(dissenting) — "[T]he person whose home is searched has the right to know what items may be seized.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 29, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). Because this warrant does not comply with the rule, I dissent.
A generic description in a search warrant will suffice only if "a more specific description is impossible.” State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 28 ("When the nature of the underlying offense precludes a descriptive itemization, generic classifications such as lists are acceptable.”) (emphasis added). Here, as Detective Jepson’s affidavit demonstrates, it was possible to specify marijuana in the warrant; but the police did not. Instead, the warrant describes a "Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act.” As the trial court aptly noted, a citation to the Act could not possibly give .notice of what substances were to be seized because the Act lists nearly 240 substances. For example, Schedules II through V list over 140 substances available by prescription, including such well-known drugs as Percodan (Oxycodone), Tylenol No. 3, and Valium (Diazepam). RCW 69.50.206(b)(l)(xiv); 69.50.208(e)(2); 69.50.210(b)(14). Drugs that can be obtained without a prescription in Canada are covered as well.4 E.g., RCW 69.50.208(e)(2). We have held that police "oversight, mistake[,] or carelessness is of no consequence” if a warrant fails the particularity requirement. State v. Eisele, 9 Wn. App. 174, 176, 511 P.2d 1368 (1973) (affidavit *650specifying LSD cannot support warrant specifying marijuana). Because the police failed to specify marijuana when it was possible to do so, I would hold that the warrant fails the particularity requirement. Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 28-29; Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547; see State v. Salinas, 18 Wn. App. 455, 461, 569 P.2d 75 (1977) ("But I would not hesitate to reverse a conviction obtained on a warrant seeking 'scheduled and legend drugs’ . . . where the drugs sought from the defendant’s possession were specifically known.”) (MclnturfF, J., concurring.)
Further, when police rely on generic classifications in a search warrant, "the search must be circumscribed by reference to the crime under investigation.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 28. Here, no specific crime was alleged in the warrant. The majority asserts that "it is clear that RCW 69.50.401(a) was the crime under investigation.” Majority op. at 646. I disagree. The Act prohibits numerous acts, including (1) the unauthorized dispensing or administering of controlled substances; (2) the use of fraud in obtaining controlled substances; (3) the sale of counterfeit controlled substances; and (4) the use of drug paraphernalia. RCW 69-.50.402, .403, .410, .412. Because it is not clear what specific crime was under investigation, the warrant again fails the particularity requirement.
Moreover, in eight paragraphs, the warrant authorizes the police to search for and seize various items ostensibly related to controlled substances, including "equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use” with controlled substances. Given that the Act prohibits numerous crimes, virtually any object found in a home would fall under the category of "FRUITS/INSTRUMENTALITIES OF A CRIME.” I fail to understand how the warrant limits police discretion in a search. By using inexact and broad boilerplate language, the warrant simply encourages the general rummaging prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
The majority, however, relies on State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555, 556, 648 P.2d 476 (1982), for the proposition that *651a warrant for "all illicit drugs and controlled substances” meets the particularity requirement. Olson is distinguishable. There, the Court held that police "discretion was limited” by the affidavit establishing probable cause that marijuana was present. Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 558. But an affidavit can support an overbroad warrant only if the warrant expressly incorporates the affidavit and the affidavit is attached to the warrant. Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29. Although the Olson opinion does not say, we assume the record showed that the affidavit was attached to the warrant. If it was not, the Olson result is wrong. Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29. Here, the affidavit was not attached to the warrant. Thus, Olson offers no support for this warrant.
But the majority also cites Olson for the proposition that persons confronted with a warrant specifying a particular drug have no greater right to privacy than those presented with a warrant for "controlled substances.” This is because police who are authorized to search for any drug may "inspect virtually every aspect of the premises” and seize nonspecified substances under the plain view doctrine. Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 559. By adopting this analysis, the majority ignores the rule that generic descriptions are sufficient only if "a more specific description is impossible.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547 (emphasis added); see also Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 28. Here, it was possible for the warrant to specify marijuana. We should not reward police oversight at the expense of the Fourth Amendment. See Eisele, 9 Wn. App. at 176. To hold otherwise would encourage the general searches prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the majority "agree[s] with the reasoning” in State v. Christiansen, 40 Wn. App. 249, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985). Majority op. at 647. The warrant in Christiansen authorized a search for and seizure of "all evidence and fruits of the crime(s) of manufacturing, delivering or possessing controlled substances.” Christiansen, 40 Wn. App. at 251. Division Three of this Court denied a challenge to the warrant for lack of particularity. But Christiansen was decided before Riley *652and did not discuss the right of the person whose home is being searched to know what items may be seized. Because I believe that most homeowners could not begin to list all the chemicals and tools used to manufacture, deliver or possess the approximately 240 controlled substances listed in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, I doubt Christiansen’s continuing validity.
For example, the common aspirin-caffeine-codeine mixture known as "222.” Compendium of Pharmaceuticals and Specialties 1648-49 (32d ed. 1997); see United States v. Betancourt, 594 F. Supp. 686, 689, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing that 222 does not require prescription in Canada).