specially concurring:
What should be the abiding rule for the establishment of a prima facie claim in a workmen’s compensation case where the evidence as to the causal connection between the employment and the death of the employee is wholly circumstantial? The majority opinion contains the answer, but I think we should attempt a more explicit statement of the applicable principles than appears in such opinion. This concurring opinion is an effort at achieving such statement.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and it may be based upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the reasonable prob*124abilities flowing from the evidence; “neither absolute certainty nor demonstration is required.” Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 19 Cal. (2d) 622, 122 P. (2d) 570, 141 A.L.R. 798; Herron Lumber Co. v. Neal, 205 Ark. 1093, 172 S.W. (2d) 252. “All that is necessary, to warrant the finding of causal connection between the accident and the disability, is to show facts and circumstances which would indicate with reasonable probability” such connection. Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P. (2d) 293. Industrial Commission v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P. (2d) 812.
The case under consideration has present two elements ordinarily necessary in a death claim based upon circumstantial evidence: (1) the death occurring with the nearness it did to the exertion which decedent had just undergone, Teal v. Potash Company of America, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P. (2d) 99; Herron Lumber Co. v. Neal, supra; Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 75 Atl. (2d) 191; (2) the sequence of events reasonably suggestive of a causal relation between the employment and the injury. Teal v. Potash Company of America, supra; Adelaide Stevedorinq Co. v. Forst, 64 C.L.R. 538 (Australia) ; Industrial Comm. v. Corwin Hospital, 126 Colo. 358, 250 P. (2d) 135.
“We are not unmindful that the exact and precise cause of death is not established with the degree of proof desirable. But death occurring with the nearness it did to the extreme strain and exhaustion decedent had just undergone, plus the conditions under which he labored, all contribute to make it a matter of permissible inference, in our opinion, whether the strain and exhaustion were not a proximately contributing cause of the workman’s death and, hence, compensible [sicj under our Workmen’s Compensation Act.” (Emphasis supplied.) Teal v. Potash Company of America, supra.
“We concede that in the great majority of cases *125[medical] testimony ordinarily is necessary because of the seeming absence of connection between a particular accident and a claimed resulting injury. But in other cases involving special and peculiar circumstances, medical evidence, although highly desirable, is not altoays essential for an injured employee to make a prima facie case, especially if the testimony is adequate, undisputed and unimpeached.” (Emphasis supplied.) Valente v. Bourne Mills, supra.
“I am greatly impressed by the sequence of events. The deceased, who had arrived at an age when arteriosclerosis and atheroma afflict mankind, was a stevedore’s labourer. On the day of his death he climbed up the jib of the crane and lay prone on the crane with his arms outstretched, trying to replace a wire which had come off the gin. He failed to do so, returned to the deck and for some time, with his arms in a position raised over his head, helped in holding up a wire rope. Immediately after performing this task he collapsed. What weighs so much with me is the fact that he was brought to a standstill, as an ordinary lay observer would think, by the exertion he had undergone: Cf. Partridge Jones and John Patón Ltd. v. James (1). I do not see why a court should not begin its investigation, i.e. before hearing any medical testimony, from the standpoint of the presumptive inference which this sequence of events would naturally inspire in the mind of any common-sense person uninstructed in pathology. When he finds that a workman of the not-so-young standing attempts in a posture calculated' by reason of the pressure on the stomach to disturb or arrest the rhythm of the heart a very strenuous task not forming part of his ordinary work and then collapses almost immediately and dies from a heart condition, why should not a court say that here is strong ground for a preliminary presumption of fact in favour of the view that the work materially contributed to the cause of death? From this standpoint the investigation of physiological and pathological opin*126ion shows no more than the current medical views find insufficient reason for connecting coronary thrombosis with effort. Be it so. That to my mind is not enough to overturn or rebut the presumption which flows from the observed sequence of events. If medical knowledge develops strong positive reasons for saying that the lay common-sense presumption is wrong, the courts, no doubt, would gladly give effect to this affirmative information. But, while science presents us with no more than a blank negation, we can only await its positive results and in the meantime act on our own intuitive inferences.” (Emphasis supplied.) Adelaide Stevedoring Co. v. Forst, supra.
The following language from Teal v. Potash Company of America, supra, could be applied with equal propriety to the present case: “But where, as here, there is a sequence of events in rapid order, such a brief hiatus of time between the exertion, followed by the quenching of thirst with refrigerated water and, then, sudden death, the natural experience of mankind suggests there likely is a causal connection between the strain and exhaustion, on the one hand, and the consequent death on the other.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A prima facie case may be established without the aid of expert medical evidence. Industrial Comm. v. Corwin Hospital, supra; Valente v. Bourne Mills, supra; Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, 227 F. (2d) 110; Hampton Roads Stevedoring Corp. v. O’Hearne, 184 F. (2d) 76; Dell v. State Workmen’s Insurance Fund, 118 Pa. Super. 541, 179 Atl. 889; Jarka Corp. v. Norton, D.C., 56 F. (2d) 287. “In fact, when there is medical opinion that the death is not related to the injury, the circumstances may outweigh the physician’s express opinion.” Hampton Roads Stevedoring Corp. v. O’Hearne, supra; Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, supra; Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Cyr, 200 F. (2d) 633; Utah Delaware Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 76 Utah 187, 289 *127Pac. 94; Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marshall, D.C., 57 Fed. Supp. 177.
Within the limitations of the, law as herein enunciated, I am in accord with the majority opinion.