concurring specially.
I agree that in this case the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine the prosecutor during the Batson hearing. This is because, even though the trial court never expressly ruled on whether a prima facie case of discriminatory intent had been established, the record shows a prima facie case, in fact, was not established. Compare Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325 (3) (357 SE2d 792) (1987) . See generally Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75 (4) (365 SE2d 111) (1988) . A defendant does not have the right to cross-examine the prosecutor as part of his prima facie case. See Dewberry v. State, 743 SW2d 260, 266 (Tex. App. 1987). Once the defendant has shown he is a member of a racially cognizable group and that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove members of this group from the jury, the remaining facts to establish an inference of racially discriminatory motivation for those strikes may be established from “other relevant circumstances,” such as facts appearing in the record. See Aldridge v. State, supra. The testimony of the prosecuting attorney should not be necessary to establish a prima facie case. However, once a prima facie case is established, the testimony of the prosecuting attorney concerning his reasons for making the strikes is relevant. I do not agree with the implication of Division 2 of the majority opinion that a defendant would never have the right to cross-examine the prosecutor. Once a prima facie case of discriminatory intent is established and the prosecuting attorney is called to explain the reasons for each peremptory strike, then the very purpose of the Batson hearing requires the defendant be permitted to cross-examine the prosecutor in order to challenge his explanation. Cf. Daniels v. Texas, _ SW2d _ (no. 12-86-00268-CR, Tex. App., April 26, 1988) and Cliff v. Alabama, 518 S2d 786 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (in which the prosecuting attorney was cross-examined by defendant at the Batson hearing).
I am authorized to state that Judge Benham joins in this special concurrence.