Paccar Financial Corp. v. Les Schwab Tire Centers of Montana, Inc.

’ NO. 95-503 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA .+ 1996 PACCAR FINANCIAL CORP., a Washington corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTERS OF MONTANA, INC., a Montana corporation, and INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorablk Ed McLean, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Patrick G. Frank, Worden, Thane & Haines, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: John R. Velk, Blakley & Velk, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: February 15, 1996 Decided: July 23, 1996 Filed: Clerk Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. Paccar Financial Corporation (Paccar) brought this action against Les Schwab Tire Centers of Montana (Les Schwab) and Insurance Company of North America (ICNA) to recover damages for the repossession of tires affixed to semi-trucks and trailers owned by Paccar and leased to MPT Corporation and/or Arthur and Dena Pamin (MPT). The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted Les Schwab's and ICNA's Motion for Summary Judgment as well as their Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification to this Court. We affirm. The following issues are presented for review: 1. Whether the District Court erred in determining that Paccar had no interest in the tires purchased by MPT from Les Schwab. 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to ICNA because Padcar was not a named party to the surety bond and did not have an insurable interest in the tires. 3. Whether the District Court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Factual and Procedural Background From late 1987 through early 1989, Paccar entered into several agreements with MPT over the lease of eighteen semi-trucks. To protect its interest in the leased trucks, Paccar filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State on May 17, 1989. From December 11, 1990, through October 5, 1991, MPT purchased 123 tires and related equipment from Les Schwab for mounting onto 2 the eighteen trucks leased through Paccar as well as several trucks owned by MPT. On July 23, 1991, MPT executed a continuing security agreement with Les Schwab setting forth the commercial and credit terms under which MPT could have an on-going business relationship with Les Schwab for the purpose of purchasing, on credit, goods and services for use in its trucking business. Les Schwab did not perfect its lien on the tires until August 5, 1991. When MPT failed to pay for the tires, Les Schwab brought an action in the District Court to repossess them. The court found that Les Schwab had made a prima facie showing of its right to possession and ordered the sheriff to seize the tires. Les Schwab asked ICNA to issue a bond wherein ICNA agreed to indemnify and pay all costs to the Defendants "in the event that the attachment or taking of property of Defendant(s) is found to be wrongful." Paccar filed a motion to intervene in the case on August 8, 1992, but before the court could rule on the motion, Les Schwab and MPT entered into a settlement agreement and the case was dismissed. Paccar instituted the present action on November 17, 1992, alleging a claim of conversion against Les Schwab for the repossession of the tires and naming ICNA as a party because of the bond. On September 9, 1994, Les Schwab and ICNA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this action. The District Court granted the motion on March 14, 1995. Upon motion by Les Schwab and ICNA and without objection by Paccar, the District Court certified, pursuant to Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., that its order granting summary judgment is a final order and judgment. 3 Standard of Review Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de nmm. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth our inquiry as follows: The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred. Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitted). Issue 1. Whether the District Court erred in determining that Paccar had no interest in the tires purchased by MPT from Les Schwab. Paccar contends that under its lease agreement with MPT, the tires became the property of Paccar when they were installed on the trucks leased by MPT. Paccar's lease agreements with MPT provide in part: [MPT] shall furnish, at its own expense, all necessary fuel, lubricants, grease, antifreeze, tires, tubes and all other replacement parts and supplies necessary for maintenance and lawful operation of the Equipment. . . . All parts installed and any modifications and alterations made in the course of the ordinary maintenance and repair of the Equipment shall become the property of [Paccarl and shall remain the property of [Paccarl upon termination of this Agreement unless otherwise provided herein. 4 The threshold issue then is whether the tires became so affixed to the trucks leased by MPT that they became "accessions." The District Court found that the tires were not accessions under the common law because they did not become an integral part of the trucks and remained independently identifiable and capable of being removed without harm or damage to the trucks. The doctrine of accession stems from the equitable notion that an owner of a chattel is entitled to his chattel in the same or improved condition after it has been tampered with by an innocent trespasser. The principle was not designed or intended to give the owner of the chattel more than he had to start with, but it was intended to assure he would not obtain his chattel in a condition of less value or usefulness than before it was changed by a third party. Thus, if the chattel was improved or enhanced and the improvements could not be severed from the chattel without injury to it, the improvements passed to the owner. Bank of America v. J. & S. Auto Repairs (Ariz. 1985), 694 P.Zd 246, 252 In Bank of America, the bank brought a replevin action to recover a van upon which the bank held a purchase money lien. The automobile repair shop which had repaired the van after its apparent abandonment by the mortgagor, filed a counterclaim. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that if detachable parts, such as the engine, transmission and tires, can be removed without damaging the vehicle, they are not accessions. Bank of America, 694 P.2d at 253. The Arizona court also determined that while a buyer and seller of a vehicle can make an agreement between themselves, they cannot bind third persons not parties to the agreement. Bank of America, 694 P.2d at 250. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Oregon held in Bancorp 5 Leasing v. Stadeli Pump (Or. 1987), 739 P.2d 548, that because a truck el