No. 92-355
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA
1993
L. MICHAEL BEASLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SEMITOOL, INC., SEMITHERM, INC.,
and RAYMON F. THOMPSON,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
The Honorable Ted 0. Lympus, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL O F RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeffrey D. Ellingson; Ellingson Law Offices,
Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
Debra D. Parker; Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn &
Phillips, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 14, 1993
Decided: May 13, 1993
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
L. Michael Beasley appeals an order of the Eleventh Judicial
District Court, Flathead County, granting summary judgment in favor
of Semitool, Inc., Semitherm, Inc. and Raymon Thompson on his claim
for wrongful discharge, breach of express and implied contract, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We reverse.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred
in concluding that the Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's
contract claims for breach of express and implied contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
While L. Michael Beasley (Beasley) was working as an
electronics project engineer in Kentucky, an agent of Semitool,
Inc. (Semitool) began employment negotiations with Beasley.
Semitool, located in Kalispell, manufactures products in the
electronics, memory disk and semiconductor industry. On June 3,
1986, Semitool offered Beasley the position of "Product Marketing
Manager for Spray Acid Tool," which Beasley accepted eight days
later. Beasley contends that Semitool's offer included oral
promises of stock options, bonuses tied to sales increases and
opportunities for advancement not specifically set forth in the
letter offering him the position.
Beasley moved to Kalispell, began working for Semitool and
received excellent job evaluations. In November of 1987, he was
transferred to Semitherm, Inc. (Semitherm), a sister company of
Semitool, to lead the development, marketing and production of a
vertical diffusion furnace. He alleges that this transfer was
accompanied by oral promises of raises, higher bonuses, and stock
options. On January 28, 1989, Beasley resigned from semithem,
citing the company's failure to keep its compensation-related
promises.
On February 13, 1990, Beasley filed a complaint against
Semitool, Semitherm and Raymon Thompson (collectively hereafter
Semitool) for breach of express and implied contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful discharge.
Semitool moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Montana
Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (Wrongful Discharge Act)
provided Beasley's exclusive remedy and that he could prove no
damages under the Wrongful Discharge Act. The District Court
granted Semitool's motion, and entered judgment against Beasley.
This appeal follows.
Initially, we note that Beasley was hired by a Texas firm at
a significantly higher salary soon after his resignation from
Semitherm, As a result, Beasley has abandoned his claim for
wrongful discharge on appeal.
Did the District Court err in concluding that the Wrongful
Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims for breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
In its order, the District Court first stated that Beasley's
three claims for damages were based on the same facts and that the
acts complained of occurred during the employment relationship.
The court focused on 5 39-2-913, MCA, of the Wrongful Discharge
Act, which reads:
Preemption of common-law remedies. Except as provided in
this part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or
express or implied contract.
The District Court then determined that this provision of the
Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims. It
concluded that Beasley would be unable to prevail on his complaint
under any set of facts because his contract claims were barred as
a matter of law and he could prove no damages under the Wrongful
Discharge Act. Therefore, the District Court granted summary
judgment for Semitool.
Our standard in reviewing a grant of summary judgment is the
same as that initially utilized by the trial court. McCracken v.
City of Chinook (1990), 242 Mont. 21, 24, 788 P.2d 892, 894.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions,
and other documents on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of
material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. In its order,
the District Court assumed the facts alleged by Beasley to be true
and concluded, as a matter of law, that the Wrongful Discharge Act
barred Beasley's contract claims. Therefore, we focus our initial
inquiry on this legal conclusion. Our review of legal questions is
plenary. See Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont.
470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
Beasley agrees that the Wrongful Discharge Act is the
exclusive remedy for claims arising from an employee's discharge
and that no discharge claim thereunder can arise from tort or
express or implied contract. He argues, however, that his contract
claims arise from semitool's failure to abide by its
representations during his employment and, therefore, that his
breach of contract and covenant claims occurred both prior to, and
independent of, his resignation. On that basis, Beasley argues
that his independent contract-based claims for damages are not
affected or barred by the Wrongful Discharge Act.
In interpreting statutes, including the Wrongful Discharge
Act, we first look to the plain meaning of the words used. ~llison
v. Jumping Horse Ranch, Inc. (Mont. 1992), 843 P.2d 753, 755, 49
St.Rep. 1039, 1040. To interpret a phrase within the plain meaning
rule, the language used must be reasonably and logically
interpreted, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning.
Allison, 843 P.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is the function of the
courts to ascertain and declare what in terms or substance is
contained in a statute; it is not our function to insert what has
been omitted or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA;
City of Bozeman v. Racicot (l992), 253 Mont. 204, 208, 832 P.2d
767, 769.
Turning to 5 39-2-913, MCA, we must give effect to the
entirety of the statute, which reads: lt[e]xceptas provided in this
part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or
implied contract." The usual and ordinary meaning of llclaim for
discharge" does not encompass any and all claims an employee may
have against the employer, but only those claims for damages caused
by an asserted wrongful discharge. The District Court s
interpretation of 1 39-2-913, MCA, effectively omits the words t'for
d i s c h a r g e " from that statute and r e s u l t s i n a sweeping preemption
of a11 other claims arising out of the employment relationship.
This result disregards the stated purpose ofthe Wrongful Discharge
Act, which is to set forth "certain rights and remedies with
respect to wronqful discharse." Section 39-2-902, MCA (emphasis
added). We conclude that 39-2-913, MCA, bars claims for
discharge arising from tort or implied or express contract, but
does not bar all tort or contract claims merely because they arise
in the employment context.
Semitool contends that because Beasley relied on the same set
of facts for each cause of action in his complaint, he presented
one claim and three alternative theories of recovery, two of which
are barred by the Wrongful Discharge Act. It may be true that
Beasleyfs complaint is not a model of artful pleading and that the
manner in which it is structured creates confusion. Rather than
specifying which factual allegations support each cause of action
individually, Beasley sets forth all of his factual allegations at
the beginning of the complaint; he then separately sets out his
causes of action, essentially incorporating all of the factual
allegations into each count. However, Beasley does aver his
contract damages separately from the damages claimed for wrongful
discharge. The complaint is sufficient to indicate Beasley's
intent to plead the causes of action as separate and independent
claims.
Further, Rules 8(a) and 18(a), M.R.Civ.P., specifically allow
the joinder of alternative claims in a complaint. Mere joinder of
alternative or inconsistent claims in a complaint does not require
dismissal of an otherwise legitimate claim. See Bozeman Deaconess
Foundation v. Cowgill (1963), 143 Mont. 98, 100, 387 P.2d 435, 436.
Nor does the Wrongful Discharge Act limit a claimant's right to
plead independent causes of action in conjunction with a claim
under the Wrongful Discharge Act. We conclude that Beasley's
reliance in his complaint on the same set of facts for his three
causes of action does not require dismissal of the alleged
independent contract-based claims.
Semitool further argues that Dagel v. City of Great Falls
(lggl), 250 Mont. 224, 819 P.2d 186, relied on by the District
Court, requires the dismissal of Beasley's contract claims. It
does not. Dasel did not concern, as does the case before us, the
effect of the Wrongful Discharge Act on claims which are separate
and independent from the claim of wrongful discharge. A close
examination of the allegation in plaintiff's complaint on which we
focused in Daqel illustrates the distinguishing characteristics
between Daqel and the present case:
8. By reason of Plaintiff's satisfactory service and the
performance of her duties, her employer's assurances,
policies, and procedures, salary increases, and the
absence of criticism of her performance, there was an
implied promise by the City that Plaintiff's employment
would not be terminated and she would not be discharged
except for just cause. In terminating Plaintiff's
employment as alleged, the City wrongfully, unreasonably
and tortiously violated its implied promise and its duty
implied in the employment relationship to deal fairly and
in good faith with Plaintiff.
Daqel, 819 P.2d at 194. Clearly, sets forth a tort claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
relating t o the plaintiff's discharge. The only conceivable
contract-based claim found in the complaint in a is the
allegation regarding an "implied promise by the City that
Plaintiffrs employment would not be terminated. . . . Most
importantly, however, it is clear both the tort and implied
contract claim in Dasel are completely and inextricably intertwined
with and based on Dagelrs termination and discharge. Dasel is
simply inapplicable here.
In sum, the Wrongful Discharge Act is the exclusive remedy for
claims arising from an employee's wrongful discharge. Beasley's
contract-based claims, taken as true solely for purposes of the
issue before us, arise from Semitoolrs breach of his employment
contract rather than from an alleged wrongful discharge. We hold
that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for
Semitool on Beasley's contract-based claims.
Finally, Semitool argues that even if Beasleyrs remaining
contract-based claims are not barred by the Wrongful Discharge Act,
he did not present a prima facie case on those claims and,
therefore, summary judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, Semitool
argues that Beasley's allegations of oral representations
concerning the employment contract are barred by the statute of
frauds .
It is well settled that this Court will not address on appeal
an issue not presented to the district court. Wyman v. DuBray Land
Realty (1988), 231 Mont. 294, 299, 752 P.2d 196, 200. Before the
District Court, Semitool argued only that the Wrongful Discharge
Act barred Beasley's contract claims and that he had not suffered
compensable damages under the Act; it did not present and,
accordingly, the District Court did not address the additional
issues now presented by Semitool. Having determined that the
District Court's legal conclusion that the Wrongful Discharge Act
barred Beasley's contract claims was in error, we leave further
consideration of the contract-based issues for the District Court
on remand.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We concur:
May 13, 1993
CERTFECATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Jeffrey D. Ellingson
Ellingson Law OEces
33 Second St. E.
Kalispell, hdT 59901
Dana L. Christensen and Debra D. Parker
Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips
P.O. Box 759
Kalispell, MT 59903-0759
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA