dissenting.
The Court holds that the Thys Company unlawfully misused its patent monopoly by contracting with purchasers of its patented machines for royalty payments based on use beyond the patent term. I think that more discriminating analysis than the Court has seen fit to give this case produces a different result.
The patent laws prohibit post-expiration, restrictions on the use of patented ideas; they have ho bearing on use restrictions upon nonpatented, tangible machines. We have before us a mixed case involving the sale of a tangible machine which incorporates an intangible, patented idea. My effort in what follows is to separate out these two notions, to show that there is no substantial restriction on the use of the Thys idea, and to demonstrate that what slight restriction there may be is less objectionable than other post-expiration use restrictions which are clearly acceptable.
I.
It surely cannot be questioned that Thys could have lawfully set a fixed price for its machine and extended credit terms beyond the patent period. It is equally unquestionable, I take it, that if Thys had had no patent or if,its patent had expired, it could have sold its machines at a flexible, undetermined price based on use; for example, a phonograph record manufacturer could sell a recording of a song in the public domain to a jukebox owner for an undetermined consideration based on the number of times the record was played.
*35Conversely it should be equally clear that if Thys licensed another manufacturer to produce hop-picking machines incorporating any of the Thys patents, royalties could not be exacted beyond the patent term. Such royalties would restrict the manufacturer’s exploitation of the idea after it falls into the public domain, and no such restriction should be valid. To give another example unconnected with a tangible machine, a song writer could charge a royalty every time his song — his idea — was sung for profit during the period of copyright. But once the song falls into the public domain each and every member of the public should be free to sing it.
In fact Thys sells both a machine and the use of an idea. The company should be free to restrict the use of its machine, as in the first two examples given above. It may not restrict the use of its patented idea once it has fallen into the public domain. Whether it has done so must be the point of inquiry.
Consider the situation as of the day the patent monopoly ends. Any manufacturer is completely free to produce Thys-type hop-pickers. The farmer who has previously purchased a Thys machine is free to buy and use any other kind of machine whether or not it incorporates the Thys idea, or make one himself if he is able. Of course, he is not entitled as against Thys to the jree use of any Thys machine. The Court’s opinion must therefore .ultimately rest on the proposition that the purchasing farmer is restricted in using his particular machine, embodying as it does an application of the patented idea, by the fact that royalties are tied directly to use.
To test this proposition I again put a hypothetical. Assume that a Thys contract called for neither an initial flat-sum payment nor any annual minimum royalties; Thys’ sole recompense for giving up ownership of its *36machine was a royalty payment extending beyond the patent term based on use, withqut any requirement either tó use the machine or not to use a competitor’s. A moment’s thought reveals that, despite the clear restriction on use both before and after the expiration of the patent term, the arrangement woúld involve no misuse of patent leverage.1 Unless the Court’s opinion rests on technicalities of contract draftsmanship and not on the economic substance of the transaction, the distinction between the hypothetical and the actual case lies only in the cumulative investment consisting of the initial and minimum payments independent of use, which the purchaser obligated himself to make to Thys. I fail to see why this distinguishing feature should be critical. If anything the investment will encourage the purchaser to use his machine in order to amortize the machine’s fixed cost over as large a production base as possible. Yet the gravamen of the majority opinion is restriction, not encouragement, of use.
II.
The essence of the majority opinion may lie in some notion that “patent leverage” being used by Thys to exact use payments extending beyond the patent term somehow allows Thys to extract more onerous payments from the farmers than would otherwise be obtainable. If this be the case, the Court must in some way distinguish long-term use payments from long-term installment payments of a flat-sum purchase price. For the danger which, it seems to fear would appear to inhere equally in both, and as I read the Court’s opinion, the latter type of arrangement is lawful despite the fact that failure to pay an *37installment under a conditional sales contract would permit the seller to recapture the machine, thus terminating — not merely restricting — the farmer’s use of it. Furthermore, since the judgments against petitioners were based almost entirely on defaults in paying the $500 minimums and not on failures to pay for above-minimum use,2 any such distinction of extended use payments and extended installments, even if accepted, would not justify eradicating all petitioners’ obligations beyond the patent term, but only those based on use above the stated minimums; for the minimums by themselves, being payable whether or not a machine has been used, are precisely identical in substantive economic effect to flat installments.
In fact a distinction should not be accepted based on the assumption that Thys, which exploits its patents by selling its patented machines rather than licensing others to manufacture them, can use its patent leverage to exact more onerous payments from farmers by gearing price to use instead of charging a flat sum. Four possible situations must be considered. The purchasing farmer could overestimate, exactly estimate, underestimate, or have no firm estimate of his use requirements for a Thys machine. If he overestimates or exactly estimates, the farmer will be fully aware of what the machine will cost him in the long run, and it is unrealistic to suppose that in such circumstances he would be willing to pay more to have the machine on use than on straight terms. If the farmer underestimates, the thought may be that Thys will take advantage of him; but surely the farmer is in '.a better position than Thys or anyone else to estimate'his own requirements and is hardly in need of the Court’s protection in this respect. If the farmer has no fixed estimate *38of his use requirements he may have good business reasons entirely unconnected with “patent leverage” for wanting payments tied to use, and may indeed be willing to pay more in the long run to obtain such an arrangement. One final example should illustrate my point:
At the time when the Thys patent term still has a few years to run, a farmer who has been picking his hops by hand comes into the Thys retail outlet to inquire about the mechanical pickers. The salesman concludes his description of the advantages of the Thys machine with the price tag — $20,000. Value to the farmer depends completely on the use he will derive from the machine; he is willing' to obligate himself on long credit terms to pay $10,000, but unless the machine can substantially outpick his old hand-picking methods, it is worth no more to him. He therefore offers to pay $2,000 down, $400 annually for 20 years, and an additional payment during the contract term for any production he can derive from the machine over and above the minimum amount he could pick by hand. Thys accepts, and by doing so, according to the majority, commits a per se misuse of its patent. I cannot -believe that this is good law.3
III.
The possibility remains that the Court is basing its decision on the technical framing of the contract and would have treated the case differently if title had been *39déclared to pass at the termination instead of the outsfet of the contract term, or if the use payments had been verbally disassociated from the patent licenses and described as a convenient means of spreading out payments for the machine. If indeed the impact of the opinion is that Thys must redraft its contracts to achieve the same economic results, the decision is not only wrong, but conspicuously ineffectual.
I would affirm.
Installment, of a patented, coin-operated washing macKirje. in the basement of ail apartment building without charge except' that the landlord and- his tenants must deposit 25 cents for every use, should not constitute patent misuse. - ■
Petitioner'Charvet was indebted to Thys only to the extent of the minimums; petitioner Brulotte was in default approximately $4,500 of which $3,120 was attributable to minimums
The Court also adverts to the provisions in the license agreements prohibiting “assignment of the machines or their removal from Yakima County” (ante, p. 32) during the terms of the agreements. Such provisions, however, are surely appropriate to secure performance of what are in effect conditional sales agreements and they do not advance the argument for patent misuse.
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that we are dealing here with a patent, not an antitrust, case, there being no basis in the record for concluding that Thys’ arrangements with its licensees were such as to run afoul of the antitrust laws.