Michael Genthe appeals from the district court’s1 entry of judgment as a matter of law on two claims that Genthe’s employer, Quebecor World Lincoln (Quebecor), unlawfully failed to promote him because it regarded him as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12117 et seq. We affirm.
Since the age of' one, Genthe has suffered from Marfan’s- Syndrome, which is a connective tissue disorder that can manifest itself in various ways. In Genthe’s case, he has been left with some curvature of the spine, subluxation of the lenses of the eyes, damage to his aorta, long extremities, and a sunken chest. Notwithstanding the effects of the syndrome, Genthe had worked, with some accommodation regarding limitations on lifting and on overtime hours, for the seven years prior to the initiation of this lawsuit as a Journeyman II Apprentice (J-2) in Quebe-cor’s bindery factory.2 J-2s were commonly called upon to assist with the operation of the various machines in the bindery factory; to lift, and move heavy bundles alone or with other employees; to see accurately and to possess good near, distance, and color vision; and to frequently work overtime.
Genthe applied for promotions to the Journeyman I Apprentice (J — 1) position and to the Forklift Operator position, stating that he wanted these promotions because they were less physically demanding and required less overtime. After Quebe-cor denied his requests for promotion, Genthe brought suit, alleging nine claims of discrimination under the ADA. The jury found in favor of Quebecor on all but two of the claims. On -claim four, the jury found that , Quebecor- had regarded *716Genthe’s impairments as substantially limiting him in one or more of his major life activities; that Quebecor’s perception of these impairments was a motivating factor in its decision not to transfer Genthe to the Forklift Operator position; but that nonetheless Quebecor would not have transferred him because he was not the most qualified applicant for that position. On claim five, the jury found that Quebecor had refused to transfer Genthe to the Journeyman I Apprentice position because of its similar perceptions and motivation and awarded Genthe damages in the amount of $3,302.72. The district court then granted Quebecor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law. Arabian Agriculture Services Co. v. Chief Industries, Inc., 309 F.3d 479, 482 (8th Cir.2002). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the evidence adduced at trial is entirely insufficient to support the verdict. Id. In making this determination, we consider all of the evidence in the record without weighing credibility, and we resolve conflicts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. An inference is reasonable, however, when it “may be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.” Id. (quoting Fought v. Hayes Wheels International, Inc., 101 F.3d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Credence should also be given to evidence favoring the moving party where that evidence is uncontradicted and unimpeached and comes from disinterested witnesses. Kinserlow v. CMI Corp., 217 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).
The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to hiring, advancement or discharge.” 42 U.S.C. 12112(a); Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.1999). A “qualified individual” is a person who, “with or without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions” of the position he or she seeks. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Moreover, an individual is considered disabled under the ADA if he or she has a record of such an impairment or is “regarded as having” such an impairment. Id. “[M]ajor life activity means ‘functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’” Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting the non-exclusive enumeration of major life activities from 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
To survive Quebecor’s post-trial motion, Genthe must have introduced evidence from which the jury could determine 1) that he was regarded as having an impairment that limited a major life activity, 2) that he was a qualified individual, and 3) that he was not promoted because he was regarded as having an impairment that limited a major life activity. Longen v. Waterous Co., 347 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir.2003). The district court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was regarded as having such an impairment or that he was passed over for promotion because of that perception.
Genthe argues that the district court improperly required him to introduce direct evidence supporting those two propo*717sitions, which, he maintains, is not necessary in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (holding that in order to receive a mixed motive instruction under Title VII, “a plaintiff need only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his or her protected status] was a motivating factor for any employment practice”). We need not reach this question, however, because we conclude that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicating that Genthe was regarded as having a limiting impairment or that he was passed over for promotion because of such an impairment. Cf. Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that claim could not proceed because of the lack of direct or circumstantial evidence without deciding effect of Desert Palace).
With respect to' Genthe’s request for promotion to Forklift Operator, the evidence indicated that Dennis Hruza had sole discretion to decide whether to promote Kathy Sieck, a co-worker, or Genthe to the position. He interviewed both Sieck and Genthe and testified that he selected Sieck because she had experience in material handling and Genthe did not. There is evidence that Hruza was told of some of Genthe’s health problems on two occasions. First, Hruza testified that during his interview with Genthe, Genthe mentioned that he had a heart condition and believed that working as a Forklift Operator would be less physically strenuous than his position as a J-2. When asked whether Genthe’s heart condition was a factor in his decision-making process, Hruza said no. Second, one of Genthe’s evaluations, prepared by Connie Melichar, a co-worker referred to her impression that Genthe was legally blind. There is no evidence that Hruza saw or considered this comment in his decision-making process. In fact, he stated that he ignored the evaluation. In the light most favorable to Genthe, then, the evidence shows that Hruza regarded him as having some health conditions that impaired him and that Hruza decided not to promote him. Genthe argues that this coincidence is sufficient circumstantial evidence of both a perception that his impairment was substantially limiting of a major life activity and of a causal connection between that perception and the adverse employment action. We disagree, for no reasonable juror could infer from this evidence, without resorting to speculation, that the denial of Genthe’s request for promotion was in any way caused by a perception that he had an impairment which limited a major life activity. Our cases require both evidence of protected status and of a causal relationship between that status, and the adverse employment decision. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law.
As for Genthe’s request to be promoted to the Journeyman position, the analysis is the same, although there were more people involved in the decision-making process regarding that position. Rather than a single person exercising sole authority to promote, a committee (composed of half labor representatives and half company officials) made the determination to pass Genthe over for promotion. Again, the decision makers knew of certain aspects of Genthe’s physical condition, including that he had a heart problem, that he at times had lifting and overtime accommodations, and that his vision had been questioned by Ms. Melichar. In the light most favorable to Genthe, then, the committee members regarded him as having some impairments at the time they decided not to promote him. This was the *718sum total of the evidence upon which the jury could base its verdict. We conclude that this evidence is insufficient to support, without resort to speculation, the inferences that Genthe was regarded as having an impairment which limited a major life activity or that he was passed over for promotion because of that perception.
Finally, Genthe argues that the district court committed plain error in its jury charge regarding Genthe’s allegation that he was discriminated against because he had a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. “Plain error review is narrow and confined to the exceptional case where error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The verdict should be reversed only if the error prejudices the substantial rights of a party and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.” BBSerCo, Inc. v. Metrix Co., 324 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Industries, Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir.2002)). Without deciding whether the district court’s instructions were erroneous, we conclude that reversal would not be appropriate in any event because Genthe has failed to establish any facts upon which the jury could base a determination that he had a record of an impairment that limited a major life activity or that such a record of impairment caused any adverse employment action. Genthe points only to his non-permanent vision problems and his occasional seizures (by his own admission, none occurred between November 1997 and the summer of 2000) as evidence of a record of impairment. He does not cite any facts in the record from which a jury could determine that these impairments limited him in a major life activity, because, but for short periods of convalescence, he had successfully performed the position of J-2 — which required that he be able to work, think, read, and lift, among other things — for the seven years preceding initiation of this law suit. Additionally, he fails to point us to any adverse employment action that was caused by this alleged record of impairment. We note too that, given the jury’s rejection of his actual disability claim and our decision with respect to his perceived disability claim, “it is virtually inconceivable that the jury would have found for [him] on a record of disability theory.” Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir.1999).
The judgment is affirmed.
. The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. Prior to Quebecor’s purchase of the factory from American Signature, the J-2 position was divided into three different roles: J-2, "heavy” and "light.” As the name implies, a "heavy” was required to do most of the heavy lifting in the factory. Genthe was successfully employed as a "heavy” until the positions were merged into the J-2 role.