dissenting:
I cannot accept the majority’s reasoning with regard to the effect of the release executed by Pope. The restrictive view of that release now advanced by the majority was never even remotely argued by plaintiff either below or on appeal. Moreover, on its merits, the majority’s conclusion defies the plain and unambiguous language of the release. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the district court correctly held that the settlement agreement between Pope and BHC defeats Pope’s present action against BHC for wrongful discharge. That agreement, which was drafted by Pope’s attorney, clearly states that plaintiff:
hereby accepts the said agreement and the aforesaid payments) in final compromise and settlement of any and all claims, except that her future right to necessary medical treatment related to her occupational injury sustained on the 29th day of December, 1979, will remain open and continue to be the responsibility of the Employer/Insurer, which the Claimant, his or her personal representative, dependents, husband, children or any other parties who might become beneficiaries under the said Workmen’s Compensation Law, might now or could hereafter have under the provisions of the said Law, arising out of the aforesaid injury or disablement or the disability resulting therefrom, and does hereby, on behalf of himself or herself and all of said other parties, release and forever discharge the Employer/Insurer, their personal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns, from all other claims of whatsoever kind which might or could hereafter arise under the Workmen’s Compensation Law from the said injury, disablement or disability.
(emphasis added).
The broad language employed by Pope in her release precludes “any and all claims ... of whatsoever kind” arising under Maryland’s workmen’s compensation laws. Construing this language and relying on the analysis of a similar issue in Roberts v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 597 F.Supp. 311 (D.Md.1984), the district court reasonably concluded that Pope’s wrongful discharge action arose under the workmen’s compensation statutes and was, therefore, barred by the settlement agreement.
I am unpersuaded by the majority’s attempt to circumvent the obvious effect of the release by artificially limiting its reach to claims involving the specific back injury which gave rise to plaintiff’s request for workmen’s compensation benefits. Such splitting of hairs is simply not justified by the facts presented in this case. Had Pope intended to so restrict her release, she, as the drafter of the agreement, could easily have included appropriate language to accomplish that purpose. Furthermore, the fact that Pope confined her argument below and on appeal solely to whether her claim for wrongful discharge arose under Maryland’s workmen’s compensation laws belies the majority’s strained interpretation of the release and convincingly demonstrates that the document does not say what the majority now perceives it to say.
Md.Ann.Code Art. 101, § 39A of Maryland’s Workmen’s Compensation Act grants employees the substantive right to be free from retaliatory discharge as a result of filing a claim for workmen’s compensation benefits. That statute is the source of Pope’s present cause of action. By accepting $43,400 and lifetime free medical treatment in exchange for releasing defendants “from all ... claims of whatsoever kind which might or could hereafter arise under the Workmen’s Compensation Law,” Pope erected a permanent barrier to bringing the instant action.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm summary judgment in favor of defendants on the reasoning of the district court. Pope v. Bethesda Health Center, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 797 (D.Md.1986).