(dissenting).
Since defendants, by counsel, chose not seriously to resist the challenge of plaintiffs to the residency requirement of one year for admission to practice law in this state as provided by West Virginia Code 30-2-1, I do not believe a formal opinion presenting my views to be warranted. Nonetheless, in dissenting from the views of the majority, I consider a short note setting forth my basic premise in so doing to be in order; and this I do with due deference to the opinion and judgment of my colleagues and the courts that are in accord therewith.
I take this course on principle, and as a protest to the menacing thrust of the “new federalism” into every facet of our political life and the consequent erosion of the powers of local government. This has been accomplished, in my opinion, under the guise of a sort of “freedom for everything for everybody” concept supposedly reposed in the Constitution. It is this “free swinging” interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which virtually renders it a vehicle for remaking our political order that I cannot embrace. Subverted also is the Constitutional right to freedom of travel from state to state. I fail to see any infringement of this right by the statutory requirement in question.
*1231To be more specific, with respect to the issue presented in this proceeding, I submit that the state does have a compelling interest in maintaining the competency, the integrity and stability of the bar, and that it outweighs any claim of infringement of “due process” and “equal protection” guaranteed to these plaintiffs or the class they represent by the Fourteenth Amendment.
I do not agree, as the majority says, that substantial professional rights, privileges and earnings are here involved. The professions involve long training, discipline and dedication. They vitally affect the very lives and freedoms of our people. To open the door to all persons who may desire a license to enter the profession of the law in this state, or a.ny state for that matter, without the time and opportunity to thoroughly examine the character and fitness of applicants to engage in the most vital of the professions in our society is neither justified on principle, nor required to meet “due process” or “equal protection” guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. How can a state require high standards of competence and mature judgment in members of the profession and not subject applicants for a license to careful scrutiny ? Proper scrutiny and evaluation requires time.
It is true, as plaintiffs argue, that the primary objective of licensing requirements is to assure competency and fitness to practice law. But this cannot be accomplished without adequate time for observation and evaluation of the applicant. This may best be achieved by exposure of the applicant to his fellows in the everyday pursuits of life in the neighborhood he seeks to serve.
After all, some board or agency must make a judgment on each individual applicant on the basis of objective facts. The quality of that judgment of necessity must depend upon the source, the comprehensive character and reliability of those facts. A short term residency or “residency in fact,” whatever that means, is not consistent, in my opinion, with the agreed purpose of licensing requirements.
It follows that I would deny the relief sought by this action.