(concurring specially).
[¶ 49.] I concur on all issues, except issue three with which I concur specially.
*500[¶ 50.] 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen Manlove.
[¶ 51.] Based upon this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Manlove’s testimony. This record does not contain any hearing where this type of forensic evidence was tested under Daubert principles. All that was done was the making of a generic objection based upon foundation during trial which was next made into a continuing objection; whatever that is. During oral arguments counsel for Thomas stated that, for financial reasons, no expert was hired to contest or challenge Manlove’s opinions. In addition, Thomas was not provided with a copy of Manlove’s proposed opinion until the “midnight hour” or just prior to trial. The Eighth Circuit, when discussing admissibility of an expert’s testimony under Dau-bert, stated:
When evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district court must look to both the relevancy and the reliability of the testimony, [citations omitted]. This gate-keeping function is applicable to “ ‘technical’ and other ‘specialized’ ” expert testimony, in addition to the testimony of scientific experts.
Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Assoc., 178 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8thCir.1999) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249 (1999) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702)). Is the mere fact that an individual has credentials sufficient to allow testimony of any subjective opinion? In Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5thCir.1987), the court said no. In Viterbo, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[w]ithout more than credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert’s testimony that ‘it is so’ is not admissible.” Id.
[¶ 52.] Whether the use of forensic psychiatry to prove testamentary capacity should receive a “rubber stamp of approval” is not supported by this record. There is not enough contained in this record for a meaningful appellate review of whether the methodology used by this witness is reliable because Thomas could not afford to challenge it. Under the gatekeeping duties of the trial court, we must always remember that the reasoning or methodology of experts should be first tested for their scientific validity and then whether that reasoning or methodology is properly applicable to the facts at hand. This has not been done in this case, but it is not the fault of the trial court. Based upon the above, I would submit that this opinion should not be taken as a carte blanche admission of forensic psychiatry testimony in all future testamentary capacity disputes.