dissenting:
I concur in the view that the affidavit of counsel shows inexcusable neglect on his part, but I do not agree that his neglect should be imputed to his client, in order to avoid delay or to promote the speedy termination of litigation. I think the default should be set aside and the cause tried on its merits.
My reasons for not imputing the neglect of counsel to his client are set forth in my dissenting opinion in Schalk v. Bresnahan, 138 Mont. 129, 354 P.2d 735, and will not be repeated here.
Furthermore, I am not able to agree with the specially concurring opinion of Justice John C. Harrison to the effect that there was room for a finding that there may have been lacking a meritorious defense or a finding that the granting of the motion to set aside the default would not be in furtherance of justice.
The defendant tendered an answer which sets forth a general denial and a counter-claim. The court could not, or at least ought not, in ruling on the motion to set aside the default *42and without trial, determine that there was no merit in defendant’s answer or that a trial on the merits could not be in furtherance of justice.