dissenting.
In its 1995 session, the legislature passed Public Law 16-1995, commonly called the Unified Court Bill. This legislation created a unified Superior Court in Marion County. It set forth general conditions and qualifications for judges, including a mandatory retirement age. The statute provides that “[a] judge of the court must retire upon becoming seventy-five (75) years of age.” Ind.Code 33-5.1-2-25(c) (P.L. 16-1995 § 7).
*128However, recognizing the special cases presented by former Marion Municipal Court judges who were to join the unified court, the legislature went beyond this language of general application. It inserted within P.L. 16-1995 specific provisions for these judges, providing them with specific terms as judges of the Superior Court. In relevant part, the statute provides:
The six (6) judges whose terms as municipal court judges expire December 31,1997, and who are serving as municipal court judges on that date, are entitled to serve as judges of the Marion superior court established under I.C. 33-5.1-2, as added by this act, until midnight December 31, 2000.
P.L. 16-1995 § 17(a)(5), effective July 1, 1995.
A well-established rule of statutory construction holds that where provisions of a statute conflict, the specific provision takes priority over the general provision. Robinson v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467, 475 (Ind.1998). I would hold that the specific language of P.L. 16-1995—which clearly vests Judge Bolden with an extended term on the superior court bench not to expire until December 31, 2000 — controls over any application of the more general language of the act, and specifically exempts him from the general mandatory retirement age of 75 years “until December 31, 2000.” Cf. Wencke v. City of Indianapolis, 429 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (holding that mandatory retirement age of 70 years provided by statute at time officer entered police department was incorporated into officer’s contract of employment, and application by city of a subsequent statutory age limit of 65 violated contract clauses of state and federal constitution).
For these reasons, I dissent.