal of this suit is indicative of the new majority’s resistance to
enforcing our laws as written. Plaintiff’s failure to include Ross as a named defendant
from the outset of the proceedings defies all logic and reason. If plaintiff has lost a viable
claim against Ross because of this error, his recourse is against his attorney.
Accordingly, I vigorously dissent from the majority’s chosen course of action,
which allows plaintiff to completely ignore the medical malpractice notice and
limitations periods and proceed with his cause of action anyway. However, as stated, I
think that this is precisely the new majority’s goal.
CORRIGAN, J., joins the statement of YOUNG, J.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
I concur in Justice Young’s legal analysis concerning the irrelevance of Bush v
Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), and Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397 (2009), to the
instant case, and therefore dissent. The majority’s decision to vacate the Court of
Appeals and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of our completely
inapposite decisions in Bush and Potter, as well as its decision in ADM 2009-13 to revise
court rules pertaining to affidavits of merits in a manner inconsistent both with this
6
Court’s opinion in Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007), and with the constitution’s
apportionment of legislative and judicial responsibilities, is indicative of an attitude
toward tort and medical malpractice reform that ought to be deeply troubling to citizens
of this state concerned about representative self-government. My objections are
elaborated upon in dissents in Bush, Potter, and ADM 2009-13.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
February 17, 2010 _________________________________________
d1222 Clerk