IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 39458
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 690
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: October 24, 2012
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
COLBY TYLER HICKEY, aka COOKSON; ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
HICKEY-COOKSON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified fifteen-year sentence
with two-year determinate term for aggravated battery, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge
PER CURIAM
Colby Tyler Hickey was convicted of aggravated battery, Idaho Code §§ 18-903(a), 18-
907(b). The district court imposed a unified fifteen-year sentence with a three-year determinate
term, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed Hickey on
probation. Subsequently, Hickey admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the
district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence,
reducing the determinate term to two years. Hickey appeals, contending that the district court
abused its discretion in revoking probation or, alternatively, in failing to further reduce his
sentence upon revoking probation.
1
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158,
162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering
execution of Hickey’s reduced sentence. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing
execution of Hickey’s previously suspended, modified sentence is affirmed.
2