dissenting:
We granted petitions for certiorari review filed by the People and by the defendant, Robert Deskins, to consider two issues addressed by the court of appeals in People v. Deskins, 904 P.2d 1358 (Colo.App.1995): whether the trial court correctly advised the defendant of the consequences of an election to testify on his own behalf, and whether the offense of reckless child abuse as defined by sections 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) and 18-6-401(7)(a)(III), 8B C.R.S. (1986), require an awareness by an accused that his or her conduct could result in injury to a child. The court of appeals held that the trial court’s advisement failed to meet the criteria established by this court’s opinion in People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), and that the two offenses proscribing child abuse by means of reckless conduct do not require an accused to be aware that his or her conduct could result in harm to a child. Deskins, 904 P.2d at 1360-61. The majority holds, contrary to the determination of the court of appeals, that the trial court’s advisement satisfied the standards established by Curtis in view of our decision in People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787 (Colo.1996), and affirms the court of appeals’ construction of sections 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) and 18-6-401(7)(a)(III). Maj. op. at 369, 370. I conclude that the trial court’s advisement to the defendant concerning the consequences of his decision to testify did not satisfy the principles enumerated in Curtis and view Gray as re-affirming these principles. I also conclude, contrary to the court of appeals, that the relevant statutes defining the offenses of child abuse resulting from reckless conduct require that an accused must be aware that his or her conduct could injure a child to distinguish such offenses from other statutorily defined offenses prohibiting reckless conduct in general. I there*377fore respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
I
In People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), we articulated standards for assessing the adequacy of a trial court advisement with respect to a defendant’s constitutional right to testify on his or her own behalf pursuant to the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article two, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 509, 510. We held that the procedural safeguards established by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), apply to any determination of whether a defendant in fact waived his or her fundamental right to testify. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514. We next held that any waiver of the right to testify must be voluntary, knowing and intentional; that the existence of an effective waiver should be ascertained by the trial court on the record; and that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Id. at 515. The rule we adopted requires a court to question the defendant on the record to ascertain whether the defendant’s waiver of the right to testify is made with a complete understanding of the defendant’s rights. Id. at 516. In recognition of the significant responsibility of trial judges to ascertain whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waived the right to testify, we emphasized the basic facts a defendant must understand to assure that the presumption of non-waiver has been overcome, as follows:
A trial court exercising appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional right to testify should seek to assure that waiver is voluntary, knowing and intentional by advising the defendant outside the presence of the jury that he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can prevent him from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine him, that if he has been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will be entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury, and that if the felony conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility. In connection with the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he has a right not to testify and that if he does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right.... The purposes of the advisement by the court on the record are to ensure that waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is intelligent and knowing, to preclude postconviction disputes between defendant and counsel over the issue, and to facilitate review.
Id. at 514-15 (footnote and citations omitted).
Of crucial importance in this advisement is the specific requirement that the defendant know and understand that if he or she elects to exercise the constitutional right to testify, the prosecution may disclose to the jury the fact, if such be the case, that the defendant has been convicted of a felony, but that the jury will also be instructed that such fact may be considered only for purposes of credibility. See People v. Chavez, 853 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Colo.1993); People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787, 793-98 (Colo.1996) (Lohr, J. concurring and dissenting).
The record in the present ease establishes that the trial court’s advisement to the defendant did not contain this crucial information concerning the fact that the defendant had previously been convicted of numerous felonies. The advisement consisted in pertinent part of the following two sentences:
[I]n this case we are aware that there are prior felony convictions upon which you may be impeached, and the jury would have the opportunity to know and hear of the fact that you have prior felony convictions. And would be entitled to an instruction or the People would be entitled to an instruction on credibility with regard to prior criminal convictions.
Maj. op. at 370.
The second sentence of this instruction is both erroneous and ambiguous. It is erroneous in expressly indicating that only the People would be entitled to an instruction concerning the effect of the defendant’s prior *378felony convictions. The instruction failed to inform the defendant that should the People elect not to request such an instruction, the defendant would be entitled to insist that the jury be so instructed. The instruction is ambiguous in its description of the content of any such instruction: the phrase “on credibility with regard to prior criminal convictions” does not inform the defendant of the fact that his numerous prior felony convictions could be considered by the jury only for purposes of evaluating the credibility of the defendant’s testimony. In view of the fundamental nature of the constitutional right involved and the presumption against waiver thereof, the trial court’s advisement does not satisfy the test we adopted in Curtis.
The majority concludes that the language of the instant advisement is indistinguishable from the language of the advisement a divided court found sufficient in Gray.1 However, to reach that conclusion the majority interjects the pronoun “you” into the actual advisement given by the trial court, reconfiguring the language to read: “And [you] would be entitled to an instruction ...” Maj. op. at 371 n. 7. Such interpolation admits the ambiguity of the trial court’s instruction, but resolves the ambiguity in a manner that in effect suggests a presumption of waiver rather than a presumption of non-waiver. An equally if not more plausible interpolation, given the tenor of the trial court’s language, would be the insertion of the words “the jury” at the outset of the critical second sentence, thus reconfiguring the court’s actual language as follows:
[A]nd the jury would have the opportunity to know and hear of the fact that you have prior felony convictions. And [the jury] would be entitled to an instruction or the People would be entitled to an instruction on credibility with regard to prior criminal convictions.
If the court’s actual advisement were understood by the defendant to refer to the jury’s right to an instruction, the defendant would know only that if he testified the jury would be able to learn of his prior convictions and only the prosecution would be entitled to request an instruction regarding those convictions.
As the People’s argument acknowledges, these post-hoc deconstructions of the trial court’s actual language take on a surrealistic quality. Such exercises also suggest that a defendant should be deemed to have made all appropriate interpolations of ambiguous trial court language to support a conclusion that the defendant has voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally waived the right to testify — a principle we rejected in Curtis. The rule adopted in Curtis was designed not only to safeguard a defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to testify but also to avoid precisely the kind of post-trial semantic dueling the parties to this litigation must necessarily undertake in the face of the trial court’s ambiguous and erroneous advisement. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515.
In my view, the language actually used by the trial court is simply not sufficiently precise to permit this court to conclude that the *379defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waived Ms right to testify. While no precise formula is or should be required, the trial court’s actual language must convey accurate information in words sufficiently precise to permit an appellate court to conclude, solely on the record, that the presumption of non-waiver has been overcome. The admittedly ambiguous language constituting the advisement to the defendant in tMs case does not satisfy those requirements. The court of appeals so held, and I would affirm that portion of the court of appeals’ opimon.
II
I must also respectfully dissent from the majority’s construction of sections 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) and 18-6-401(7)(a)(III), defining certain types of child abuse offenses, and in its application of those statutes to the facts of this ease.
The General Assembly has defined child abuse as “[causing] an injury to a child’s life or health.” § 18-6-401(1), 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). TMs defimtion contains no mens rea element. However, the General Assembly has defined the mens rea elements applicable to the offense of child abuse in portions of the criminal code specifying potential penalties for said offenses, as follows:
(I) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in death to the child it is a class 2 felony.
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(Ill) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child it is a class 3 felony.
§§ 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), -401(7)(a)(III), 8B C.R.S. (1986). When the General Assembly prescribes a culpable mental state as an element of an offense, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears. § 18-1-503(4), 8B C.R.S. (1986). No such intent is discernible here.
In People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375 (Colo.1981), we recognized that one of the elements of the offense of child abuse is that the conduct of the accused in some fasMon be child-oriented, as opposed to being directed toward the public at large. We made the following pertinent observations concerning that distinction:
The proscriptions of section 18-6-401 encompass conduct that is particularly abusive to children, that is directed specifically against a child, [as opposed to conduct directed toward] anyone, adult or child.
Taggart, 621 P.2d at 1382 (emphasis in original). See also Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo.1991); People v. Thompson, 756 P.2d 353, 355 (Colo.1988); People v. Christian, 632 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Colo.1981).
Here, the defendant was charged with recklessly causing death to three children and recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another child. There is no question that in driving while intoxicated, the defendant acted recklessly — he consciously disregarded a substantial risk that he might kill or seriously injure persons on or in close proximity to the road that Mght. See § 18-1-501(8), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (defimng reckless conduct). The defendant was charged with and convicted of the offenses of vehicular homicide and assault.2 The defendant could also have been charged with the offenses of reckless manslaughter and assault in the second degree.3 However, in view of the statutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly, he cannot be charged with offenses of child abuse simply because some of the victims of Ms reckless conduct were children.
We have not previously considered the application of the reckless mens rea element as defined in sections 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) and 18-6-401(7)(a)(III) to the child-oriented element of child abuse that distinguishes such offenses as assaults on children from assaults *380on non-child victims. In the typical case of child abuse we would not need to consider this question because the accused’s conduct would include some kind of face-to-face contact with a child, and the actor would thus know that his or her conduct is directed toward a child. See, e.g., Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 572-73 (Colo.1991) (defendant refused medical treatment in favor of spiritual treatment for child’s illness); People v. Thompson, 756 P.2d 353, 354 (Colo.1988) (defendant stepped on child); People v. Christian, 632 P.2d 1031, 1033-35 (Colo.1981) (defendant beat child); People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Colo.1981) (same). Actual knowledge of child-orientation satisfies the mens rea requirements of recklessness or criminal negligence specified in the statute. § 18-1-501(3), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
The defendant asserts that in order to be convicted of child abuse he must have known that his conduct could result in injury to a child rather than to an adult. I do not agree with this argument. As the majority notes, section 18-6-401 does not require a defendant to actually know that his or her conduct would affect a child. Maj. op. at 376. However, the statute does require that the actor’s criminal conduct be oriented in some discern-able fashion toward children as opposed to the population at large. Taggart, 621 P.2d at 1382. If an actor’s culpable conduct is oriented toward the population at large, it is purely accidental that a child rather than an adult is victimized. Id.
In this case, the evidence establishes only that the defendant’s reckless conduct was directed toward the general population. Such conduct is punishable by the general assault and vehicular homicide statutes.4 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority conflates the injury-causing element of child abuse offenses with the child-oriented substantive elements of such offenses. The defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that he would injure somebody. He did not consciously disregard a substantial risk that he would injure a child as opposed to a member of the population at large. If the defendant had driven through a well-marked school zone while intoxicated, such evidence might well establish. the requisite child-orientation of his culpable conduct. If the defendant had driven his car while intoxicated on Halloween night, when he should have known that children could be walking the streets and sidewalks, such evidence might well establish the child-orientation component of his culpable conduct. The suggestion that the defendant may be charged with the knowledge that children are often passengers in ears does not satisfy the requirement that the defendant have some awareness that his victims will most likely be children. Children constitute a portion of the general population; the general assault and vehicular homicide statutes define offenses oriented toward the general population.
The court of appeals’ holdings in People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161 (Colo.App.1993) and People v. Davis, No. 94CA1132, — P.2d — 1996 WL 385669 (Colo.App. July 11, 1996), do not suggest a different result. Those cases construed statutes providing increased penalties for crimes directed at elderly or disabled adults.5 Like the child abuse statute, these statutes increase the penalties for injury-causing crimes, and therefore contemplate direct contact between the actor and his elderly or disabled victim. Moreover, in defining the one instance of a crime against an at-risk adult which does not involve physical injury, the General Assembly has chosen to require that the crime be committed in the presence of the at-risk adult. § 18-6.5-103(5), 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.) (theft from an at-risk adult). If the General Assembly had intended the at-risk status of the victim to be a matter of strict liability, it would not have required the victim’s presence in its definition of theft from *381an at-risk adult. Accord, §§ 18-3-202(e), -202(e.5), 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1996 Supp.) (enhanced penalties for the offenses of assaulting a peace officer, fireman, judge, or officer of the court require that defendant should reasonably be aware of the victim’s status).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I conclude that the court of appeals correctly held that the defendant must be granted a new trial in view of the trial court’s inadequate Curtis advisement. I also conclude that the defendant’s convictions for offenses of reckless child abuse must be vacated.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR joins in this dissent.
. The advisement in Gray included the following pertinent language:
I anticipate that if you testify the District Attorney will inquire of you as you are testifying about the existence of these six prior felonies. The six prior felonies would be admissible with respect to credibility.
Gray, 920 P.2d at 789 (emphasis in original).
As this court unanimously agreed, this language did not expressly inform Gray of the fact that if he testified his six prior felony offenses could be considered by the jury only for purposes of impeachment. Id. at 791; id. at 794 (Lohr, J. dissenting). The majority of the court found no reversible error in the advisement administered to Gray because the trial court advised the defendant that his testimony regarding prior convictions " 'would be admissible with respect to credibility,' ” id. at 791, and because in its view "the trial court did not mislead [the] defendant.” Id. at 792. Furthermore, the majority acknowledged that "a more clear and full advisement, stating that evidence of prior felonies could be considered by the jury only for purposes of impeachment” would constitute a "better” advisement, but suggested that the fact that the record revealed that the defendant’s attorney had counseled the defendant concerning the defendant’s right to testify was significant. Id. at 791.
In this case, the ambiguous instruction did mislead the defendant. Of more significance than the differing views respecting the adequacy of the advisement expressed by the majority and minority opinions in Gray is the unanimous reaffirmation by this court of the rule and principles, as articulated in Curtis, that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Id. at 790.
. §§ 18-3-106 and -205, 8B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.). Vehicular homicide and assault are both defined as strict liability crimes, so as to eliminate the seldom applicable defense that even if the drunk driver had been sober and non-negligent, the accident still would have occurred.
. §§ 18-3-104(l)(a) and -205(l)(d), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
. The contrary result reached by the majority, in my view, invites constitutional challenges to the statutory scheme, challenges which we should avoid if at all possible when construing legislation. See, e.g., Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 278, 599 P.2d 869, 871 (1979).
. § 18-6.5-103, 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.) (crimes against at-risk adults). An earlier assault on the elderly statute, § 18-3-209, 8B C.R.S. (1986), was recently repealed and replaced with the more general and better drafted crimes against at-risk adults statute.