Marriage of Hill

No. 81-275
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
ZELDA SANGRAY HILL,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
ROBERT A. HILL,
Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade
Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Christensen and McLean, Stanford, Montana
Jack M. McLean argued, Stanford, Montana
For Respondent:
Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana
Leo Graybill, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted: January 12, 1982
Decided : M4 j . 5 a
I '2
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of
the Court.

This is an appeal frorn a judgment of the District

Court, Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, Cascade

County, a r i s i n g o u t of a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. Appellant

wife was g r a n t e d a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e on O c t o b e r 21,

1976, with t h e q u e s t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y reserved.

On December 17, 1980, a hearing on the disposition of

property was h e l d in the District Court, The trial judge

e n t e r e d judgment d i s p o s i n g of the marital assets, and from

t h a t judgment w i f e a p p e a l s .

The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e :

1. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District

Court to find that respondent husband owned one-half

i n t e r e s t a s a t e n a n t i n common i n t h e " G a l l o d a y P l a c e " ?

2. Was there s u f f i c i e n t evidence for the District

Court to find that the property known as the "Richardson

P l a c e " had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a s of t h e d a t e o f

t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage?

3. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District

Court to find that the property known a s t h e "Home P l a c e "

had a fair market value of $260,00I?I as of the date of

d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e ?

4. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District

Court to conclude that the remainder interest which

respondent received from h i s father's e s t a t e was a vested
remainder s u b j e c t t o divestment?

5. Should a v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t be i n c l u d e d i n

t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ?

6, Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District

Court t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Woodbury
P l d c e " s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ?

7. Did the District Court err i n deducting child

support from the appellant's share of the marital assets

when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t ?

Respondent and appellant were married in Geyser,

Montana, on June 14, 1959. Three children were born as

i s s u e of t h e m a r r i a g e , b u t t h e i r c u s t o d y is n o t i n d i s p u t e .

The d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e was g r a n t e d O c t o b e r

21, 1976, w i t h t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e s e r v e d .

Respondent is a farrner and c a t t l e rancher. During

most o f t h e p a r t i e s ' seventeen-year marriage, t h e y l i v e d on

a ranch near Raynesford, Montana, which r e s p o n d e n t f a r m s i n

conjunction with his mother, Anna Hill, and his brother

LeRoy H i l l . The r a n c h h a s a l w a y s been a f a m i l y o p e r a t i o n .

Respondent i n h e r i t e d a one-fourth remainder interest

i n one-half of his parents' ranch pursuant to a decree of

d i s t r i b u t i o n e n t e r e d on O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , a b o u t e i g h t m o n t h s

prior to the parties' marriage. This property existed in

two separate parcels known as the Home Place and the

Richardson Place, Respondent's b r o t h e r r e s i d e d on t h e Home

Place which contains about 2,956 acres. Respondent and

appellant resided on the Richardson Place which contains

1,199 acres. Respondent and h i s brother each worked the

p a r c e l o f l a n d on which h e r e s i d e d ,

On July 25, 1963, respondent and his brother pur-

chased, a s t e n a n t s i n common, a b o u t 795 a c r e s o f l a n d known

a s t h e Galloday Place. The l a n d was f i n a n c e d by a m o r t g a g e

on a l l o f t h e l a n d owned by t h e H i l l s , i n c l u d i n g Anna and

LeRoy H i l l .

At the t i m e of the dissolution respondent operated
t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e a s h i s own p r o p e r t y . Appellant t e s t i f i e d

that while LeRoy, the husband's brother, had a one-half

i n t e r e s t i n t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e , i t was i n o r d e r t h a t o n e d a y

the husband would have t h e Richardson and G a l l o d a y P l a c e s

and h i s b r o t h e r would h a v e t h e Home P l a c e . Appellant a l s o

t e s t i f i e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r o t h e r d i d n o t have a n y t h i n g t o

d o w i t h t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e b u t was h e l p i n g pay f o r i t s o h e

c o u l d g e t t h e Home P l a c e .

In addition, i n 1972 t h e property was m o r t g a g e d to

buy more l a n d . A t t h a t time respondent's two s i s t e r s s i g n e d

a q u i t c l a i m deed to their i n t e r e s t s over to their mother.

Respondent testified t h i s was d o n e a s a c o n v e n i e n c e t o t h e

Federal Land Bank t o o b t a i n t h e l o a n and t h a t the sisters

still have their equitable i n t e r e s t s coming to them. The

m o r t g a g e o f a l l t h e H i l l l a n d s was i n c r e a s e d a g a i n when t h e

b r o t h e r purchased o t h e r l a n d s .

T h i s c a s e was some f o u r y e a r s i n coming t o t r i a l . It

was n o t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t t r i a l j u d g e i n s i s t e d and s e t t i m e

periods to ready the case for trial that it finally was

tried. One of t h e p r o b l e m s a t t r i a l a r o s e from a n o r d e r o f

t h e c o u r t , i s s u e d November 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , s h o r t e n i n g t h e t i m e f o r

response t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s concerning t h e r e a l

property in which the husband claimed an interest and a

r e q u e s t f o r a l i s t o f e x h i b i t s and p e r m i s s i o n t o e n t e r upon

tile p r o p e r t y f o r inspection purposes. T h i s o r d e r was n o t

timely complied with, causing appellant problems at the

trial. At trial, r e s p o n d e n t i n t r o d u c e d h i s 1976 income t a x

r e t u r n i n t o e v i d e n c e , and a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s s h e d i d n o t h a v e

time t o inspect it. Appellant a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t because of

the lateness of its submission, she could not properly
cross-examine r e s p o n d e n t on t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e r e t u r n .

Subsequently, a p p e l l a n t requested t h e D i s t r i c t Court

to take judicial notice of respondent's claimed one-half

interest in 2,270 a c r e s of land a c q u i r e d i n 1972 known a s

t h e Woodbury P l a c e . However, no f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r c o n c l u -

s i o n s o f l a w were made r e g a r d i n g t h i s p r o p e r t y .

Respondent d i d n o t p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d support. The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t , however, i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u -

s i o n s of l a w on t h e m a t t e r . The judgment e n t e r e d on March

31, 1981, deducted $7,126 for child s u p p o r t payments from

a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y award.

The District Court found appellant's share of the

i n a r i t a l e s t a t e t o be $30,432.51, l e s s $7,126 f o r c h i l d sup-

p o r t and $ 1 , 1 2 5 f o r a p p r a i s a l .

The first issue is whether there was sufficient

evidence for the District Court to find that t h e husband

owned a o n e - h a l f e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y known a s

the Galloday Place. The G a l l o d a y Place was purchased in

1 9 6 3 and r e c o r d e d i n t h e names o f r e s p o n d e n t and h i s b r o t h e r

a s t e n a n t s i n common. A s previously noted, testimony indi-

c a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d owners of t h e H i l l p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t

always t h e e q u i t a b l e owners. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s s i s t e r s q u i t -

claimed their remainder interest in certain properties to

t h e i r mother to assist i n g e t t i n g a l o a n from t h e F e d e r a l

Land Bank. While t h e r e s p o n d e n t i s t h e l e g a l o n e - h a l f owner

of the property as a tenant in common, according to the
appellant, he considered himself the owner of the entire

property.

The G a l l o d a y P l a c e c o n s i s t s o f 795 a c r e s . The B l a c k

Place, which was p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l Galloday Place, con-
s i s t e d of f i v e a c r e s . The r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t w h i l e t h e

G a l l o d a y P l a c e was b o u g h t by him and h i s b r o t h e r t o be h e l d

i n common o w n e r s h i p he does farm the property and has at

times listed it in his financial statement. However, as

previously noted, i n t h i s family ranch, o p e r a t i n g much l i k e

a partnership, it was n o t uncommon when b o r r o w i n g from a

bank t o i n c l u d e a l l t h e H i l l f a m i l y l a n d which was t o s t a n d

good f o r t h e l o a n . A l l t h e H i l l l a n d s were farmed t o g e t h e r ,

and e a c h p l a c e made a c o n t r i b u t i o n whenever p o s s i b l e t o t h e

payment on the Federal Land Bank mortgage. Therefore,

respondent argues, the t r i a l c o u r t had reasonable evidence

b e f o r e i t on which i t c o u l d draw i t s c o n c l u s i o n ,

The rule in Montana for our review of a property

division of marital cases is whether the District Court

acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious

judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason i n view of the

circumstances. Kuntz v . Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 237, 593

P.2d 4 1 , 36 St.Rep. 662.

On r e v i e w , the court's f i n d i n g s do n o t a p p e a r t o be

arbitrary or beyond reason concerning this issue. The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a p p e a r t o be s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n -

tial credible evidence, and the f i n d i n g s of the District

Court concerning t h e Galloday Place a r e s u s t a i n e d ,

I s s u e s two and three, concerning t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of

the evidence t o support the District Court's f i n d i n g s on

t h e v a l u e of the properties known a s t h e Richardson Place
and t h e Home P l a c e , w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r .

The District Court found that the Richardson Place

had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i s -

s o l u t i o n and t h a t t h e Home P l a c e had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f
$260,000 a t that time. However, the court failed to set

forth in its findings of fact how the net worth of the

p a r t i e s was d e t e r m i n e d , a s r e q u i r e d by N u n n a l l y v . Nunnally

(1981) , Mont . , 625 P.2d 1 1 5 9 , 38 St.Rep. 529.
The c o u r t found t h e f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f t h e R i c h a r d -

s o n P l a c e was $160,000. T h i s v a l u e was b a s e d e n t i r e l y upon

t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s testimony of per a c r e v a l u a t i o n . Respondent

t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e p e r a c r e v a l u e o f h a y and g r a z i n g l a n d .

However, no t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d a s t o how many a c r e s o f

c r o p , hay o r g r a z i n g l a n d t h e r e w e r e on t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e

or on the Home P l a c e . The only explanation that we can

arrive at for the District Court's valuation is that it

adopted t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t on t h e s e

matters verbatim.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y

Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), Mont. , 607 P.2d 102,

37 S t . R e p . 247, is c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Hamilton, Arabian h o r s e s

were a p p r a i s e d in the property d i s t r i b u t i o n without a find-

i n g a s t o t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .

This Court held t h a t t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s was n e c e s -

s a r y t o p l a c e a v a l u e on them. The s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r h e r e

f o r it appears t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court ignored t h e testimony

of a competent cour t-appointed appraiser, who valued the

property some $68,000 higher than t h e v a l u e g i v e n by the

respondent.

Viewing t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l

court erred in its v a l u a t i o n of both t h e Richardson Place

and t h e Home P l a c e . The c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e number

of a c r e s of e a c h t y p e of l a n d which was used i n t h e v a l u a -

tion. W h i l e r e s p o n d e n t ' s E x h i b i t B r e f e r s t o 1 , 2 0 0 a c r e s on
t h e Richardson Place, t h e r e i s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c r e a g e

breakdown s o we are unable t o determine what p a r t of the

l a n d was c r o p l a n d , h a y l a n d , o r g r a z i n g l a n d . As a result,

we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and

t h e Home P l a c e a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .

Respondent a r g u e s t h a t h i s remainder i n t e r e s t i n both

the Richardson Place and the Home Place should not be

included as a part of the marital estate and that their

valuations are therefore not relevant. T h i s c o n t e n t i o n is

b a s e d on r e s p o n d e n t ' s claim t h a t h i s remainder interest in

the Home Place and the Richardson Place is subject to

divestment in the event that he dies before h i s mother,

R e s p o n d e n t b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on t h e wording o f the w i l l

of his father, J. Elmer Hill. That c o n t e n t i o n d i s r e g a r d s

t h e d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e e s t a t e of J. Elmer I i i l l ,

d a t e d O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t p r o v i d e d :

" I T I S HERE A D J U D G E D AND D E C R E E D , t h a t ...
t h e r e s i d u e o f s a i d E s t a t e o f J. Elmer H i l l ,
... hereinafter p a r t i c u l a r l y described. ..
be and t h e same i s h e r e b y d i s t r i b u t e d a s
follows, to-wit:

"Real e s t a t e : To Anna Mae H i l l , f o r and
during her l i f e t i m e , with f u l l c o n t r o l , use,
p o s s e s s i o n , p r o c e e d s , and income t h e r e f r o m ,
and w i t h o u t liability for any injury,
d e s t r u c t i o n , damage, l o s s o r w a s t e t h e r e t o ,
w i t h remainder s h a r e and s h a r e a l i k e t o
R o b e r t A. H i l l [ r e s p o n d e n t ] ..
.[description
o f R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and Home P l a c e ] ."
The c o n t e n t i o n s o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t i g n o r e t h e s e t t l e d

law in this state. Even prior to the enactment of the

Uniform P r o b a t e Code, a d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e

upon t h e r i g h t s o f d e v i s e e s u n d e r a w i l l . As stated in In

r e B e l l ' s Estate ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 4 lvlont. 345, 350, 331 P.2d 517,

"A d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e upon
 t h e r i g h t s of h e i r s , l e g a t e e s o r d e v i s e e s ,
s u b j e c t o n l y t o be r e v e r s e d , s e t a s i d e o r
m o d i f i e d on a p p e a l . R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , s e c t i o n 91-
3902; I n Re E s t a t e o f Murphy, s u p r a [other
cases cited]. A decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n h a s
t h e same f o r c e and e f f e c t a s d o e s a f i n a l
judgment."

The r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t i s c o r r e c t l y de-

s c r i b e d i n t h e d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n and c a n n o t be c h a n g e d

by a c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k i n which t h e r e s p o n d e n t s u g g e s t s t h a t

the w i l l required a d i f f e r e n t t y p e of d e c r e e of distribu-

tion. W therefore conclude t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court's find-
e

i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t was a v e s t e d i n t e r -

e s t s u b j e c t t o d i v e s t m e n t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .

The n e x t i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r -

e s t of r e s p o n d e n t s h o u l d be included in the marital estate

f o r p u r p o s e s of property distribution. At t h e t i m e of the

m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n on O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 6 , t h e r e s p o n d e n t had

a remainder interest with a present value, a property

i n t e r e s t which w i l l r i p e n i n t o a f u l l o n e - f o u r t h interest in

a l l of t h e l a n d upon t h e d e a t h o f h i s m o t h e r .

At least three jurisdictions, Kansas, Wisconsin and

Kentucky, have h e l d t h a t a s p o u s e ' s v e s t e d remainder i n t e r -

e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y should be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n

of a marital estate. A s i m i l a r p r o b l e m was c o n s i d e r e d i n

t h e c a s e o f McCain v . McCain ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 219 Kan. 780, 549 P.2d

896. T h e r e , t h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d owned s p e c i f i c

u n d i v i d e d f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i n two q u a r t e r s e c t i o n s o f land.

Neither of these would ripen into a possessory interest
until t h e termination of t h e e s t a t e of t h e l i f e t e n a n t of

each tract. Nonetheless, his interests were vested re-

m a i n d e r s which c o u l d be s o l d . They had p r e s e n t v a l u e . The

court, speaking of a remainder interest subject to life
e s t a t e , s a i d t h a t i t h e l d i n Woolums v . Simonsen ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 214

Kan. 722, 522 P.2d 1321:

". . . t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r c h i l d r e n h a v e a
remainder i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t
t o a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e mother of t h e a p p e l -
lant, Considering t h e age of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s
mother, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t
and h e r c h i l d r e n w i l l s u r v i v e h e r m o t h e r . ..
i s a good p r o s p e c t , B e c a u s e o f t h i s prob-
a b i l i t y the appellant has a saleable property
r i g h t of c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s e n t v a l u e ...
"Under t h e law o f t h i s s t a t e , t h e g e n e r a l
r u l e i s t h a t a n y i n t e r e s t a p e r s o n may h a v e
in property, vested or contingent, legal o r
equitable ,
under e x e c u t i o n .
.
, may b e l e v i e d upon and s o l d
[Citing cases.] Another
c a s e h o l d i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t o f a remain-
derman , . . is s a l e a b l e is Markham v .
Waterman, 1 0 5 Kan. 9 3 , 1 8 1 P. 621." McCain,
549 P.2d a t 900.

See also: Jordan v. Jordan (1969), 44 Wisc.2d 471, 171

N.W.2d 385; Rompf v . Rompf (Ky. 1 9 6 8 ) , 433 S.W.2d 879.

I n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have reached

t h e same c o n c l u s i o n s when c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s

of marital estates, See, Trowbridge v. Trowbridge (1962) ,

1 6 Wisc.2d 176, 1 1 4 N.W.2d 129; Maxwell v . Maxwell (1921),

106 Neb. 689, 1 8 4 N.W. 227; Hughes v . Hughes (1975) , 132

Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , in dis-

p o s i n y of property f o l l o w i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , to

" f i n a l l y , e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s t h e prop-

erty and assets belonging to either or both, however and

whenever acquired and w h e t h e r the title thereto is i n the

name of the husband or wife or both." S e c t i o n 40-4-202,

MCA.

While the right to possession of a vested future

i n t e r e s t is p o s t p o n e d , i t is s t i l l a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t t h a t

c a n be d i s t r i b u t e d . S e e s e c t i o n s 70-1-315 and 70-1-317, MCA.
 W agree with the court
e i n McCain, supra, where it

found that since such vested interest could be sold or
t
o t h e r w i s e a l i e n a t e d , t r a n s f e r r e d o r mortgaged, t h e p r o p e r t y

had a p r e s e n t v a l u e and s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d .
Respondent attempts to distinguish McCain because

K a n s a s h a s n o t a d o p t e d t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t .
However, the Kansas statute on the division of marital

p r o p e r t y is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f Montana:
"The d e c r e e s h a l l d i v i d e t h e r e a l and p e r -
s o n a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e p a r t i e s , w h e t h e r owned
by e i t h e r s p o u s e p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d
by e i t h e r s p o u s e i n t h e s p o u s e ' s own r i g h t
a f t e r m a r r i a g e , o r a c q u i r e d by t h e i r j o i n t
e f f o r t s , i n a j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e manner
... I' S e c t i o n 60-1610 ( d ) , K a n s a s S t a t u t e s
Annotated.
We find that the District Court erred in not

including respondent's vested remainder interest in the
m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of d i s t r i b u t i o n .

The n e x t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i -
dence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o conclude t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y
known a s t h e Woodbury P l a c e s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e
marital estate.
W have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d i n s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s
e

in t h i s case that one of the problems that arose during
t r i a l was r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o co~nply w i t h the c o u r t ' s

o r d e r t o a l l o w s h o r t e r time t o respond t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .
This included respondent's 1976 f e d e r a l income t a x return

about which the appellant complained she did not have
s u f f i c i e n t time t o p r o p e r l y cross-examine or analyze. This

r e t u r n c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e Woodbury P l a c e . In
view of the fact that t h i s case nust be returned to the
District Court for reconsideration of the a s s e t s of the
m a r i t a l e s t a t e , we d i r e c t t h a t on r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p e l l a n t
b e a l l o w e d t o p u r s u e examination a s t o t h e Woodbury P l a c e .

We also note that t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t condone r e s p o n d e n t ' s

f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r o r a n y o t h e r

f r u s t r a t i o n of discovery. Owen v . F. A, Buttrey & Charles

Revson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont, -, 627 P.2d 1 2 3 3 , 38 S t . R e p . 714.

The f i n a l i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e d u c t -

ing child support from appellant's share of the marital

a s s e t s when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r s u c h s u p p o r t ,

A p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e f a m i l y home i n J a n u a r y 1 9 7 3 and went t o

G r e a t F a l l s where s h e a t t e n d e d a Vo-Tech school for eleven

months. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t respondent paid f o r her

t u i t i o n and e x p e n s e s and t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n r e m a i n e d on t h e

r a n c h w i t h him d u r i n g t h i s period. Appellant returned to

the family home on December 21, 1973, but left the ranch

again and did not return until several months before the

dissolution. During that time the children remained with

respondent a t t h e ranch.

The decree of dissolution, dated October 21, 1976,

provides, among other things, that "custody, support and

v i s i t a t i o n of t h e minor c h i l d r e n was r e s e r v e d , " Appellant

i n h e r c o m p l a i n t a s k e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be g r a n t e d " m u t u a l "

c u s t o d y , and r e s p o n d e n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e c e s -

s a r y c h i l d s u p p o r t and c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n was t h e r e b y

placed in issue. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded that, "the

reasonable cost of support of the minor children of the

parties from October 21, 1976, through their respective

majorities, is $14,252. One-half of t h i s sum, o r '$7,126'

is t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of [appellant] to t h e support of the

m i n o r c h i l d r e n from h e r s h a r e o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . "

The c o u r t h e a r d no e v i d e n c e on t h e c h i l d r e n ' s f i n a n -
c i a 1 r e s o u r c e s o r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n
or on the financial resources of the appellant. These
f a c t o r s must be considered in determining child support
under s e c t i o n 40-4-204, MCA. W find,
e therefore, that the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e and

c o n s t i t u t e s an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . When t h e m a t t e r comes
b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on remand, t h e s e m a t t e r s may b e

c o n s i d e r e d w i t h p r o p e r t e s t i m o n y by b o t h p a r t i e s t o a r r i v e
a t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n .
The cause is remanded to the District Court with

d i r e c t i o n s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s o p i n i o n .

W conc
e