IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35823
LEE A. RIDGLEY, )
) Boise, December 2009 Term
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) 2010 Opinion No. 24
v. )
) Filed: March 17, 2010
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Stephen Kenyon, Clerk
Respondent. )
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Boundary County. Hon. Charles W. Hosack, District Judge.
The district court order dismissing post-conviction relief petition is affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin M.
Curtis argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth
Jorgensen argued.
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HORTON, Justice
This is an appeal from the district court‟s summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court‟s dismissal in part and
this Court granted the State‟s petition for review. We affirm the district court‟s order of
dismissal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 26, 2002, sixteen days after his wife died, Lee Ridgley pled guilty to lewd
and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. Before sentencing, Ridgley moved
to withdraw his plea on the grounds that appointed counsel had not adequately represented and
advised him prior to entry of the guilty plea, but the district court denied his motion. In an
unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‟s decision.
On April 4, 2005, Ridgley filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Ridgley‟s petition
alleged that his defense counsel‟s performance was deficient because counsel had met with him
for less than one hour before Ridgley pled guilty, failed to provide Ridgley with a copy of the
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police report, failed to contact potential witnesses, failed to watch or listen to tapes of interviews
of the victim, failed to advise Ridgley of potential defenses, and failed to take steps to determine
whether Ridgley‟s severe grief and depression rendered him incompetent or unable to make a
rational decision about pleading guilty.
The State answered the petition and, in its answer, moved for summary dismissal, arguing
that the issues presented in Ridgley‟s petition were “essentially identical” to the issues advanced
in support of Ridgley‟s earlier motion to withdraw his plea. After Ridgley requested a trial
setting on his petition, the State renewed its motion for summary dismissal, again asserting that
the bases for post-conviction relief advanced in the petition were identical to those that had been
decided previously. The district court then issued notice of its intention to summarily dismiss the
action pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906. In that notice, the district court observed that Ridgley had
included a transcript of the testimony produced at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. In light of the evidence produced at that hearing—that Ridgley had told his attorney
that he wished to plead guilty—the district court stated that there was an insufficient showing of
deficient performance by trial counsel. The district court further observed that there was “a total
lack of evidence that, but for counsel‟s alleged deficiencies, [Ridgley] would have insisted on
going to trial.”
Ridgley thereafter filed a response to the notice, supported by his affidavit and two other
affidavits. These responsive filings focused on the final claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, i.e., counsel‟s failure to take steps to evaluate Ridgley‟s mental condition prior to his
plea of guilty. In his affidavit, Ridgley averred that he informed his attorney that he was
suffering from severe depression and did not understand the proceedings. He further averred that
his attorney did not discuss with him the possibility of obtaining an evaluation to determine his
competence. He also asserted that, if successful in obtaining post-conviction relief, he intended
to go to trial. Ridgley‟s attorney‟s first affidavit advanced his opinion that trial counsel‟s
performance was objectively unreasonable and appended a report prepared by a psychologist, Dr.
Jonelle Timlin. Dr. Timlin prepared this report approximately nine months after Ridgley pled
guilty. After reviewing Ridgley‟s response, the district court summarily dismissed Ridgley‟s
petition.
Ridgley appealed the district court‟s decision. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court‟s dismissal of the first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court
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of appeals reversed the grant of summary dismissal regarding counsel‟s failure to request a
competency evaluation prior to Ridgley‟s plea. This Court granted the State‟s petition for
review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the court of appeals when
considering a case on review from that court, this Court reviews the district court‟s decision
directly. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 226, 91 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2004).
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed
by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646
(2008). However, “[t]he „application must contain much more than a short and plain statement
of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).‟” State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61
P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). The application must be supported by a statement that
“specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based.” Rhoades v. State, 148
Idaho 247, 249-51, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69 (2009). “The application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
to dismissal.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court‟s own initiative.
Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under
I.R.C.P. 56.” State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). “When
reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard
used by the district court in ruling on the motion.” Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148
Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2009) (citing Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,
556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009)). Likewise, when reviewing a district court‟s order of summary
dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same standard as that applied by
the district court. Thus, when reviewing such a dismissal, this Court must determine whether a
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.
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“[I]f the petitioner‟s alleged facts are uncontroverted by the State . . . [they] must be
regarded as true.” Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985).
However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not
controvert the applicant‟s evidence because the court is not required to accept
either the applicant‟s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant‟s conclusions of law.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.
“[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible
for resolving the conflict between those inferences.” Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). “When an action is to be
tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but
rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.” Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,
437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
Id.
III. ANALYSIS
As previously noted, Ridgley‟s petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the
following aspects: (1) that his attorney met with Ridgley for less than one hour before Ridgley
pled guilty; (2) that his attorney failed to provide Ridgley with a copy of the police report; (3)
that his attorney failed to contact potential witnesses; (4) that his attorney failed to watch or
listen to tapes of interviews of the victim; (5) that his attorney failed to advise Ridgley of
potential defenses; and (6) that his attorney failed to take steps to determine whether Ridgley‟s
severe grief and depression rendered him incompetent or unable to make a rational decision
about pleading guilty.
A petitioner‟s claim that counsel‟s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a
conviction has two components. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In
addition to showing that his counsel‟s performance was deficient, “the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.
The district court‟s order of dismissal concluded a ten-page memorandum opinion. The
first four pages of the order were largely devoted to a recitation of the procedural history of the
case. The district court devoted approximately one page of analysis to the first five claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and observed that these “were virtual mirror images” of the
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claims advanced in support of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Relying heavily on the
earlier findings of a different district judge in connection with the earlier proceedings and the
court of appeals‟ affirmance, the district court then concluded that Ridgley had failed to
demonstrate that trial counsel‟s performance was deficient.
The district court observed that the only “„new‟ evidence” presented in response to the
proposed dismissal of the petition related to trial counsel‟s failure to request an evaluation of
Ridgley‟s mental health condition. The district court then devoted approximately five pages of
discussion to that claim, concluding that Ridgley had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel‟s
performance was deficient in this regard and that Ridgley had failed to demonstrate resultant
prejudice. In light of the differing treatment of the first five issues by the district court, we
consider them collectively before turning to the sixth claim.
A. Although the district court improperly failed to provide Ridgley with notice of the
grounds upon which Ridgley’s first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
were dismissed, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal.
As to the first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel presented in his petition for
post-conviction relief, Ridgley asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his petition on a
ground that was not identified by the court in its notice of intent to dismiss. The district court‟s
notice stated its intent to dismiss on the grounds that Ridgley had presented no evidence
supporting his claims of deficient performance nor evidence establishing an objective basis from
which to conclude that, but for counsel‟s alleged deficiencies, Ridgley would not have pled
guilty. However, the degree to which the final order referenced and evidently relied on the
earlier factual findings by a different judge can only be reasonably interpreted as reflecting the
district court‟s view that the issues previously presented by Ridgley in support of his motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty could not be relitigated in this post-conviction action. This ground
for dismissal was not stated in the district court‟s notice of intent to dismiss.
A petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial court‟s contemplated grounds for dismissal
and an opportunity to respond before a petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. I.C. § 19-
4906(b). Failure to provide such notice and opportunity to be heard may result in reversal of a
summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho
319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). We are unable to conclude that the district court gave
Ridgley appropriate notice of its intention to dismiss the first five claims on the basis of res
judicata.
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This conclusion does not automatically require reversal, however. Where the lower court
reaches the correct result, albeit by reliance on an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the
order on the correct theory. Boise Tower Assoc.s, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 782, 215 P.3d
494, 502 (2009) (citing Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868,
873 (2003)). Because this Court employs the same standards on appellate review that the trial
court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, if Ridgley
failed to provide admissible evidence supporting these claims, they were properly dismissed.
We address only the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified how the Strickland prejudice prong is to be
applied when the defendant entered a plea of guilty. In order to demonstrate prejudice, a
petitioner is required to show that as a result of counsel‟s deficient performance “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Since its pronouncement, this Court has
regularly reiterated that the Hill prejudice standard is applicable to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with guilty pleas. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106
P.3d 376, 385 (2004); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002);
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 464 (2004); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,
101, 983 P.2d 931, 936 (1999).
In his affidavit filed in response to the district court‟s notice of intent to dismiss, Ridgley
asserted that if post-conviction relief were granted, he would not again plead guilty but would
insist on going to trial because he is innocent. This assertion is insufficient to withstand
summary dismissal. Nowhere in his petition or his affidavit does Ridgley attempt to draw a
causal connection between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney‟s performance and his
decision to plead guilty. In Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on a similar failure to allege a
causal connection. 474 U.S. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had
counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not
guilty.”)
In the present case, Ridgley did not attempt to show that the relatively brief contact with
his trial attorney contributed to his decision to plead guilty or that greater contact may have
dissuaded him from pleading guilty. He did not show that information contained within the
police reports may have given him some reason to go to trial. Similarly, he did not identify any
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evidence from potential witnesses or that was contained in the tape recording of the victim‟s
interview that may have led him to decide against pleading guilty. He did not identify any
potential defense to the charge that may have resulted in a different decision. In short, Ridgley
simply made no effort to link his claims of deficient performance with his plea of guilty.
Therefore, we affirm the district court‟s summary dismissal of these claims.
B. The district court properly dismissed Ridgley’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to determine Ridgley’s competence to enter a plea of guilty.
The district court found that Ridgley failed to establish necessary facts to support a
finding that his counsel was deficient by failing to seek a competency evaluation before Ridgley
entered his guilty plea or that Ridgley was prejudiced by any deficient performance.
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Ridgley alleged that
[m]y attorney did not advise me of the potential of having an evaluation to
determine my mental status, whether or not I would appreciate the proceedings
that were filed against me or be able to assist in my defense. In fact, I was not
able to assist in my defense. I had no basis of knowledge.
In other words, Ridgley alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that he
was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. See I.C. § 18-210 (“No person who as a result
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an
offense so long as such incapacity endures.”). This Court has determined that the I.C. § 18-210
standard is consistent with that applied by the federal courts. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842,
537 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). The standard to
determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has “the capacity to understand the
proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense.” Id.
Once again, we find that Ridgley has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact as to prejudice. “With respect to the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel [for failing to order a competency evaluation], [a petitioner] need only demonstrate a
„reasonable probability‟ that he was incompetent, „sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome‟” at the time he entered his plea. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir.
1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
A claim of incompetence does not lend itself very well to the “outcome”
test in Strickland because it does not turn on the validity of the result vis a vis
guilt or innocence. Since to convict an incompetent person is a per se due process
violation, guilt or innocence of the offense charged is irrelevant.
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Id. at 595 n.20. The South Carolina Supreme Court states the rule this way:
Due process prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant, and this
right may not be waived by a guilty plea. Jeter v. State, [417 S.E.2d 594, 595-
596] (1992) (citations omitted).
In a [post-conviction relief] action, the petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty
plea. Id. at [417 S.E.2d at 596]; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP.
In order to find that petitioner‟s trial counsel was ineffective for refusing
to request a . . . hearing on petitioner‟s competency to stand trial, petitioner must
show that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of
petitioner‟s proceedings. In [Jeter, 417 S.E. 2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that
in proving Strickland prejudice within the context of counsel‟s failure to fully
investigate the petitioner‟s mental capacity, “the [petitioner] need only show a
„reasonable probability‟ that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea.”
Matthews v. State, 596 S.E.2d 49, 50-51 (S.C. 2004). Thus, we must decide whether Ridgley has
presented admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was
incompetent at the time he entered his plea. We conclude that he has not.
In discussing whether Ridgley‟s trial counsel should have ordered an evaluation, the
district court stated that
[t]he only evidence offered in this case that Ridgley was emotionally distraught,
in a state of shock, and incompetent are the allegations of Ridgley‟s own affidavit.
Ridgley‟s own conclusory and bare assertions, alone, are not sufficient to survive
summary dismissal . . . . While Ridgley‟s affidavit does raise the fact issue that
he was emotionally distraught when he entered the guilty plea, the affidavit offers
no more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the
nature of the proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is
unsupported by any facts as to the alleged mental incompetency.
The court further stated that
without something in the record suggesting that an examination in February 2002
would have shown [that Ridgley was incompetent] to proceed, there is nothing to
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.
We note that the district court was not entirely accurate in saying that Ridgley offered
nothing more on the issue of his incompetency than his own statements. Ridgley also offered the
psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Timlin for sentencing purposes nine months after
Ridgley‟s plea in support of his claim that he was not competent to plead guilty. Despite noting
that Ridgley suffers from some indications of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
anxiety disorder, the report also states that Ridgley is “„oriented to person, place and time.‟”
More importantly, the report addressed only Ridgley‟s mental state at the time it was prepared;
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the report says nothing about Ridgley‟s mental state at the time he entered his plea—nine months
earlier. By contrast, in Bouchillon, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in holding that a
defense attorney‟s failure to investigate the defendant‟s competency to stand trial constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel, recognized that
the psychologist who examined Bouchillon . . . testified that, in his opinion,
Bouchillon was incompetent at the time of his pleading. While that opinion was
not offered based on a contemporaneous examination of Bouchillon it was
rendered in the context of his diagnosis of Bouchillon‟s condition. That diagnosis
is consistent with Bouchillon‟s record of treatment in prison and his previous
history of mental problems.
Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d at 594.
In the present case, Ridgley did not present an expert‟s opinion that he was not
competent, as defined by I.C. § 18-210, at the time he pled guilty. Although Ridgley stated in
his petition that he was not able to assist in his defense, to the extent that this statement may be
interpreted as an opinion regarding his competence for purposes of I.C. § 18-210, it was not
admissible evidence. This Court has recognized that in order to render admissible opinions
regarding mental condition, the witness must be qualified as an expert under the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992).1 In the absence of
admissible evidence showing a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of his
plea of guilty, we conclude that Ridgley failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as
to his claim that his attorney‟s deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, we
affirm the decision of the district court.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Ridgley did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact supporting his claim that his attorney‟s allegedly deficient performance resulted in
prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‟s order granting summary dismissal of
Ridgley‟s petition for post-conviction relief.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.
1
Although admissibility of evidence is governed by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the standard that we have
required is consistent with legislative requirements. Court-ordered competency evaluations are to be performed by a
“qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist.” I.C. § 18-211.
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