concurring.
I agree that the affidavit met the test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). Having met that *775test, any discussion of Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 4709, decided June 8, 1983, is unnecessary.
Gates and, more recently, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 51 U.S.L.W. 4812, decided June 17, 1983, present the disturbing vision that the bedrock of our federal constitutional rights may only be a mass of shifting sand.
In my view, it is now past time to consider search and seizure cases in light of Neb. Const, art. I, § 7: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
“ ‘ “These ([Fourth Amendment rights]), I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 [(1949)] (Jackson, J., dissenting).’ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S., at 273-274.” 51 U.S.L.W. at 4820