with whom Justice White, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
Article II of the Constitution provides that “[ejach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” who shall select the President of the United States. U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This provision, one of few in the Constitution that grants an express plenary power to the States, conveys “the broadest power of determination” and “[i]t recognizes that [in the *807election of a President] the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object.” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892) (emphasis added).
In exercising this power, the Ohio Legislature has provided alternative routes to its general election ballot for capture of Ohio’s Presidential electoral votes. Political parties can earn the right to field a Presidential candidate in the general election in one of two ways. Parties that obtained at least 5% of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial or Presidential election are automatically entitled to have a candidate on the general election ballot. Other political parties are required to file 120 days before the primary election (in 1980 the date was February 4) a statement of intent to participate in the primary, together with petitions containing signatures of voters equal to 1% of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial or Presidential election (in 1980 approximately 28,000 signatures would have been required). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.01 (Supp. 1982).
Ohio also offers candidates different routes to the general election ballot. Should a candidate decide to seek the nomination of a political party participating in Ohio’s primary election by capturing delegate votes for the party’s national convention, the candidate must file a declaration of candidacy and a nominating petition bearing signatures from 1,000 members of the party; the filing must occur no later than the 75th day before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June of the election year (in 1980 the date was March 20). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3513.05 (Supp. 1982). Of course, because a political party has earned the right to put on the ballot a candidate chosen at its national convention, a candidate seeking the nomination of that party could forgo the Ohio primary process and, if he should win at the national convention, still be placed on the ballot as a party candidate. If a candidate chooses to run as a nonparty candidate, he must file, by *808the same date as a party candidate participating in the primary, a statement of candidacy and a nominating petition bearing the signatures of 5,000 qualified voters. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.25.7 (Supp. 1982). Since a nonparty candidate does not participate in a national convention, obviously he cannot benefit from the routes made available to political parties.
Today the Court holds that the filing deadline for non-party candidates in this statutory scheme violated the First Amendment rights of 1980 Presidential hopeful John Anderson and Anderson’s supporters. Certainly, absent a court injunction ordering that his name be placed on the ballot, Anderson and his supporters would have been injured by Ohio’s ballot access requirements; by failing to comply with the filing deadline for nonparty candidates Anderson would have been excluded from Ohio’s 1980 general election ballot.1 But the Constitution does not require that a State allow any particular Presidential candidate to be on its ballot, and so long as the Ohio ballot access laws are rational and allow nonparty candidates reasonable access to the general election ballot, this Court should not interfere with Ohio’s exercise of its Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, power. Since I believe that the Ohio laws meet these criteria, I dissent.
In support of its conclusion that Ohio’s filing deadline “may have a substantial impact on independent-minded voters,” ante, at 790, the Court explains that “[i]f the State’s filing deadline were later in the year, a newly emergent independent candidate could serve as the focal pojnt for a grouping of *809Ohio voters.” Ante, at 791. In addition, the Court says: “Not only does the challenged Ohio statute totally exclude any candidate who makes the decision to run for President as an independent after the March deadline, it also burdens the signature-gathering efforts of independents who decide to run in time to meet the deadline.” Ante, at 792. Finally, the Court intimates that the effect of the filing deadline for nonparty candidates is that election campaigns are “monopolized by the existing political parties.” Ante, at 794. While if true these findings might provide a basis for finding a substantial impact on nonparty candidates and their supporters, the Court’s conclusions are simply unsupported by the record in this case.
Anderson makes no claim, and thus has offered no evidence to show, that the early filing deadline impeded his “signature-gathering efforts.” That alone should be enough to prevent the Court from finding that the deadline has such an impact. A statute “is not to be upset upon hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good upon the facts as they are.” Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23, 26 (1914). What information the record does contain on this point leads to a contrary conclusion. The record shows that in 1980 five independent candidates submitted nominating petitions with the necessary 5,000 signatures by the March 20 deadline and thus qualified for the general election ballot in Ohio. See ante, at 791-792, n. 12. The Court of Appeals found that this number of nonparty candidates was not unusual in Ohio. 664 F. 2d 554, 565, n. 14 (1981). The importance of this kind of evidence was noted in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974), where the Court said: “Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not.” Id., at 742. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from “past experience” in this case is that a “reasonably diligent independent candidate” choosing to take Ohio’s nonparty route has little *810difficulty in obtaining the necessary signatures in a timely fashion. See ibid,.2
The Court’s intimation that the Ohio filing deadline infringes on a nonparty candidate who makes the decision to run for President after the March deadline is similarly without support in the record.3 Certainly, if such candidates emerge, the Ohio deadline will prevent their running in the general election as nonparty candidates. Just as certainly, however, Anderson was not such a candidate. Anderson formally announced his candidacy for the Presidency on June 8, 1979 — over nine months before Ohio’s March 20 deadline. And the record does not reveal the existence of any other in*811dividual who decided- to become a nonparty Presidential candidate after the March 20 deadline. In fact, as noted above, the five individuals who did seek electoral votes through the nonparty alternative had no trouble making this decision before the filing deadline and had no trouble qualifying for a position on the general election ballot.
Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this is a case where “independent-minded voters” are prevented from rallying behind a candidate selected later in the election year so as to guarantee “major parties” a monopoly on the election process. Like-minded voters who do not want to participate in an existing political party are at complete liberty to form a new political party and obtain for themselves the same flexibility that established political parties have in the selection of their nominee for President. It is true that Ohio provides this benefit only where a group of voters acts with some foresight and shows a degree of support among the electorate, but this case presents no challenge to these requirements.
On the record before us, the effect of the Ohio filing deadline is quite easily summarized: it requires that a candidate, who has already decided to run for President, decide by March 20 which route his candidacy will take. He can become a nonparty candidate by filing a nominating petition with 5,000 signatures and assure himself a place on the general election ballot. Or he can become a party candidate and take his chances in securing a position on the general election ballot by seeking the nomination of a party’s national convention. Anderson chose the latter route and submitted in a timely fashion his nominating petition for Ohio’s Republican Primary. Then, realizing that he had no chance for the Republican nomination, Anderson sought to change the form of this candidacy. The Ohio filing deadline prevented him from making this change. Quite clearly, rather than prohibiting him from seeking the Presidency, the filing deadline only pre*812vented Anderson from having two shots at it in the same election year.
Thus, Ohio’s filing deadline does not create a restriction “denying the franchise to citizens,” such as those faced by the Court in Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626 (1969) (emphasis omitted), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969) (per curiam), Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S. 419 (1970), Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). Likewise, Ohio’s filing deadline does not create a restriction that makes it “virtually impossible” for new-party candidates or nonparty candidates to qualify for the ballot, such as those addressed in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 25 (1968), Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974). Yet in deciding this case, we are not without guidance from prior decisions by this Court.
In Storer v. Brown, the Court was faced with a California statute prohibiting an independent candidate from affiliating with a political party for 12 months preceding the primary election. This required a prospective candidate to decide on the form of his candidacy at a date some eight months earlier than Ohio requires. In upholding, in the face of a First Amendment challenge, this disaffiliation statute and a statute preventing candidates who had lost a primary from running as independents, the Court determined that the laws were “expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of various routes to the ballot,” 415 U. S., at 733, and that the statutes furthered “the State’s interest,” described by the Court as “compelling,” “in the stability of its political system.” Id., at 736. The Court explained its holding, saying:
“The State’s general policy is to have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it *813is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively.
“[The disaffiliation statute] carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an ‘independent’ candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
“A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than early decision to seek independent ballot status. . . . [T]he Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the in*814terest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot.” Id., at 735-736 (emphasis added).
The similarities between the effect of the Ohio filing deadline and the California disaffiliation statute are obvious.
Refusing to own up to the conflict its opinion creates with Stover, the Court tries to distinguish it, saying that it “did not suggest that a political party could invoke the powers of the State to assure monolithic control over its own members and supporters.” Ante, at 803. The Court asserts that the Ohio filing deadline is more like the statutory scheme in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, which was designed to protect “ ‘two particular parties — the Republicans and the Democrats — and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly.’ ” Ante, at 802 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32). See also ante, at 802 (“In Williams v. Rhodes we squarely held that protecting the Republican and Democratic Parties from external competition cannot justify the virtual exclusion, of other political aspirants from the political arena.” But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)). “Ohio’s asserted interest in political stability,” says the Court, “amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition.” Ante, at 801. But this simply is not the case. The Ohio filing deadline in no way makes it “virtually impossible,” 393 U. S., at 25, for new parties or nonparty candidates to secure a position on the general election ballot. It does require early decisions. But once a decision is made, there is no claim that the additional requirements for new parties and nonparty candidates are too burdensome. In fact, past experience has shown otherwise. What the Ohio filing deadline prevents is a candidate such as Anderson from seeking a party nomination and then, finding that he is rejected by the party, bolting from the party to form an independent candidacy. This is precisely the same behavior that California sought to prevent by the disaffiliation statute this Court upheld in Stover.
*815The Court makes other attempts to distinguish this case from the obviously similar Storer case. The Court says Ohio has no interest in preventing “intraparty feuding” because by the nature of the Presidential nominating conventions “‘intraparty feuding’ will continue until August.” Ante, at 804.4 This is certainly no different than the situation in Storer. Essentially all of the battles for party nominations in California would have taken place during the 12 months before the party primaries — the period during which an independent candidate had to be disaffiliated with any party.
The Court further notes: “Storer upheld the State’s interest in avoiding political fragmentation in the context of elections wholly within the boundaries of California. The State’s interest in regulating a nationwide Presidential election is not nearly as strong.” Ante, at 804 (footnote omitted). The Court’s characterization of the election simply is incorrect. The Ohio general election in 1980, among other things, was for the appointment of Ohio’s representatives to the electoral college. U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 2. The Court throughout its opinion fails to come to grips with this fact. While Ohio may have a lesser interest in who is ultimately selected by the electoral college, its interest in who is supported by its own Presidential electors must be at least as strong as its interest in electing other representatives. While the Presidential electors may serve a short term and may speak only one time on behalf of the voters they repre*816sent, their role in casting Ohio’s electoral votes for a President may be second to none in importance. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545 (1934).
The Court suggests that Storer is not controlling since in that case the Court held that the California disaffiliation statute was not discriminatory because party candidates were prohibited from affiliating with another political party for the 12 months preceding the primary election. The Court says that Ohio’s filing deadline does discriminate against nonparty candidates. But merely saying it is so does not make it so. As explained later, nonparty candidates and party candidates wishing to participate in Ohio’s primary election must file on the same date. It is true that party candidates can obtain a place on the general election ballot without participating in the primary by obtaining a party’s nomination at its national convention. But this is a benefit given to the party and only incidentally received by the winning party candidate; it provides no benefit to one who seeks but fails to obtain a party nomination. On the whole, party candidates have a more difficult chore in getting a place on the general election ballot than do nonparty candidates; a fact of which Anderson and other unsuccessful rivals for the 1980 Republican nomination are doubtless aware. Nonparty candidates, if they file in time and submit the necessary nominating petitions, are assured of a place on the ballot; party candidates must win a party nomination.
In a final attempt to distinguish Storer, the Court argues that even if Ohio is serving some interest in preventing “intraparty feuding,” the filing deadline is “both too broad and too narrow”; the Court even argues that the filing deadline may in fact impair this interest.. Ante, at 805. The Court claims that the effect of the deadline is too broad because it applies “to independent candidates who have not been affiliated in the recent past with any political party.” Ibid. Its effect is too narrow because it “does not prohibit independent candidacies by persons formerly affiliated with *817a political party, or currently participating in intraparty competition.” Ibid. The Court says the filing deadline may impair the States’ interest in preserving political stability because it may force independent-minded voters “‘to create minor parties without first attempting to influence the course taken by a major one.’” Ibid, (quoting A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity 87-88 (1971)). But each of these criticisms could have been asserted against the California disaffiliation statute.
The point the Court misses is that in cases like this and Stover, we have never required that States meet some kind of “narrowly tailored” standard in order to pass constitutional muster. In reviewing election laws like Ohio’s filing deadline, we have said before that a court’s job is to ensure that the State “in no way freezes the status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 439 (1971). If it does not freeze the status quo, then the State’s laws will be upheld if they are “tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [are] in no sense invidious or arbitrary.” Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 762 (1973). See also Marston v. Lewis, 410 U. S. 679 (1973) (per curiam); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U. S. 686 (1973) (per curiam); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173 (1977) (per curiam); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U. S. 957 (1982). The Court tries to avoid the rules set forth in some of these cases, saying that such rules were “applicable only to party primaries” and that “this case involves restrictions on access to the general election ballot.” Ante, at 802, n. 29. The fallacy in this reasoning is quite apparent: one cannot restrict access to the primary ballot without also restricting access to the general election ballot. As the Court said in Storer v. Brown: “The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people *818choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates.” 415 U. S., at 785 (footnote omitted).
The Ohio filing deadline easily meets the test described above. In the interest of the “stability of its political system,” Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S., at 736, Ohio must be “free to assure itself that [a nonparty] candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support.” Id., at 746. This interest alone is sufficient to support Ohio ballot access laws which require that candidates for Presidential electors choose their route early, thus preventing a person who has decided to run for a party nomination from switching to a nonparty candidacy after he discovers that he is not the favorite of his party. But this is not the only interest furthered by Ohio’s laws.
Ohio maintains that requiring an early declaration of candidacy gives its voters a better opportunity to take a careful look at the candidates and see how they withstand the close scrutiny of a political campaign. The Court does not dispute the legitimacy of this interest. But the Court finds that “the State’s important and legitimate interest in voter education does not justify the specific restriction on participation in a Presidential election that is at issue in this case.” Ante, at 796. Admitting that the Constitutional Convention in 1787, in establishing the electoral college and providing plenary authority to the States for election of its members to the college, had a heightened awareness of the importance of an informed electorate, the Court tells us how times have changed in the past 200 years and how the problem of ensuring an informed electorate is no longer so great. The Court explains: “In the modern world it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that it takes more than seven months to inform the electorate about the qualifications of a particular candidate .... Our cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues.” Ante, at 797.
I cannot agree with the suggestion that the early deadline reflects a lack of “faith” in the voters. That Ohio wants to *819give its voters as much time as possible to gather information on the potential candidates would seem to lead to the contrary conclusion. There is nothing improper about wanting as much time as possible in which to evaluate all available information when making an important decision. Besides, the Court’s assertion that it does not take 7 months to inform the electorate is difficult to explain in light of the fact that Anderson allowed himself some 19 months to complete this task; and we are all well aware that Anderson’s decision to make an early go of it is not atypical. The Court’s reliance on the quote from Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 358, that campaign spending and voter education occur “largely during the month before an election” cannot be taken seriously when applied to Presidential campaigns. I see no basis whatsoever for the Court’s conclusion that “[t]his reasoning applies with even greater force to a Presidential election.” Ante, at 798.
“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 14-15. This is especially true in the context of candidates for President. “The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S., at 545. I believe the Court of Appeals aptly explained the present day need in saying:
“To be sure, some of the impediments to an informed electorate that existed in 1787 have been removed by our extensive present day communications network, through which news of a candidacy is transmitted nationwide virtually simultaneously with its announcement. However, rapid communication can only inform the electorate of the existence of a candidacy. Equally crucial to a meaningful vote is the electorate’s ability to evaluate *820those who would be President once aware of their desire to fill the post. Ohio may very reasonably conclude that requiring Presidential candidates to be in the public eye for a significant time materially advances its interest in careful selection.” 664 F. 2d, at 564.5
Ohio also has an interest in assisting its citizens in apportioning their resources among various candidates running for the Presidency. The supply of resources needed for operating a political campaign is limited; this is especially true of two of the most important commodities, money and volunteers. By doing its best to present the field of candidates by spring, right at the time that campaigns begin to intensify, Ohio allows those of its citizens who want to provide support other than voting, adequate time to decide how to divide up that support. While the Court does not give attention to this interest, it is certainly a legitimate one and an important one in terms of the effective campaigning of Presidential candidates.
The Court seems to say that even if these interests would otherwise be served by Ohio’s filing deadline, they are “undermined by the State’s willingness to place major-party nominees on the November ballot even if they never campaigned in Ohio.” Ante, at 798. The Court fails to follow its own warning that “ ‘[sjometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.’” Ante, at 801 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442). Underlying the Court’s entire opinion is the idea that “independent candidates” are treated differently than candidates fielded by the “major parties.” But this observation is no more productive than comparing *821apples and oranges and wondering at the difference between them.
First of all, any political party, major, minor, or otherwise, can qualify for a position on Ohio’s general election ballot and have that position held open until later in the election year. The reasonableness of this approach is fairly obvious. Political parties have, or at least hope to have, a continuing existence, representing particular philosophies. Each party has an interest in finding the best candidate to advance its philosophy in each election. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U. S. 107 (1981). The Court suggests that if such a procedure is so important for political parties, then followers of a particular candidate should also have more time. See, e. g., ante, at 800, n. 27. This argument simply does not wash. Any group of like-minded voters, if they are of sufficient numbers, is free to form a political party and ensure more time in selecting a candidate to express their views. But followers of a particular candidate need no time to find such a representative; they are organized around that candidate. Such followers have no real organized existence in the absence of that particular candidate.
Comparing party candidates and nonparty candidates is somewhat more useful, but does not change the result. Any candidate wanting to pursue his place on the Ohio general election ballot through Ohio’s preliminary procedures must file at the same time. Nevertheless, should an individual who has not filed a statement of candidacy be chosen by a political party as its nominee, Ohio does not attempt to keep that candidate off of its general election ballot. To the extent that this is an advantage to the successful party candidate, however, it is a benefit given to the party, which the party candidate only receives incidentally.6 Furthermore, *822to the extent the party candidate is benefited, such benefit is counterbalanced by the risk he takes of not getting the party nomination at all. Only the nonparty candidate can assure himself of a place on the general election ballot. Many party candidates may seek the party’s nomination, but only one of them will get it.
The Court’s decision in this case is not necessary for the protection of like-minded voters who want to support an independent candidate; Ohio laws already protect such voters. This case presents a completely different story. John Anderson decided some 19 months before the 1980 general election to run for President. He decided to run as a Republican Party candidate. When Anderson sought to get on the Ohio ballot after the March 20 deadline, he was not a “newly emergent independent candidate” whose candidacy had been created by dramatic changes in the election campaign. He was a party candidate who saw impending rejection by his party and rather than throw his support to the party’s candidate or some other existing candidacy, Anderson wanted to bolt and have a second try.
*823The Court’s opinion protects this particular kind of candidate — an individual who decides well in advance to become a Presidential candidate, decides which route to follow in seeking a position on the general election ballot, and, after seeing his hopes turn to ashes, wants to try another route. The Court’s opinion draws no line; I presume that a State must wait until all party nominees are chosen and then allow all unsuccessful party candidates to refight their party battles by forming an “independent” candidacy. I find nothing in the Constitution which requires this result. For this reason I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Anderson would not have been totally excluded from participating in the general election since Ohio allows for “write-in” candidacies. The Court suggests, however, that this is of no relevance because a write-in procedure “is not an adequate substitute for having the candidate’s name appear on the printed ballot.” Ante, at 799, n. 26. Until today the Court had not squarely so held and in fact in earlier decisions the Court had treated the availability of write-in candidacies as quite relevant. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736, n. 7 (1974).
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, one could speculate that nonparty candidates would have more difficulty meeting the signature requirements of various States if the States had less discretion in setting their own deadlines. “We also note that the effect of limiting the states’ discretion would be to require uniformity, thus compressing the signature gathering and campaigning requirements in the various states. This would greatly increase the burden on all candidates, who may presently devote their scarce resources to a few states at a time.” 664 P. 2d 554, 565, n. 13 (1981).
It would seem that realistically speaking, there is little chance in these modern times of a serious candidate for the Presidency making his decision to run after the spring of the election year. We might judicially take notice that it is presently the spring of the year preceding an election year and numerous candidates have already thrown their hats into the campaign ring. For proof of a contrary point, the Court cites by reference to the candidacies of Martin Van Burén in 1848, James B. Weaver in 1892, Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and Robert La Follette in 1924. Ante, at 792, n. 13. The most obvious response is that the method of Presidential campaigning has so changed since the last of these campaigns that such candidacies are not as likely to arise today. It also should be noted that most, if not all, of these men decided to seek the Presidency far in advance of their actual nomination. Finally, none of these individuals were elected in the years in question and those who split from their political parties may well have been responsible for the election going to a different party, a result which this Court, in Storer v. Brown, supra, said States were at liberty to try to avoid.
The Court seeks comfort from the idea that the filing deadline is not a “sore loser” statute which prevents a candidate who is defeated in a primary from running as an independent candidate. Ante, at 804, n. 31. But the effect of the deadline in this case is much the same. Under the Court’s approach, so long as a candidate pulls out of his party race before the votes of the party are counted, he must be recognized as a “newly emergent independent candidate” whose candidacy is created by a dramatic change in national events. To the contrary, I submit that such a candidate is no more than a “sore loser” who ducked out before putting his popularity to the vote of his party.
The Ohio Legislature’s decision is not that different from the decision by the Federal Government requiring television networks to provide early access for Presidential candidates. Recently, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 458 U. S. 367 (1981), this Court held that under the Federal Communications Act a Presidential candidate had a right to television access as early as December 1979, some 11 months before the election.
The Court says that nevertheless this exposes a serious weakness in the State’s claim that it wants to put all the candidates before its voters *822early so they will have time to evaluate the candidates. Even if the Court were correct, the other interests advanced by the State would justify the filing deadline for nonparty candidates. But I do not believe the Court is correct.
The Court ignores the fact that voters learn about a nonparty candidacy only by listening to what the candidate has to say. Reality requires a different conclusion about party candidates. Even before a party candidate is chosen, the public will know a great deal about that candidate because of its knowledge about the party. Of course, the Court is correct that the focus of a party will vary somewhat according to the candidate chosen. But this proves only that the time between the choosing of the party’s nominee and the general election should be sufficient to allow the voters to evaluate the party’s candidate. It does not prove that the voters need as much time evaluating the party candidate as they need for an individual who does not run as the representative of any particular established views. It would in fact be quite reasonable for a State to require, in furtherance of its voter education interest, that the nonparty candidate put himself before the public at an earlier time than it requires of the party candidate.