with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
A State should, of course, scrutinize closely the qualifications of those who perform professional ■ services within its borders. Police officers, like lawyers, must be qualified in their field of expertise and must be trustworthy. Detailed review of each individual’s application for employment is therefore appropriate. Conversely, a «rule which disqualifies an entire class of persons from professional employment is doubly objectionable. It denies the State access to unique individual talent; it also denies opportunity to individuals on the basis of characteristics that the group is thought to possess.
The first objection poses a question of policy rather than *308constitutional law. The wisdom of a rule denying a law enforcement agency the services of Hercule Poirot or Sherlock Holmes is thus for New York, not this Court, to decide. But the second objection raises a question of a different kind and a satisfactory answer to this question is essential to the validity of the rule: What is the group characteristic that justifies the unfavorable treatment of an otherwise qualified individual simply because he is an alien?
No one suggests that aliens as a class lack the intelligence or the courage to serve the public as police officers. The disqualifying characteristic is apparently a foreign allegiance which raises a doubt concerning trustworthiness and loyalty so pervasive that a flat ban against the employment of any alien in any law enforcement position is thought to' be justified. But if the integrity of all aliens is suspect, why may not a State deny aliens the right to practice law? Are untrustworthy or disloyal lawyers more tolerable than untrustworthy or disloyal policemen? Or is the legal profession better able to detect such characteristics on an individual basis than is the police department? Unless the Court repudiates its holding in In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, it must reject any conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrustworthy.1
A characteristic that all members of the class do- possess may provide the historical explanation for their exclusion from some categories of public employment. Aliens do not vote. Aliens and their families were therefore unlikely to have been beneficiaries of the patronage system which controlled access to public employment during so' much of our history. The widespread exclusion of aliens from such positions today may *309well be nothing more than a vestige of the historical relationship between nonvoting aliens and a system of distributing the spoils of victory to the party faithful.2 If that be true, it might explain, but cannot justify, the discrimination.
Even if patronage never influenced the selection of police officers in New York, reference to the law governing denial of public employment for political reasons is nevertheless instructive. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, the Court held that most public employees are protected from discharge because of their political beliefs but recognized that an exception was required for policymaking officials.3 The exception identified in Burns was essentially the same as the category of “officers who participate in the formulation, execution, or review of bread public policy” described in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 647. In both cases the special nature of the policy-making position was recognized as justifying a form of discriminatory treatment that could not be applied to regular employees.
*310The Court should draw the line between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions in as consistent and intelligible a fashion as possible. As Mr. Justice Marshall points out, ante, at 305, in the context of immunity from liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the Court placed the police officer in a different category from the Governor of Ohio. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 245-247. And under Elrod v. Burns, supra, the Court would unquestionably condemn the dismissal of a citizen state trooper because his political affiliation differed from that of his superiors. Yet, inexplicably, every state trooper is transformed into a high ranking, policymaking official when the question presented is whether persons may be excluded from all positions in the police force simply because they are aliens.
Since the Court does not purport to disturb the teaching of Sugarman, this transformation must rest on the unarticulated premise that the police function is at “the heart of representative government” and therefore all persons employed by the institutions performing that function “participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy . . . .” Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 647. In my judgment, to state the premise is to refute it. Respect for the law enforcement profession and its essential function, like respect for the military, should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that in our representative democracy neither the constabulary nor the military is vested with broad policymaking responsibility. Instead, each implements the basic policies formulated directly or indirectly by the citizenry. Under the standards announced in Sugarman, therefore, a blanket exclusion of aliens from this particular governmental institution is especially inappropriate.
The Court’s misapprehension of the role of the institutionalized police function in a democratic society obfuscates the true significance of the distinction between citizenship and alienage. The privilege of participating in the formulation *311of broad public policy — a privilege largely denied to the institutions exercising the police function in our society — is the essence of individual citizenship. It is this privilege which gives dramatic meaning to the naturalization ceremony.4 The transition from alienage to citizenship is a fundamental change in the status of a person. This change is qualitatively different from any incremental increase in economic benefits that may accrue to holders of citizenship papers. The new citizen’s right to vote and to participate in the democratic decisionmaking process is the honorable prerogative which no alien has a constitutional right to enjoy.
In final analysis, therefore, our society is governed by its citizens. But it is a government of and for all persons subject to its jurisdiction, and the Constitution commands their equal treatment. Although a State may deny the alien the right to participate in the making of policy, it may not deny him equal access to employment opportunities without a good and relevant reason. Sugarman plainly teaches us that the burgeoning public employment market cannot be totally foreclosed to aliens. Since the police officer is not a policymaker in this country, the total exclusion of aliens from the police force must fall.
Even if the Court rejects this analysis, it should not uphold a statutory discrimination against aliens, as a class, without expressly identifying the group characteristic that justifies the *312discrimination. If the unarticulated characteristic is concern about possible disloyalty, it must equally disqualify aliens from the practice of law; yet the Court does not question the continuing vitality of its decision in Griffiths. Or if that characteristic is the fact that aliens do not participate in our democratic decisionmaking process, it is irrelevant to eligibility for this category of public service. If there is no group characteristic that explains the discrimination, one can only conclude that it is without any justification that has not already been rejected by the Court.5
Because the Court’s unique decision fails either to apply or to reject established rules of law, and for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Marshall, I respectfully dissent.
It is worth reiterating that “one need not be a citizen in order to take in good conscience an oath to support the Constitution. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 726 n. 18.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 111 n. 43.
“In its historical context, the assumption that only citizens would be employed in the federal service is easily understood. The new system of merit appointment,, based on competitive examination, was replacing a patronage system in which appointment had often been treated as a method of rewarding support at the polls; since such rewards were presumably reserved for voters (or members of their families) who would necessarily be citizens, citizenship must have characterized most, if not all, federal employees at that time. The assumption that such a requirement would survive the enactment of the new statute is by no means equivalent to a considered judgment that it should do so.” Id., at 107.
“A second interest advanced in support of patronage is the need for political loyalty of employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be insured, but to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate. The justification is not without force, but is nevertheless inadequate to validate patronage wholesale. Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S., at 367.
As the Court eloquently points out:
“The aet of becoming a citizen is more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare of ceremony. A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of a people distinct from others. Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832). The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is entitled to participate in the processes of democratic decision-making. Accordingly, we have recognized ‘a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions.’ Dougall, supra, at 648, as part of the sovereign’s obligation ‘to preserve the basic conception of a political community.’ 413 U. S., at 647.” Ante, at 295-296.
The Court has squarely held that a State may not treat employment as a scarce resource to be reserved for its own citizens. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 641-645. Nor may a State impose special burdens on aliens to provide them with an incentive to become naturalized citizens. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1, 9-11. For it is the Federal Government that exercises plenary control over naturalization and immigration. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S., at 100-101. The Court’s understanding that “most States expressly confine the employment of police officers to citizens,” ante, at 299, is not persuasive. Most of the statutes cited to support that understanding were enacted before the Court had decided Sugarman. Some of the cited statutes are patently invalid as a result of Sugarman, and there is no evidence that most of the States referred to by the Court have decided to continue enforcement of their citizenship requirement for police officers after deliberate consideration of Sugarman’s teaching that only policymaking officials would be unaffected by the holding.