dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Under the Animal Control Act (the Act) (510 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)), the defendant, James Griffith, cannot be construed as an “owner” of the horses. Although the primary goal of the Act is to encourage tight control of animals for the public’s protection, there must be a factual and reasonable basis to impose liability upon the defendant. Goennenwein v. Rasof, 296 Ill. App. 3d 650, 653 (1998). In order to be held liable under the Act, the injury must be caused by an animal owned by the defendant, and the term “owner” has consistently been construed to involve some measure of care, custody, or control at the time of the injury. Goennenwein, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The Act imposes this liability not only on the animal’s legal owner but also against anyone who places himself in a position of control akin to an owner. Frost v. Robave, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 533 (1998).
Along with defining legal “owner,” the statute sets forth that those who keep or harbor the animal may also be held liable under the Act as “owners.” 510 ILCS 5/2.16 (West 2004). The words “keeps” and “harbors” in the statute both necessarily imply an intent to exercise control over an animal. Thompson v. Dawson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 695, 698 (1985). Therefore, merely allowing an animal to temporarily be on one’s land does not make the landowner a keeper or harborer of the animal under the Act. Goennenwein, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The defendant must exercise some higher degree of care, custody, or control over the animal to be considered an “owner” for liability purposes. Goennenwein, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 654. Further, to qualify as an “owner” under the Act, more is required than passive ownership of grazing land. Heyen v. Willis, 94 Ill. App. 2d 290, 291-92 (1968). Finally, where the legal owner of the animal is present and in control of it at the time the injury occurs, the landowner cannot be considered an “owner” under the Act merely because the landowner permitted the animal to be on the premises. Goennenwein, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 654.
In this case, Griffith was not in a position of control akin to the horses’ legal owner, Gailen Rankin. Although Griffith owned the land and barn and allowed Rankin to temporarily keep his horses there, Griffith had no active involvement in the horses’ care. Griffith did not feed, groom, train, exercise, or care for the horses. Rankin provided all the necessary care for the horses, including constructing and maintaining a fence to contain the horses on the land. Further, Rankin was also present on the land at the time the injury took place. Therefore, since Griffith cannot be considered an “owner” under the Act, the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff in this case was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Imposing ownership status on Griffith under the Act not only would extend liability to a noncustodial party but could also restrict Griffith’s ability to rent his surrounding land or show his land to potential buyers, therefore placing an unreasonable burden on Griffith. This burden does not comport with the Act’s intent, which is meant to impose a reasonable scope on liability. Frost, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 534. We should decline to extend the Act beyond its reasonable scope in order to punish the defendant. See Frost, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 534.