dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority states that the adoption by the bankruptcy court of the stipulation between John D. and John R. is an adjudication which bars recovery against the surety under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2641 (Reissue 1995). That section, however, simply codifies a general principle of surety-ship law. The principle states that the surety’s liability to the holder of the obligation is no greater and no less than that of the principal. Niklaus v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 166 Neb. 438, 89 N.W.2d 258 (1958).
The reference to “adjudication” or “limitation” under § 30-2641(b) refers to claims barred by a statute of limitations or a proceeding in which it was determined that the principal was not liable. In the present case, no issue of statute of limitations exists. Similarly, we do not have an adjudication determining that the principal is not liable. Rather, this case involves two separate adjudications, one by the bankruptcy court allowing the son’s claim, and the judgment by the county court in favor of the son against his father, the principal. Both determined the principal was liable. The liability of the surety is dependent on the liability of the principal. Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., 246 Neb. 495, 519 N.W.2d 530 (1994). The fact that recovery cannot be had against the principal is why a surety bond was posted in the first place. To endorse the majority’s reading of this statute is to render meaningless the very purpose of the principal-surety relationship.
White, C.J., joins in this dissent.