IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 36238
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Respondent, ) Boise, November 2009 Term
)
v. ) 2009 Opinion No. 138
)
MICAH NATHANIEL WEGNER, ) Filed: November 25, 2009
)
Defendant-Appellant. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
_______________________________________ )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Jerome County. Hon. John K. Butler, District Judge.
The district court’s order is affirmed.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Dennis Benjamin
argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, for respondent. Kenneth K.
Jorgensen argued.
_____________________
J. JONES, Justice.
Micah Wegner appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 33 motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We affirm.
I.
In March of 2001, the State filed a juvenile petition charging Micah Wegner, born August
21, 1983, with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen pursuant to
Idaho Code section 18-1508. The State filed a motion for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, and in
January of 2002, Wegner was charged as an adult. Pursuant to a nonbinding plea agreement,
Wegner pleaded guilty to one count of approximately thirteen separate acts of vaginal and anal
intercourse and manual/genital contact with his sister and stepbrother committed between
February 18, 1995, and May 3, 1998, while Wegner was between the ages of eleven years, six
months, and fourteen years, eight months. On August 7, 2002, the district court entered a
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judgment of conviction and sentenced Wegner to a twenty-year term of imprisonment, with five
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for 180 days. On January 27, 2003, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction.
On February 26, 2003, Wegner filed a timely appeal from the judgment of conviction and
order relinquishing jurisdiction, arguing that he was improperly waived into adult court and that
his sentence was excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and
sentence in an unpublished opinion. A remittitur was issued on April 15, 2004.
Two and a half years later, on December 1, 2006, Wegner filed a pro se “Motion to
Withdraw Plea to Correct Manifest Injustice, I.C.R. 33(c),” arguing he could not have been
found guilty because he was under the age of fourteen at the time of the alleged offense and
Idaho Code section 20-509 does not list lewd conduct as one of the offenses for which minor
children can be tried as adults. Wegner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The
district court found that it lacked jurisdiction because Wegner had not filed the motion until more
than two years after the remittitur was issued in his direct appeal and therefore denied Wegner’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court also denied Wegner’s motion for
appointment of counsel on the basis that the motion was frivolous. Wegner appealed, and in
January of 2009, the Court of Appeals concluded that while the district court erred in ruling that
it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Rule 33 motion, it was not reversible error because
there was no basis for the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s denial of Wegner’s Rule 33 motion as well as the motion for
appointment of counsel. Wegner then requested review by this Court.
II.
This Court grants review of decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals in strictly limited
circumstances. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b), the “[g]ranting [of] a petition for review
from a final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons . . . .” Idaho App. R.
118(b). While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when
considering a case on review from that court, it reviews the district court's decision directly. State
v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819, 821, 172 P.3d 1094, 1096 (2007).
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A.
The issue in this case is whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider Wegner’s
Rule 33 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Wegner premises his Rule 33 motion on the claim
that the charging information was jurisdictionally deficient because it does not specify, in certain
terms, that Wegner committed a criminal act when he was above the age of fourteen. However,
irrespective of the merits of Wegner’s claim,1 the district court was without jurisdiction to
consider his Rule 33 motion.
In State v. Jakoski, we stated:
Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court’s jurisdiction to
amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal.
139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). We noted that Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal
Rules does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for purposes of
hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. The Court held that once a judgment of
conviction becomes final, “the district court no longer [has] jurisdiction to hear a motion to
withdraw [a] guilty plea.” Id.
Wegner seeks, in essence, to utilize Rule 33 as a means of collaterally attacking a
judgment that has become final. We decline to allow such an attack. The appropriate avenue for
obtaining relief from a final judgment of conviction is a proceeding brought pursuant to the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act set out in Chapter 49, Title 19, Idaho Code. Wegner
may not utilize Rule 33 as a means of circumventing or supplementing this statutory remedy. In
this case, the judgment of conviction became final prior to the time Wegner filed his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and thus the district court was without jurisdiction to rule on the
motion. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Wegner’s Rule 33 motion.
B.
Wegner additionally argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
appointment of counsel. However, because the district court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Wegner’s motion to withdraw his plea, it properly found his motion for
appointment of counsel to be frivolous under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).
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Although not pertinent to our analysis of the jurisdictional issue, it is worthy of note that Wegner admitted at his
sentencing hearing that he committed one of the acts charged when he was between fourteen and fifteen years of
age.
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III.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Wegner’s motions.
Justices W. JONES and HORTON, and Justices Pro Tem TROUT and KIDWELL
CONCUR.
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