U.S. Steel Group (A Unit of Usx Corporation)and Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. United States, and Ag Der Dillinger Huttenwerke

LOURIE, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

I would affirm the decision of the CIT because I believe that movement expenses are not within the definition of “total expenses” as defined in section 1677a(f)(2)(C). That provision defines total expenses as “all expenses ... incurred ... with respect to the production and sale of [the subject] merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f)(2)(C) (1994) (emphasis added). That language is not unclear or ambiguous. While the term “all expenses” appears to be comprehensive, the subsequent qualification “with respect to the production and sale” is limiting.

In interpreting this definition, it is useful to refer to the previous definition in section 1677a(f)(2)(B), “Total United States Expenses,” which means those “expenses described in subsection (d)(1) and (2) of this section.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f)(2)(B). The expenses described in subsection (d)(1) all relate to selling expenses, and those described in subsection (d)(2) all relate to “manufacture or assembly.” The latter are essentially production expenses. Thus, total United States expenses and total expenses are consistently defined as including selling and production (manufacture) expenses. We are not entitled to modify an unambiguous provision.

Elsewhere in this section there is reference to what are clearly movement expenses. Section 1677a(c)(2)(A) refers to “the amount ... attributable to any additional costs, charges, or expenses ... incident to bringing the subject merchandise from the original place of shipment in the exporting country to the place of delivery in the United States,” ie., movement expenses. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). All parts of a statute must be interpreted to provide consistent meaning. Congress obviously had such expenses in mind when it failed to include them in the definition of total expenses.

Commerce is surely entitled to deference in interpreting a statute it is obligated to implement. However, Chevron deference need not be given when Congress has spoken to the issue before us. The plain language of the statute states that CEP is to be reduced for: movement expenses, under section 1677a(c)(2)(A); sales and production expenses, under sections 1677a(d)(l) and 1677a(d)(2); and profits allocated to sales and production expenses, under sections 1677a(d)(3) and 1677a(f). Because the provisions of the statute are clear in not including movement expenses as “total expenses,” I believe we need not reach the second Chevron step to determine whether Commerce’s interpretation to the contrary is reasonable.