I dissent.
My views with respect to the enforcement of integrated bargains by contempt proceedings are set forth in a dissenting *639opinion in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 523 [310 P.2d 634]. Although these views remain unchanged, I would concur in the judgment herein under the compulsion of that case if it necessarily controlled the present one.
The present case, however, differs from the Bradley case in that plaintiff has not remarried and the payments are partly for child support. Accordingly, the payments are partly in lieu of the statutory obligation to support. In integrated bargains the monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. “To the extent that they are designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a division of the community property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties.” (Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873].) So long as the wife has not remarried or there is a continuing obligation of child support, the characteristics of the obligation to support remain and alone justify enforcement by contempt. Such a rule is implicit in Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 740 [72 P.2d 868], where the court took care to point out that the payments were ordered pursuant to a property settlement and could not be changed without the consent of the parties. Although the majority rejected this reasoning in the Bradley case, it had only to decide in that case whether contempt would lie to enforce an integrated bargain after the wife had remarried and the characteristics of the support and maintenance obligation were no longer present.
A rule that the wife’s right to enforce the agreement by contempt terminates only on her remarriage would permit the parties to make a final settlement of all their marital rights without compelling the wife to give up contempt enforcement while she is still dependent on her former husband for support. So long as the Bradley decision remains law, I would adopt such a rule instead of following the Bradley rationale to its logical extreme.