No. 81-119
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA
1981
WYSE ,
Relator,
D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE FOURTH J U D I C I A L
D I S T R I C T O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA, MISSOULA
COUNTY, JOHN S. HENSON, D i s t . Judge,
Respondent.
O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING:
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For R e l a t o r :
R o n a l d C . Wyse, P r o S e , M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a
For R e s p o n d e n t :
R o b e r t L. Deschamps, 111, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y ,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted: S e p t e m b e r 23, 1981
Decided : 85 m
F i l e d : @OV 2 5 1981
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
R e l a t o r , Ronald C . Wyse, p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r a
w r i t of r e v i e w on March 23, 1981, concerning the order of
t h e D i s t r i c t Co u rt of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of the
S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , f i n d i n g
him g u i l t y o f c o n t e m p t a s h e r e a f t e r s t a t e d .
R e l a t o r Wyse i s a n a t t o r n e y d u l y l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e
l a w i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana. I n t h e a f t e r n o o n of O c t o b e r
28, 1 9 8 0 , Wyse was c o n t a c t e d by A l a n R o b b i n s , a California
s t a t e senator. Robbins i n f o r m e d Wyse t h a t he had recently
been charged with sexual misconduct involving two minor
girls. Robbins f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t one of t h e minor g i r l s
making t h e a c c u s a t i o n s f o r m e r l y r e s i d e d i n M i s s o u l a , and i t
was Robbins' belief that she had been the subject of a
juvenile proceeding while in Missoula. Robbins informed
Wyse that a grand jury was to be convened on O c t o b e r 30
( forty-eight hours later ) to consider the charges. Wyse
agreed to provide all the i n f o r m a t i o n he c o u l d obtain to
" a s s i s t Robbins.
That same day Wyse discovered that his firm had
represented the mother of the girl in a dependent and
n e g l e c t e d c h i l d a c t i o n i n 1977. Wyse d e c i d e d t o l o o k a t t h e
court file i n the matter t o determine i f i t c o n t a i n e d any
i n f o r m a t i o n which was n o t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e l a w f i r m ' s f i l e .
Wyse obtained the court file from the clerk of court by
r e p r e s e n t i n g himself a s a member of t h e firm t h a t handled
the neglected child action.
L a t e r t h a t same d a y Wyse went t o examine t h e c o u n t y
attorney's file. The county attorney's file contained a
psychologist's report that was not present in the other
files. Wyse made a photocopy of the report, included it
with the other information he had collected and sent the
information to Robbins and his attorney in California.
Upon discovering that Wyse had obtained this informa-
tion from the files, the Missoula County Attorney petitioned
the District Court for an order directing Wyse to appear and
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court
under section 3-1-501(1), MCA.
Although this action involved contempt of court, the
specific act at issue was the release by Wyse of dependent
and neglected child files to persons not authorized to
receive them. Section 41-3-205, MCA, prohibits
"dissemination" of such files without authorization, and
anyone violating this provision is deemed guilty of "a
misdemeanor." At the hearing, Wyse made a motion in limine
to restrict any testimony as to how he obtained the file
from the county attorney's office. The motion was denied.
Wyse admits he was aware that such files are confidential
and could be released pursuant to some statutory procedure.
However, he did not attempt to comply with the statute. The
District Court held that Wyse's actions constituted a viola-
tion of the duty of an attorney and was found in contempt of
court under section 3-1-501(l)(c), MCA.
The basic issue here is whether an unauthorized
dissemination, under section 41-3-205, MCA, occurred when
relator (Wyse) released the information contained in the
dependent and neglected child files.
Section 41-3-205, MCA, provides:
"Confidentialitx. (1) The case records of
the department of social and rehabilitation
services and its local affiliate, the county
welfare department, the county attorney, and
the court concerning actions taken under this
chapter and all records concerning reports of
child abuse and neglect shall be kept
confidential except as provided by this
section. Any person who permits or
encourages the unauthorized dissemination of
their contents is guilty of a misdemeanor.
"(2) Records may be used by interagency
interdisciplinary child protective teams as
authorized under 41-3-108 for the purposes of
assessing the needs of the child and family,
formulating a treatment plan, and monitoring
the plan. Members of the team are required
to keep information about the subject
individuals confidential.
"(3) Records may be disclosed to a court for
in camera inspection if relevant to an issue
before it. The court may permit public
disclosure if it finds such disclosure to be
necessary for the fair resolution of an issue
before it.
"(4) Nothing in this section is intended to
af fect the confidentiality of criminal court
records of law enforcement agencies." (Em-
phasis added. )
Relator argues that in order to ascertain the intent
of the statute, the word "dissemination" must be strictly
analyzed. He alleges that the meaning of the word
"dissemination" is synonymous with "public disclosure" and
is defined by the dictionary as "to broadcast" or
"communicate widely." (Webster's International Dictionary,
2nd Ed. at 753.) Therefore, he argues that the statute does
not apply to the type of communication involved here.
The intent of a statute cannot be derived from the
definition of one word. ,A statute derives its meaning from
the entire body of words taken together. This Court in
State ex rel. Freepan v. A b s t r a c e s Board of Examiners
(1935), 99 Mont. 564, 577, 45 P.2d 668, 670, stated:
"'The meaning of a given term employed in a
statute must be measured and controlled by
the connection in which it is employed, the
evident purpose of the statute, and the
subject to which it relates' (Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont.
608, 612, 214 Pac. 596), and, if the term has
a well-defined meaning in the law, its use,
without specific definition, will not render
the Act inoperative for uncertainty (State ex
rel. Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 Pac.
129)."
Relator admits in his brief, and admitted at the
hearing, that he knew the records of juvenile matters were
generally protected and that one could not disseminate such
information publicly. He also stated that he did not bother
to look up the statute, but that he "would have expected to
have found some provision for some kind of court hearing to
get a ruling as to its ultimate public disclosure." Relator
cannot argue that the statute is vague when he admits
knowing that this type of statute exists and admits knowing
that a court order is required to obtain the information in
the file. Relator is an officer of the court, a licensed
professional. He is not subject to the reasonable man
standard but to a higher standard, one dictated by the
nature of his profession.
Relator further contends that the provision contained
in section 41-3-205(3), MCA, which provides for court
approval to release the information does not apply here
because there was no issue before the court. Relator had
simply to file a petition requesting the court to release
the information and an "issue" would have been before the
court .
The next argument relator presents is that the
information must be communicated to the defendant and
co-counsel to determine if the information is relevant to
their defense; also, that any requirement that defense
counsel obtain a court order prior to that time makes it
impossible to obtain such an order. The statute is clear
that information relating to depenaent and neglected
children will not be released unless a court order is
obtained. To say that one needs to release the information
before one can determine if it is relevant is contrary to
the clear intent of the statute. If the information
contained in the file is not relevant, then the attorney
will just have to "discover" other sources of information.
The attorney takes a chance that the file contains relevant
information. Again, the attorney must obtain a court order
before he obtains the information in the file, not after the
fact.
Finally, the relator contends that, "Authorized
dissemination is not limited to statutory authorization."
Relator suggests by his argument that persons who are not
authorized by statute to receive the information often do
and that he should not be singled out.
The law is often applied discriminately. A police
I
officer does not cite all speeders, drinking drivers,
I
negligent drivers, etc. The fact that relator was cited is
part of the discretionary aspect of the law and simply
I because a possible violation may have gone unnoticed does
1 not mean that all persons are thereby free to violate the
, statute.
The writ of review is hereby denied.
i .-?
I W concur:
e
I
C h i e f Jus'tice
Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r s :
I concur i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e
r e q u e s t e d w r i t of r e v i e w be d e n i e d . However, I do n o t
concur i n a l l t h a t i s s a i d i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n .
I do n o t f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 41-3-205(3), MCA, sets out
a p r o c e d u r e under which r e l a t o r c o u l d have p e t i t i o n e d t h e
C o u r t f o r a r e l e a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e r e b y c r e a t e d a n
" i s s u e " a s p r o v i d e d i n t h a t code s e c t i o n . I b e l i e v e paragraph
( 3 ) a p p l i e s where a c o u r t a l r e a d y h a s an i s s u e b e f o r e i t and
r e c o r d d i s c l o s u r e r e l a t e s i n some manner t o t h a t i s s u e .
That i s n o t the f a c t s i t u a t i o n here.
Nonetheless, I do f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 41-3-205 (1) c o n t a i n s
a p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t unauthorized dissemination. That
paragraph i n p a r t s t a t e s : "Any p e r s o n who p e r m i t s o r e n c o u r a g e s
t h e u n a u t h o r i z e d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of t h e i r c o n t e n t s i s g u i l t y
o f a misdemeanor." The f a c t s show a d i s s e m i n a t i o n by r e l a t o r
of i n f o r m a t i o n t o an a t t o r n e y and c l i e n t i n C a l i f o r n i a which
was n o t a u t h o r i z e d i n any manner.
R e l a t o r i s charged w i t h a contempt under s e c t i o n 3-1-
501 ( c ) , MCA, which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t p r o v i d e s :
" (1) The f o l l o w i n g a c t s . . . i n respect
t o a c o u r t of j u s t i c e o r p r o c e e d i n g s t h e r e -
i n a r e contempts of t h e a u t h o r i t y of c o u r t :
" (c) . . . v i o l a t i o n of d u t y by a n a t t o r n e y
... 11
R e l a t o r i s b o t h a n a t t o r n e y and law p r o f e s s o r and i s
aware of t h e s t a n d a r d s of p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d u c t r e q u i r e d of
him i n t h o s e c a p a c i t i e s . R e l a t o r c o u l d r e a d i l y have c o n t a c t e d
a judge of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n M i s s o u l a , whether i n p e r s o n
o r by t e l e p h o n e , and r e q u e s t e d a u t h o r i t y t o d i s s e m i n a t e t h e
information. He c h o s e i n s t e a d t o make a n u n a u t h o r i z e d
dissemination t o t h e persons i n California. Clearly t h a t
c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of h i s d u t y a s a n a t t o r n e y and i s
t h e r e f o r e a contempt w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e . R e l a t o r i n good
f a i t h was s e e k i n g t o h e l p a f r i e n d and c l i e n t and was f a c e d
w i t h l i m i t e d t i m e i n which t o f u r n i s h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n .
However, I d o n o t f i n d f a c t s w a r r a n t i n g t h e u n a u t h o r i z e d
dissemination. I t h e r e f o r e j o i n i n t h e holding of t h e
majority.
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a
written dissent later.