dissenting.
Despite the majority's elaborate analysis of the interpretation of the word "receiving" as it appears in Indiana Code § 7.1-5-5-2, I believe that this criminal statute must be narrowly construed, in accordance with several well recognized due process principles-variously framed in our jurisprudence as the "void for vagueness doe-trine," the "rule of lenity," and the "fair notice requirement."
The "void for vagueness" doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). The "fair notice" requirement "givels] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954). The rule of lenity is premised on two ideas: first, "'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed'" and second, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 LEd.2d 488, 496-97 (1971) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816, 818 (1981)). These principles work in tandem towards one result: the strict construction of penal statutes. See Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810, 815-16 (Ind.2002); Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind.2000).
Because I believe that the majority's expansion of the word "receiving" to encompass the holder of a permit is a viola*1041tion of these principles, I respectfully dissent.
RUCKER, J., concurs.