(Dissenting).
I respectfully dissent on the ground that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and, in the alternative, that the most we have jurisdiction to do, and should do, is to vacate aspects of the district court orders that were beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.
I. Jurisdiction Over the Appeal
The briefs filed in this case by counsel for the named parties present issues of fundamental significance concerning the nature and scope of protective orders issued by district courts during pretrial proceedings and concerning settlements on terms that leave such orders in effect. Amicus briefs (filed on behalf of separate associations of attorneys who commonly represent plaintiffs and defendants respectively in product liability actions) reflect widespread interest in the bar.
The importance of the issues underscores the importance of this court’s sensitivity to limits on its jurisdiction. I recognize how pressing are the interests of the bar and trial judges in having clear guidance about important unsettled issues that are confronted almost daily in the district courts. At least equally compelling, however, are the interests underlying limits on our jurisdictional authority. We must respect constitutional constraints against issuing advisory opinions when no live case or controversy is presented to the court by real parties in interest.
A. Interest of the Poliquins
As noted in Part I .of the Court’s Opinion, the Poliquins, nominally the appellants in this case, received a check from Garden Way and executed a “release and indemnity agreement” that included a provision declaring that "[rjeleasors and their attorney acknowledge that they are still bound by the terms of the [August 2] Protective Order” as to disclosure of protected materials. The record before us strongly suggests that Garden Way may have been influenced to make a higher cash offer for this settlement than would have been made in return for a release that did not include the provision binding the Poliquins and their attorney by the terms of the protective order. Also, viewed in the light most favorable to an argument that the Poli-quins have a legally protected interest at stake in this appeal, the record fails to show that they have any tangible interest in the outcome of this appeal (if indeed it does not strongly suggest the contrary). Also, again viewing matters most favorably to an argument that the Poliquins have an interest, one may doubt that whatever intangible interest they have in the outcome of this appeal is a legally protected interest.
The fact that the Poliquins are named as people subject to an ongoing protective order does not demonstrate that they have a legally protected interest in challenging that order. To whatever extent the interlocutory protective order survives after final judgment (dismissing the action after the parties reported their settlement), it survives as a “protective order” of the court — or perhaps more accurately stated, as protective terms of a settlement agreement — only because the Poliquins and their attorney agreed to it.
The Poliquins, and the attorney who represented them in effecting the settlement, are barred by contract from challenging the terms of the order or the settlement agreement incorporating those terms. I conclude also that, by reason of this bar, the Poliquins lack the kind of interest that would give them standing in this court (or in the district court, see Part II below) to challenge the very terms of the “protective order” to which they had agreed in settling the case.
The rule that a party who settles a case cannot thereafter appeal a court order entered previously in that case is confirmed in precedent and is comprehensive in scope. Any case or controversy previously existing between the parties is moot after complete settlement. See Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120, 106 S.Ct. 553, 88 L.Ed.2d 418 (1985) (per curiam). Although partial settlement does not necessarily bar appeal of unsettled disputes, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. *537731, 743-44, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697-98, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (case not moot after agreement fixing damages dependent on outcome of appeal), when a party enters into an agreement encompassing a specific issue, no live case or controversy exists over that issue. See 13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.2 at 234 (“A partial settlement moots the issues involved in the settlement, but not those that the parties did not intend to settle.”). One context in which appeals have been dismissed concerns appeal of a trial court order of remittitur. Even when a plaintiff agrees to a remittitur “under protest” and purports to reserve a “right to appeal therefrom,” the plaintiff “may not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted.” Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650, 97 S.Ct. 835, 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 112 (1977) (per curiam) (affirming circuit court’s dismissal of appeal).
Here, the settlement agreement purported to settle the entire controversy, and the Poliquins specifically agreed to abide by the terms of the protective order. Any legal controversy between Garden Way and the Poliquins over the propriety of the protective order, therefore, is moot.
Because the legal controversy over the protective order was rendered moot by the settlement, we should not decide the important issues argued before us, whether or not the parties waived any jurisdictional impediment. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705-06, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam) (determining that in federal courts, a case is not saved from mootness by “great public interest in the continuing issues” even if that circumstance might permit jurisdiction in a state’s legal system). Resolution of any dispute over the protective order should be resolved under contract principles, and not the (moot) legal controversies addressed by the opinion of the Court in this case. See 13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.2 at 233-34 (“[Questions arising out of settlements, [as well as] mootness questions should be answered according to the [manifested] intent of the parties and more general contract principles.”).
B. Interest of the Poliquins’ Attorney
Any interest the Poliquins’ attorney may have in challenging the terms that both the Poliquins and he agreed to as part of the settlement cannot properly be asserted in this appeal as an interest of the Poliquins. Indeed, any suggestion to the contrary is troubling not only because of its inconsistency with precedents, to be considered below, but also because it raises a problem of potential conflict of interest between the Poliquins and their attorney.
A party defendant may be willing to offer more cash, and a party plaintiff may be willing to accept it, on condition that the terms of a protective order remain in force after the settlement. An attorney, on the other hand, might naturally be more or less resistant to such an agreement than the client. The potential conflict might affect the attorney-client relationship both during settlement negotiations and in further proceedings before the court after the final judgment of dismissal. In post-settlement proceedings in this case, of course, the opposing attorneys were formally appearing not each in his own right but each for his client or clients.
C. Real-Party-in-Interest and Constitutional Requirements
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 requires that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). It may be debatable whether this rule applies to proceedings in a court of appeals. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts ... with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.”). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 81 (containing no specific provision regarding applicability to proceedings in a court of appeals). Something akin to a real-party-in-interest requirement nevertheless applies to appeals because of the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (appellant pediatrician did not have a judicially cognizable interest in *538defending Illinois criminal statutes; only the State did, and it did not appeal; appeal dismissed). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137-38, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (the “injury in fact” test requires both injury to a cognizable interest and a showing that the party seeking review is among the injured and would be “directly” affected by challenged action) (citations omitted).
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contain a requirement that a “notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal,” Fed.R.App.P. 3(c), and this requirement has been rigorously enforced. A court of appeals is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal on behalf of a person who has not been specified in the notice of appeal as a party taking the appeal. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988); Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174 (1st Cir.1988). This court has dismissed an appeal that an attorney sought to press to decision after the attorney’s clients had settled all interests they had in the appeal. Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir.1992).
D. Conclusion
In view of the likelihood, suggested by the record, that the only named appellants have no legally protected interest at stake in this appeal, I conclude that we should dismiss this appeal unless, within thirty days from this date, a submission is filed with this court showing a factual and legal basis for a determination that the named appellants have a legally protected interest that would be affected by the outcome of this appeal.
. II. Jurisdiction of the District Court
In view of the rejection of my position that we should dismiss the appeal in this case for want of appellate jurisdiction, I turn next to considering limits upon the district court’s jurisdiction and the effect of those limits upon the jurisdiction of this ■ court.
Once this court determines that it has jurisdiction of this appeal for any purpose, I do not question that the court should at least exercise jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in making an order in excess of its jurisdiction.- This court’s jurisdiction may be limited, however, to authority to vacate any aspect of the orders of the district court that the district court lacked jurisdiction to make.
If the district court, in either of its orders appealed from (the December 10, 1991 and January 17, 1992 orders) made an order on the merits (for example, expanding or narrowing the scope of the magistrate judge’s August 2 order), it erred. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order in a closed case (a final judgment of dismissal, by reason of a settlement between the parties, having been entered). See Part I.A, above. The district court’s error in this respect cannot confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals to reverse in part and affirm in part, thereby making a different order on the merits; instead, our jurisdiction is limited to ordering that, insofar as the district court orders appealed from purported to expand or otherwise modify' the August 2 order, they be vacated for lack of jurisdiction of the district court to make such orders.
Just as I believe it imperative that this court be sensitive to limits on its jurisdiction over an appeal in the name of the Poliquins if they are no longer real parties in interest (for reasons explained in Part I.C, above), I believe it imperative also that this court be sensitive to limits on the jurisdiction of the district court to act on a motion made on behalf of the Poliquins in that court if, before the motion was filed, the Poliquins had ceased to be real parties in interest. The fact they are formally named as subject to the terms of the “protective order” is not enough to give them either a practical interest or a legally protected interest to support their motion seeking a modification of a “protective order” to which they agreed as part of the settlement.
In the district court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 was applicable without doubt. Also, the district court was under the same constitutional constraints as this *539court with respect to the jurisdictional necessity of a live case or controversy between the parties (the Poliquins) by whom the motion was brought and the party (Garden Way) against which relief was sought.
A summary of the history of the protective order includes these steps:
August 2, 1991. The magistrate judge made the Protective Order at Garden Way’s request and over the Poliquins’ opposition. The Poliquins appealed this order to the district judge, who affirmed it as not “clearly erroneous.” An appeal to the court of appeals was dismissed because the order was interlocutory.
October 24, 1991. During a pretrial hearing, in response to a suggestion by plaintiff’s attorney that he be free from any restriction against disclosure of material offered in evidence at trial, defendant's attorney disagreed and stated, “I will request that those exhibits be returned.”' The district court replied: “Correct.... When the trial is over, whatever rights you have ... to control the further dissemination of the material, you can invoke.”
November 4, 1991. [This date is indicated in Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Determination of Confidentiality at 1 (seven days after trial commenced on October 28, 1991).] On this date, during trial, the parties reported to the district court that they had settled. The court discharged the jury.
November 13, 1991. Defense ■ counsel wrote to plaintiffs’ counsel listing 214 items claimed to be covered by the Protective Order and requesting that the listed material be returned or destroyed. Some of these items had not previously been designated as confidential. This letter appears not to have been delivered to the court at that time, but apparently it was brought to the court’s attention through the Poliquins’ motion of November 25, 1991.
November 18, 1991. The Poliquins executed a “release and indemnity agreement” and received a check. The agreement stated that “[rjeleasors and their attorney acknowledge that they are still bound by the terms of the Protective Order” as to disclosure of protected materials. In an addendum, plaintiffs’ attorney signed an ac-knowledgement that the agreement was binding on him.
November 25, 1991. Two days before entry of the final judgment of dismissal and seven days after executing the “release and indemnity agreement,” the Poli-quins filed a motion “for determination of confidentiality”.
November 27, 1991. The clerk entered a final judgment of dismissal of the action. That final judgment made no reference to the terms of the protective order, either in its August 2nd form or as it may have been interpreted or modified by the district court’s oral ruling in the pretrial hearing of October 24, 1991.
December 5, 1991. Defense counsel sent to plaintiffs’ counsel and the court a letter, later treated by the court as defendant’s Motion to Seal Documentation from its File Until Parties Come to An Agreement.
December 9, 1991. Defendant filed a written memorandum in opposition to the Poliquins’ motion of November 25.
December 10, 1991. The clerk sent the following notice to all counsel:
Please take notice that Chief Judge Gene Carter has this date made the following endorsements on the motions listed below:
(1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Determination of Confidentiality: “12/10/91 MOTION DENIED”.
(2) Defendant’s Motion to Seal Documentation from its File until Parties Come to An Agreement (Letter addressed to William Brownell dated December 5, 1991 from Roy E. Thompson): “12/10/91 MOTION GRANTED; Counsel to file a proposed final order within ten (10) days”.
Addendum to Appellants’ Brief at 1.
January 17, 1992. The court signed- and the clerk entered an “Order on Defendant’s Motion to Seal Documentation” as follows:
After reviewing Garden Way Incorporated’s request to seal all confidential information contained in the Court’s file, *540it is hereby ordered that all such documentation may be removed from the Court’s file by counsel for Garden Way Incorporated. The documentation which is to be removed is subject to this Court’s Protective Order dated August 2, 1991. In addition the Court will seal all testimony and arguments made during the trial dealing with matters which are subject to said Protective Order, and any sealed material shall not be reviewed except upon order of this Court.
Id. at 2.
The Poliquins filed notices of appeal from the December 10, 1991 and January 17, 1992 orders.
It is true that Garden Way’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Determination of Confidentiality does not argue that the district court lacks jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs’ motion. Instead, it argues that the district court should deny plaintiffs’ motion because, after the litigation has
been settled, the case dismissed and Plaintiffs paid, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks an order from this Court essentially reversing the Protective Order, thereby permitting counsel for the Plaintiffs to disseminate this protected information on a nationwide basis.
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Determination of Confidentiality, 12/9/91, quoted in Addendum to Reply Brief of Appellants, at 17.
It is true also that defendant’s counsel, too, after the settlement, in effect sought a modification of the protective order. First, the letter of November 13, 1991, addressed to plaintiffs’ counsel, listed 214 items claimed to be covered by the protective order and requested that the listed material be returned or destroyed. The record does not disclose that this request was made to the court, but apparently it was brought to the court’s attention by plaintiffs’ motion of November 25, 1991. In any event, a second request was made by letter of December 5, which the court treated as a motion to seal.
Even if the separate requests to the court by all parties were treated as a manifestation of their consent to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction to consider modifications of the protective order, such a joint request made after the court had entered a final judgment of dismissal cannot confer jurisdiction on a United States district court contrary to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
This point is reinforced by the comment of this court when dismissing the appeal from the interlocutory protective order in this case:
The fact that the parties may settle the litigation and thereby foreclose appellate review does not make an interlocutory order immediately appealable.
Id. at 17, quoting the ORDER OF COURT entered October 18, 1991.
In view of this history, of the protective .order and the incorporation into the settlement agreement of some or all of the terms of the protective order as they existed at the moment of execution of the settlement agreement, the record before us lacks complete clarity about the extent to which protective terms survive as an order of the district court, even though not incorporated into the final judgment, or only as terms of the settlement agreement between the parties, or (perhaps by analogy to a consent decree) in some combination of court order and agreement of the parties.
For present purposes, nevertheless, I assume that the district court is not precluded from considering and ruling upon any motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement. Also, incident to such a motion, the district court may consider any request for interpretation of the agreement and — should grounds be shown for doing so, consistently with the law applicable to interpretation and enforcement of contracts — may receive evidence to resolve any ambiguity in the settlement agreement.
The motions before the court in this case, however, as well as the orders of December 10, 1991 and January 17, 1992, were focused on proposed modifications of the court’s protective order as an order of the *541court continuing in effect beyond the execution of the settlement and dismissal of the case. The motions were not viewed by the parties, their attorneys, or the court as motions seeking interpretation and enforcement of the settlement agreement. In these circumstances, even if we have jurisdiction to treat the motions in the district court as if they were motions to enforce (and interpret) the settlement agreement, and to treat the appeal from the district court’s orders as properly before us for consideration on the merits to this limited extent, the more prudent course is not to do so. Neither the attorneys nor the district court viewed the matter as a proceeding to enforce the settlement. Nor has the matter been argued before us from this perspective. The better course is to allow the contentions of the parties, and any evidence relevant to their contentions, to be developed first before the district court.
In any event, exercising jurisdiction over motions to modify the protective order of August 2, 1991 is a very different matter from exercising jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. If the appeal now before us is not to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, I conclude that we should (a) vacate the district court’s orders of December 10, 1991 and January 17, 1992 insofar as they purport to modify and continue in force, as modified, the protective order of August 2, 1992, and (b) remand with directions that the district court decline to exercise jurisdiction over any further motion by any of the parties to the settlement agreement, or their attorneys, seeking a substantive modification of the protective order to which they agreed as part of their settlement.