USCA11 Case: 22-10195 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/09/2023 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10195
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEMOND LAWRENCE BURNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00222-LCB-HNJ-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lemond Burns appeals his sentence of 150 months’ impris-
onment for assault of a corrections officer with bodily injury, in vi-
olation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a), (b) and 2, which was an upward var-
iance from the advisory Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months.
Burns asserts the district court’s 150-month sentence was procedur-
ally and substantively unreasonable because the district court af-
forded significant weight to improper factors, including Burns’ un-
charged criminal conduct and lack of remorse, and failed to afford
significant consideration to Burns’ limited criminal history and the
nature and circumstances of his offense. After review, 1 we affirm
the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In a presentence investigation report (PSI), a probation of-
ficer reported that, on April 19, 2021, Burns assaulted a female cor-
rectional officer, C.E., while incarcerated at Morgan County Jail,
where he was housed awaiting sentencing in a case involving his
guilty plea to wire- and access-device fraud charges. Officer C.E.
was distributing meal trays when Burns requested a cigarette
break. Officer C.E. told Burns that he could have a cigarette break
1 We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 3
once mealtime was over and asked Burns to back up. Burns con-
tinued to approach Officer C.E., then assaulted her, punching her
twice in the face and knocking her to the ground. Burns then stood
over Officer C.E., yelling profanities at her until another inmate
pulled him away. The assault was captured on video.
Officer C.E. was taken to the hospital by ambulance, and
sustained injuries to her face and teeth, including a bruised and
swollen eye and loosened teeth. She also had bruising to her left
triceps area and back. Four days after the assault, she went to the
doctor reporting dizziness and a mild headache.
Regarding a potential adjustment for acceptance of respon-
sibility, the PSI reported that, while incarcerated at Cullman
County Jail awaiting sentencing in the instant case, Burns sent let-
ters identified as “legal mail” in which he sought the assistance of
associates to engage in a criminal scheme. In the letters, Burns in-
structed individuals on how to send him papers sprayed with syn-
thetic drugs disguised as legal mail, and stated the associates could
earn a significant amount of money selling the contraband. Sher-
iff’s deputies employed at the Cullman County Jail intercepted
three such letters on October 5, 2021, October 10, 2021, and Octo-
ber 25, 2021.
With a total offense level of 15, and a criminal history cate-
gory of II, Burns’ advisory Guidelines range was 21 to 27 months’
imprisonment. The PSI also noted Burns had three prior charges
adjudicated by the United States Army for which he was assessed
zero criminal-history points, including (1) a 2017 charge for failure
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
to obey order and wrongful use of marijuana for which the dispo-
sition was unknown; (2) a 2018 charge for wrongful use of mariju-
ana that was not prosecuted and resulted in an administrative sep-
aration; and (3) a charge for desertion that resulted in a general
court martial and administrative separation. The PSI further noted
Burns had two pending charges, including a 2021 charge for capital
murder, for which a continuance was granted, and a 2021 charge
for domestic violence which had been set for a jury trial. The PSI
noted the maximum term of imprisonment for assault of a correc-
tions officer with bodily injury is 20 years.
Prior to sentencing, Burns objected to the paragraphs de-
scribing the “legal mail” contraband scheme and the pending do-
mestic-violence charges, as well as the denial of a two-point reduc-
tion for acceptance of responsibility. Burns subsequently withdrew
his objections to the account of the “legal mail” conduct, but main-
tained his objection to the domestic-violence pending charges.
At sentencing, the court overruled Burns’ objections to the
inclusion of the domestic-violence charges. The court then stated
it was adopting the factual statements contained in the PSI and
made findings that the offense level was 15, the criminal history
category was II, and the advisory Guidelines range was 21 to 27
months.
The Government addressed the court and noted that mem-
bers of the Morgan County Sheriff’s Office were present in support
of the victim, who was unable to attend the sentencing hearing.
Detective Brooks then addressed the court on behalf of the victim.
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 5
He spoke about the events of April 19, 2021, and the nature of the
victim’s injuries. The court admitted photographic evidence of the
victim’s injuries. The Government then addressed the court and
stated the Guidelines range was “surprisingly low” in light of
Burns’ conduct and the fact he did not receive a reduction for ac-
ceptance of responsibility. In particular, the Government noted
that Burns was not receiving a reduction for acceptance of respon-
sibility because, during the few months prior to the sentencing
hearing, the Cullman County Jail had confiscated multiple letters
from Burns in which he had attempted to give instructions to indi-
viduals outside of the jail on sending drugs and other products that
inmates use to smoke marijuana. The Government stated Burns’
conduct—the sending of letters—continued up until “very re-
cently.” The Government then recommended a sentence of 27
months, pursuant to its promise in the written plea agreement,
while noting it was making the recommendation within the Guide-
lines range because it agreed to do so before it knew what the
Guidelines range would be.
The district court then addressed Burns and stated:
Mr. Burns, obviously I am very concerned about your
continuing criminal conduct, even while in custody.
It demonstrates to me that you are not truly remorse-
ful for what you have done up to this point and,
worse than that, your criminal conduct seems to be
escalating. This was an unprovoked attack that
caused absolutely horrific injuries to this officer. And
I cannot imagine how you could have done this.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
I do not believe that the [G]uidelines adequately deter
your criminal conduct or protect the public from
your further crimes at twenty-seven months.
So I am going to exercise my authority under Booker
to impose a sentence outside the [G]uideline[s] range.
It is the judgment of the court that the defendant,
Lemond Lawrence Burns, is hereby committed to the
custody of the [B]ureau of [P]risons to be imprisoned
for a term of one hundred fifty months. The term of
imprisonment imposed by this judgment shall run
consecutively to all other sentences . . . .
The court has considered the factors found at 18
U.S.C. [§] 3553(a) and considering the [G]uideline[s]
computations and taken them under advisement, the
court finds that the sentence that I have just imposed
is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply
with the statutory purposes of sentencing, specifically
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant, to reflect
the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for
the law and provide just punishment for the offense,
to afford adequate deterrence from criminal conduct
and to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant.
The court does find that the sentence just imposed is
reasonable and concludes that the sentence imposed
would have been the same regardless of how the
[G]uideline[s] issue had been resolved.
....
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 7
Sir, it is exceedingly rare for me to have somebody
come in my courtroom that I decide seems to be the
personification of pure evil, and I have no doubt you
are an absolute danger to the public, to law enforce-
ment, to anybody you’re around. I don’t know why
that is. I hope you will take this time to look into your
heart and consider whether you need to make some
changes to the life you’re living.
Burns objected to the imposed sentence as “not supported
in law or fact.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Reasonableness
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we employ a
two-part process. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
First, we must ensure the district court committed no significant
procedural error. Id. A sentence may be procedurally unreasona-
ble if the district court improperly calculates the Guidelines range,
treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, sentences based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails
to adequately explain its chosen sentence. Id. The district court is
not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered
each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) fac-
tors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2013). Generally, “[a]n acknowledgment the district court has con-
sidered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
suffice.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2008).
Burns’ sentence is procedurally reasonable. The district
court satisfied the requirement it consider the § 3553(a) factors and
provided an adequate explanation for its sentence. The district
court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, and stated it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and Guidelines calculations. See
Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1326; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, then we
will consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. We examine whether a sentence was substantively
reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, including
the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. Id. A district
court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it
“(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due
significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-
sidering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The
district court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2),
including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, pro-
mote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense,
deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s
future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 9
In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also con-
sider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available,
the applicable Guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
We give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the § 3553(a) factors, taken together, justify the extent of a variance.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 59-60. The district court is free to consider any
information relevant to a defendant’s background, character, and
conduct in imposing a variance. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). However, a “rigid mathematical for-
mula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for
determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific
sentence” is not appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47. While an appel-
late court may take the degree of variance into account, there is no
rule that requires “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sen-
tence outside the Guidelines range. Id.
Burns has not met his burden to show his sentence is sub-
stantively unreasonable. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378 (stating the
party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show the sen-
tence is unreasonable). As an initial matter, the 150-month sen-
tence imposed by the district court is well-below the 240-month
statutory maximum sentence for assault of a corrections officer
with bodily injury, an indicator of reasonableness. See 18 U.S.C. §
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
111; United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (11th
Cir. 2015) (holding the sentence was reasonable in part because it
was 33 months below the statutory maximum of 120 months).
While Burns makes several arguments regarding the district
court’s improper consideration of and weighing of the § 3553(a)
factors, each of his arguments fail. First, Burns’ argument the dis-
trict court improperly considered the fact his criminal conduct oc-
curred while he was in custody is unpersuasive, as the nature and
circumstances of Burns’ offense, including where it occurred, was
a relevant factor for the court to consider. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
Burns’ ongoing criminal conduct, although uncharged, was rele-
vant to the court’s consideration of the need to provide adequate
deterrence and protect the public. Id. § 3553(a)(2). Consideration
of Burns’ uncharged conduct was also permissible because the dis-
trict court may rely on uncontested facts contained in a PSI, as well
as facts not resulting in a conviction. See United States v. Faust,
456 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining the district court
may also consider facts of underlying conduct that did not result in
a conviction, so long as the facts are proved by a preponderance of
the evidence and the sentence imposed does not exceed the maxi-
mum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict); United States v.
Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating the district
court’s factual findings for sentencing purposes may be based on
evidence heard during trial, undisputed statements in the PSI, or
evidence presented during the sentencing hearing).
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 11
Next, Burns’ argument the district court improperly consid-
ered his lack of remorse similarly fails because such a lack of re-
morse was relevant to the § 3553(a) factors of the need to promote
respect for the law, to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the
public from Burns’ future conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).
Additionally, Burns’ argument the district court erred because, in
imposing an upward-variance sentence, it considered factors that
were elements of Burns’ crime or otherwise already accounted for
by the Guidelines is unpersuasive because it is clearly established
by this Court’s case law that a district court may consider factors
already taken into account by the Guidelines in imposing a vari-
ance sentence. See United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833-34
(11th Cir. 2007) (stating in imposing a variance, the district court
may also rely on factors that it already considered in calculating the
defendant’s Guidelines range).
Further, Burns’ argument his sentence is unreasonable be-
cause the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors by
giving significant weight to Burns’ uncharged criminal conduct and
lack of remorse, and not enough weight to his limited criminal his-
tory and the nature and circumstance of the offense, also fails. See
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254 (stating the weight given to any
specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court). Burns’ assertion the court failed to provide an ade-
quate explanation for its sentence and solely imposed an upward
variance as a vindictive measure, as evidenced by the presence of
officers during sentencing, is unsupported by the record. In
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10195
imposing its sentence, the court specifically referenced several of
the § 3553(a) factors, including protecting the public and the need
to provide adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). The
district court also provided other reasons for its upward variance,
including the escalation of Burns’ criminal conduct, which supports
the conclusion the court provided an adequate and proper explana-
tion for its variance. See United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610,
618-20 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming an upward variance to 102
months, from a Guidelines range of 70-to-87 months, and noting
that the sentencing court “reasonably found” the Guidelines range
“understated the seriousness” of the defendant’s “recent criminal
history”); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
2012) (explaining where a court imposes an upward variance based
upon the § 3553(a) factors, it must have a justification compelling
enough to support the degree of the variance). Moreover, at no
point during sentencing did the district court indicate it had a vin-
dictive motive for imposing an upward variance, nor, without
more, can such a motive be presumed based on the presence of
officers at sentencing.
The record in this case does not leave a definite and firm
conviction the district court committed a clear error of judgment
in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (stating
we will vacate on substantive reasonableness grounds only if “left
with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com-
mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
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22-10195 Opinion of the Court 13
sentences dictated by the facts of the case”). Accordingly, we af-
firm.
AFFIRMED.