April 20 2011
DA 10-0421
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2011 MT 82
IN THE MATTER OF
I.B.,
A Youth in Need of Care.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DN 08-11
Honorable James A. Haynes, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Robin A. Meguire, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Howard Recht, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Hamilton,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 16, 2011
Decided: April 20, 2011
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 B.K. and C.B., natural mother and father of I.B., appeal the order of the Twenty-First
Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, terminating their parental rights. We affirm.
¶2 We review the following issues on appeal:
¶3 Does substantial evidence support the District Court’s adjudication of I.B. as a youth
in need of care?
¶4 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it terminated B.K.’s and C.B.’s
parental rights to I.B.?
¶5 Did the District Court correctly conclude that the Department made active efforts to
prevent breakup of the Indian family?
¶6 Did the parents receive effective assistance of counsel?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶7 The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department)
removed I.B. from his parents’ care on June 25, 2008. I.B. was about five months old at the
time of removal. The parents neglected to provide I.B. with necessary medical care. The
court adjudicated I.B. a youth in need of care and the parents stipulated to treatment plans in
July 2008. The court granted the Department’s petition to terminate B.K.’s and C.B.’s
parental rights on July 21, 2010.
¶8 B.K. and C.B. left three-month-old I.B. in the sun on May 5, 2008. I.B. suffered a
blistering facial sunburn and second degree burns on 20-30% of his body. I.B.’s sunburn
required hospitalization, including oxygen supplements, heart-monitoring, intravenous
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therapy, and blood draws. Community Medical Center in Missoula admitted I.B. on May 6,
2008. I.B. presented breathing difficulties, wheezing, a rapid heart rate, and possible
deafness and blindness. I.B.’s doctors refused to discharge I.B. until May 16, 2010, due in
part to concerns about the parents’ ability to care for I.B. I.B.’s doctors believed that B.K.
and C.B. could not understand, and were not following, medical care instructions that had
been given to them following I.B.’s premature birth. The Department received an abuse or
neglect referral and investigated.
¶9 Medical providers identified special medical needs of I.B. I.B.’s medical needs
related back to his premature birth. The record does not clearly indicate to what extent the
sunburn incident affected I.B.’s respiratory condition. The medical providers specifically
instructed B.K. and C.B. how to care for I.B. They instructed them that I.B. must be fed on a
rigid schedule and in a specific manner. The medical providers believed that I.B. would
aspirate and could possibly die if not fed in this specific manner. They instructed the parents
to hold I.B. in an upright position, hold his bottle, allow him to suck two to four times, and
then remove the nipple to allow him to breathe. They also instructed them to monitor I.B.’s
breathing closely and to keep a record of feeding times and breathing conditions. I.B.
required a closely monitored feeding schedule because he did not signal when he needed to
be fed.
¶10 Medical providers and the Department had concerns that B.K. and C.B. would not
follow the feeding routine and manner. The Department hired Family Concepts, an
independent organization that provides family support services, to assist in educating and
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training B.K. and C.B. to take care of I.B. Anna Marie White, a family support worker for
Family Concepts, provided B.K. and C.B. with supervised visitation, parenting classes, and
in-home services. White met the parents at the hospital and initially assisted them five times
a week in their home. White instructed the parents in the feeding technique ordered by I.B.’s
doctors and implemented a feeding schedule.
¶11 White also assisted B.K. and C.B. in cleaning up their yard and making it safe. The
yard contained pieces of metal, old fences, sharp tools, motor parts, and other trash that
presented safety concerns. Safety concerns also existed inside the home. The Department
found that the interior of the home needed to be cleaned. Many small items on the floor of
the home presented choking and safety hazards to I.B.
¶12 B.K. and C.B. consistently had difficulty implementing the correct feeding technique
or following the feeding schedule on their own. White suspected that the parents would not
feed I.B. properly without her direct supervision. She suspected that they left I.B.
unattended in his infant carrier with a bottle propped in his mouth. White confronted B.K.
about propping the bottle in this manner. B.K. admitted that she had been propping the
bottle. The bottle propping posed the risk that I.B. would choke or aspirate vomit. B.K. also
admitted that she had not been keeping the record of feeding times because she considered
the record-keeping to be “stupid.”
¶13 The Department’s social workers visited I.B.’s home unannounced on June 25, 2008,
and found I.B. with a bottle propped in his mouth in clear disregard of the specified feeding
technique. B.K. made no effort to hold or feed I.B. properly. B.K. busied herself instead by
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cleaning the kitchen. The Department determined that B.K. and C.B. were not able to meet
I.B.’s needs or provide for his health and safety. The Department removed I.B. from his
parents’ home and took him to the Marcus Daly Memorial Hospital due to respiratory
concerns, including wheezing. The Department later transferred I.B. to foster care, where he
had remained for about two years before the court ordered termination of parental rights.
¶14 The Department filed a petition seeking emergency protective services, adjudication
of I.B. as a youth in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The court held an
adjudication hearing. The court found that B.K. and C.B. had failed to follow simple feeding
instructions that I.B.’s medical doctors had ordered. The court adjudicated I.B. a youth in
need of care and granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The parents stipulated
to treatment plans proposed by the Department that addressed their care for I.B. and his
medical needs, the safety and condition of the parents’ home and yard, and I.B.’s attachment
to his parents. The parents agreed to complete the treatment plans’ tasks by January 15,
2009.
¶15 B.K. and C.B. did not realize that I.B. was eligible for enrollment in the Cherokee
Nation when the court adjudicated I.B. a youth in need of care. The parents apparently did
not know of their own Native American heritage until after the Department began
intervention proceedings. The parents enrolled I.B. in the Cherokee Nation sometime in
early 2009. The court held a hearing on March 11, 2009, and heard testimony from an
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) expert, Eleanor LaMere. LaMere testified that physical
and emotional risks existed in the parents’ home and that I.B.’s immediate return to the
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parents’ care would result in serious emotional or physical harm to him. LaMere
recommended that I.B. remain in foster care and that the court give the parents time to finish
their parenting classes. The Cherokee Nation filed a notice of intervention on August 11,
2009, and later informed that it would monitor the proceedings. The Cherokee Nation did
not object to I.B.’s foster family placement or the Department’s efforts to provide
rehabilitation services.
¶16 The court heard testimony for five days in a termination hearing that extended from
October 2009 to May 2010. The Department presented the testimony of a clinical
psychologist, a neuropsychologist, a licensed clinical social worker, a pediatric nurse
practitioner, two family support workers from Family Concepts, the foster mother, a
Department social worker, a Department family support specialist, an ICWA expert, and the
Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA). Several of the Department’s witnesses
recommended termination of B.K.’s and C.B.’s parental rights to I.B. The parents presented
the testimony of a clinical psychologist who opined that the parents could learn the necessary
parenting skills within a reasonable time. The trial testimony and other relevant facts will be
discussed further as needed.
¶17 The court determined that B.K. and C.B. had failed to complete or comply with their
treatment plans. B.K.’s and C.B.’s conduct and condition rendered them unfit to provide
adequate parental care to I.B. Their condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable
time. The court concluded that the evidence supported termination of B.K.’s and C.B.’s
parental rights to I.B. beyond a reasonable doubt.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s termination of parental rights. In
re B.M., 2010 MT 114, ¶ 14, 356 Mont. 327, 233 P.3d 338. We determine whether the
district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the conclusions of law are
correct. Id. Where ICWA applies, we will uphold a district court’s termination of parental
rights if a reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that continued
custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child. In re J.M., 2009 MT 332, ¶ 12, 353 Mont. 64, 218 P.3d 1213. This Court
exercises plenary review to determine whether a parent has been denied effective assistance
of counsel. In re B.M., ¶ 14.
DISCUSSION
¶19 Does substantial evidence support the District Court’s adjudication of I.B. as a youth
in need of care?
¶20 The State must present evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
child has been abused, neglected, or abandoned in order for a district court to adjudicate a
child as a youth in need of care. Sections 41-3-437(2), -102(34), -422(5)(a), MCA; In re
B.S., 2009 MT 98, ¶ 22, 350 Mont. 86, 206 P.3d 565. The abuse may be actual physical or
psychological harm to a child or substantial risk of physical or psychological harm caused by
a parent’s acts or omissions. Section 41-3-102(7), MCA; In re A.S., 2006 MT 281, ¶ 30, 334
Mont. 280, 146 P.3d 778. ICWA standards of proof apply if the proceeding involves an
Indian child. Section 41-3-422(5)(b), MCA.
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¶21 The District Court concluded in its adjudication of I.B. as a youth in need of care that
ICWA did not apply. The parties did not know of I.B.’s eligibility for tribal enrollment
during the adjudication proceedings. The parents agree that the District Court could not have
incorrectly applied the evidentiary standard during the adjudication proceedings when no one
knew that I.B. potentially qualified as an Indian child. Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157,
161-62 (Ariz. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The parents argue nevertheless that substantial
evidence does not support by a preponderance of the evidence the court’s adjudication of I.B.
as a youth in need of care.
¶22 The court found that B.K. and C.B. had subjected I.B. to actual physical harm and a
substantial risk of physical harm. I.B. received a severe sunburn that required hospitalization
due to the parents’ neglect. The parents disregarded the specific feeding techniques ordered
by I.B.’s doctors. I.B.’s doctors had warned the parents of the risk of death presented by
I.B.’s respiratory condition if they did not follow the specified feeding manner. The doctors
and social worker from Family Concepts explained the required feeding method, emphasized
the choking and aspirating risks to I.B., and taught the method to the parents in the hospital
and in their home.
¶23 Despite the efforts to help B.K. and C.B. understand the importance of the feeding
method to I.B.’s health and life, the Department in an unannounced visit found I.B. with a
bottle propped into his mouth while B.K. cleaned in the kitchen. The parents argue that B.K.
had to prop the bottle in I.B.’s mouth so that she could clean the house to impress the
Department. The housecleaning excuse demonstrates their inability or refusal to understand
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the life-threatening risks presented by improperly feeding I.B. Substantial evidence supports
the District Court’s adjudication of I.B. as a youth in need of care.
¶24 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it terminated B.K.’s and C.B.’s
parental rights to I.B.?
¶25 A district court may terminate an individual’s parental rights if (1) the child has been
adjudicated a youth in need of care, (2) an appropriate treatment plan has not been complied
with by the parent or has not been successful, and (3) the conduct or condition of the parent
rendering the parent unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Section 41-3-
609(1)(f), MCA. B.K. and C.B. enrolled I.B. in the Cherokee Nation prior to the termination
hearing. ICWA requires that the Department prove that B.K.’s and C.B.’s parental rights
should be terminated beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); In re G.S., 2002 MT
245, ¶ 33, 312 Mont. 108, 59 P.3d 1063. ICWA also requires the court to find that the
Department made active efforts for reunification and that reunification presents a risk of
serious emotional or physical harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912; In re G.S., ¶ 26. The
parents appeal separately the active efforts requirement. We discuss the active efforts
requirement under the third issue.
¶26 The parents argue that substantial evidence does not support the court’s findings that
the parents failed their treatment plans. B.K. and C.B. stipulated to the Department’s
proposed treatment plans on July 30, 2008, and received updated plans on April 15, 2009.
The plans required B.K. and C.B. to understand and correct the circumstances causing
removal, to acquire necessary parenting skills, to provide a safe and stable environment for
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I.B., and to strengthen and preserve the parent-child relationship. The plans identified the
parents’ consistent failure to recognize safety hazards in the home, the failure to meet I.B.’s
developmental needs, and the lack of an appropriate parent-child attachment as conditions
that led to removal. The plans assigned the parents several tasks to address these problems.
¶27 A parent does not successfully complete a treatment plan by partial, or even
substantial, compliance. In re D.F., 2007 MT 147, ¶ 30, 337 Mont. 461, 161 P.3d 825. A
parent technically can complete all the tasks in a treatment plan and not necessarily be
successful in overall treatment. In re S.C., 264 Mont. 24, 29, 869 P.2d 266, 269 (1994). A
parent successfully completes a plan when he or she effectuates the purposes for which the
plan had been designed. Section 41-3-609(1)(f)(i), MCA; In re L.H., 2007 MT 70, ¶ 19, 336
Mont. 405, 154 P.3d 622. District courts must do more than mechanistically check items off
a task list. District courts must determine instead whether the parents have actually
effectuated the purposes of the treatment plan. Id.; In re L.H., ¶ 19.
¶28 The Department’s social worker, Kathryn Huber, testified about B.K.’s and C.B.’s
compliance with the treatment plan and its tasks. Huber testified that B.K. attended
parenting classes, participated in therapy, and could meet basic physical needs of I.B. Huber
also testified that B.K. did not recognize I.B.’s cues when he communicated his needs or that
he was upset. Huber testified that C.B. had not completed his parenting classes and failed to
understand child development.
¶29 Huber testified that B.K. and C.B. did not demonstrate the ability to meet I.B.’s
emotional needs and could not appropriately interact or communicate with I.B. B.K. often
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ended visitation sessions earlier than scheduled. Visitation supervisors did not believe that
B.K. and C.B. possessed the skills to permit unsupervised visitation with I.B. The parents
also did not demonstrate an independent ability to correct potential safety hazards in their
home, such as small items and cigarette butts that presented a choking hazard.
¶30 Huber testified that the parents had not been able to develop an appropriate, secure
attachment to I.B. I.B. exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder on several
occasions after interacting with his parents. Early in her support services, Anna Marie White
of Family Concepts expressed concern with the lack of physical or emotional interaction
between I.B. and his parents. I.B. remained passive in his parents’ presence and would not
cry or signal his needs to his parents. When White began coaching the parents on interaction
methods, I.B. resisted his parents and would pull himself away from their care.
¶31 I.B.’s resistance escalated in the spring of 2009. He refused to eat or drink when his
parents tried to feed him. He resisted being held by them and turned away from them. He
often zoned out or entered staring spells. Benjamin Ross, a pediatric neurologist, evaluated
I.B. and conducted an EEG for the staring spells. Ross ruled out seizures and all other
possible medical conditions as causes of the staring spells.
¶32 I.B. would not engage with his parents. Social workers, visitation supervisors, and the
foster mom reported that I.B. demonstrated a complete change of demeanor in the presence
of B.K. and C.B. I.B.’s foster mother reported that I.B. seemed aggressive and resistant to
touch after supervised visits with B.K. and C.B. I.B. began vomiting and developed cyanosis
and a rash coincident with the parental visitations. I.B.’s pediatric nurse practitioner, Devry
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Garity, investigated I.B.’s vomiting and cyanosis. Garity ruled out anatomical causes and
other medical reasons for the vomiting. Garity determined that the cyanosis related to I.B.’s
vomiting episodes. Garity had no other explanation for the cyanosis. A pediatric allergist
evaluated I.B. and ruled out allergic reaction as a cause for the rashes. Garity indicated that
the episodes of vomiting, cyanosis, rash, and staring ceased after suspension of the visits
between I.B. and his parents.
¶33 B.K. underwent a psychological evaluation with Theresa Reed, a licensed clinical
psychologist. Reed found B.K.’s cognitive abilities to be in the low average range and
diagnosed B.K. with Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. Reed reported that B.K.
lacks insight, tends to be defensive, exhibits low coping ability in her role as primary
caregiver, and exhibits ineffectual parenting. Reed reported that B.K.’s cognitive function
ranged in the low average, between fifth and sixth grade. Reed opined that B.K. presented a
poor candidate for therapy.
¶34 C.B. underwent a neuropsychological evaluation with Jacqueline Day, a
neuropsychologist. Day diagnosed C.B. with Cognitive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified
and Borderline Intellectual Functioning. C.B. has a full scale IQ of 72. Day noted cerebral
dysfunction that would adversely affect his parenting skills. Day opined that C.B.’s
condition would continue to qualify him for SSI disability benefits.
¶35 The Department hired Julie Telfer, a licensed clinical social worker, to conduct a
family systems analysis that evaluated the attachment and safety of the relationship between
I.B. and his parents. Telfer expressed many of the same concerns as Huber and White,
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determined that it was not safe for I.B. to be returned to his parents, and recommended
termination. Joni Kicking Woman, a qualified ICWA expert, testified that evidence proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody likely would result in serious emotional or
physical damage to I.B. The testimony of Telfer and Kicking Woman supported the
Department’s recommendation to terminate B.K.’s and C.B.’s parental rights. Sufficient
evidence supports the District Court’s conclusion that evidence proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that all the statutory requirements of § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, had been satisfied and
that continued custody by the parents likely would result in serious emotional or physical
harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); In re G.S., ¶ 26.
¶36 The parents argue that the testimony of their clinical psychologist, Coleen Wall-
Hoeben, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether their conduct or condition rendering them
unfit was likely to change within a reasonable time. The parents argue that the District Court
should have agreed with Wall-Hoeben that no risk of harm existed in returning I.B. to his
parents because Wall-Hoeben had a doctorate degree whereas Julie Telfer, the licensed
clinical social worker hired by the Department, held only a masters degree. Despite the
disparity in educational credentials, the court found that Telfer had “specialized training
concerning infant mental and emotional health and attachment issues.” The court
highlighted this distinction when it found that “no other witness had the level of training”
comparable to Telfer. The court further found “persuasive Julie Telfer’s explanation that Dr.
Wall-Hoeben was hired by the parents to provide psychotherapy to them, rather than to serve
in a forensic role related to [I.B.’s] best interests.” This Court will not substitute its
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judgment for that of the District Court’s regarding the credibility, persuasiveness, and weight
to be given to a witness’s testimony. In re K.J.B., 2007 MT 216, ¶ 23, 339 Mont. 28, 168
P.3d 629.
¶37 Did the District Court correctly conclude that the Department made active efforts to
prevent breakup of the Indian family?
¶38 ICWA requires the Department to make active efforts to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(d). Active efforts imply a heightened responsibility for the Department to take
timely, affirmative action to avoid the breakup of the Indian family. In re T.W.F., 2009 MT
207, ¶ 27, 351 Mont. 233, 210 P.3d 174; In re G.S., ¶ 36. The parents agree that they cannot
dispute that the Department made active efforts and provided services to them throughout
these proceedings. We agree and believe it unnecessary to list the many services provided
by the Department. Those services began before removal and continued throughout these
proceedings.
¶39 The parents contend, however, that the Department’s “efforts and services were not
aimed at preventing the break-up of the family.” The parents argue that the Department’s
efforts and services “severely damaged the bond between I.B. and his parents and actually
prevented reunification of the family.” The parents argue that the Department provided
visitation services as “test sessions for the parents” and that I.B.’s stress resulted from the
infrequent and irregular visitation schedule, rather than from the parents’ lack of attachment
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to I.B. and poor parenting skills. The parents complain that the Department did not
adequately provide counseling, educational services, or therapy.
¶40 The record does not support the parents’ assertion that the Department set the parents
up for failure by not providing more visitation sessions and therapy. The Department
promptly explained why it removed I.B. from the parents’ home and what the parents needed
to provide before I.B. could be returned. The Department provided in-home trainings,
parenting classes, parenting coaching, psychological evaluations to understand better the
parents’ abilities and limitations, transportation, and visitation services. The record does not
support the parents’ argument that the many services provided by the Department actually
caused the family’s breakup.
¶41 We disagree with the parents that the Department actually caused these proceedings to
end in termination. ICWA requires heightened efforts by the Department. In re T.W.F., ¶
27. Nothing in ICWA guarantees, however, that those efforts will be successful. See e.g. In
re G.S., ¶ 37. The success of the remedial services and rehabilitative programs
concomitantly depends on the parents’ ability and willingness to develop the necessary skills
to provide their child with a safe living environment. In re T.W.F., ¶ 27. Substantial
evidence supports the District Court’s findings regarding the services and programs that the
Department provided to the parents. The District Court correctly concluded that the
Department made active efforts to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to the parents
that were designed to prevent the breakup of the family.
¶42 Did the parents receive effective assistance of counsel?
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¶43 The parents argue that their counsel provided ineffective assistance when she did not
secure an ICWA expert to rebut the Department’s ICWA expert’s testimony that returning
I.B. to his parents would likely result in serious harm. This Court determines a trial
counsel’s effectiveness by reviewing his or her 1) training and experience, and 2) advocacy
skills. In re B.M., ¶ 22. Only if the parent suffered prejudice, however, will this Court
determine that trial counsel’s ineffective performance warrants reversal. Id. Nothing in the
trial record reveals that the parents’ counsel lacked adequate training and experience to
represent them or that their counsel’s advocacy skills were ineffective.
¶44 The parents argue only that their trial counsel’s failure to present expert rebuttal
testimony on the ICWA standard prejudiced them. ICWA requires that a qualified expert
witness testify during termination hearings regarding whether continued custody of the child
by the parent likely would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25
U.S.C. § 1912(f). ICWA does not require both the Department and the parents to present
qualified expert witnesses. Such a requirement would create an impossible situation for
counsel if no qualified expert existed who would testify favorably for the parents. The trial
counsel’s decision not to present rebuttal testimony does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.
¶45 Joni Kicking Woman, a qualified ICWA expert, testified that returning I.B. to his
parents’ care would result in serious harm beyond a reasonable doubt. B.K.’s and C.B.’s
trial counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine Kicking Woman. The parents have not
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shown that their trial counsel’s cross-examination of Kicking Woman constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel or prejudiced their case.
¶46 Affirmed.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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