¶ 57. {dissenting). The majority concludes that the policy unambiguously provides no coverage to Nancy Langridge for her wrongful death claim. Its essential analysis for this conclusion is limited to only three paragraphs sandwiched in the middle of the opinion. Because I believe that the three paragraphs of analysis do not support the majority's conclusion and that any ambiguity should be construed against State Farm, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 58. Initially, the focus of this case was whether Langridge had to sustain bodily injury in order to collect on her claim.1 State Farm denied Langridge's claim on the basis that she "was not involved .in the *64accident." When asked to clarify, State Farm explained that Langridge was not entitled to coverage under the policy because she "did not sustain her own bodily injuries in the accident."
¶ 59. The circuit court awarded summary judgment to State Farm, subscribing to its then unambiguous interpretation of the policy. It determined that Langridge could not collect on her claim because "the insured attempting to claim underinsured motorist coverage must have suffered a bodily injury."
¶ 60. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. It too concluded that Langridge "must have sustained a bodily injury herself. .. because under the policy only those who suffered bodily injury may recover." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, No. 02-3353-FT, unpublished order at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. June 4, 2003).
¶ 61. Now State Farm changes its course. Although successful at both the circuit court and court of appeals, it now concedes that the language of the policy should be interpreted to provide that Langridge did not have to suffer bodily injury in order to recover under the policy. Indeed, in this court, State Farm advances a different argument altogether, maintaining that Lan-gridge cannot collect on her claim because the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is not met.
*65¶ 62. The provision in dispute is paragraph "b" of the "underinsured motor vehicle" definition. That definition provides in relevant part:
Underinsured Motor Vehicle — means a land motor vehicle....
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability:
a. are less than the limits of liability of this coverage; or
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other than the insured to less than the limits of liability of this coverage.
(Emphasis added).
¶ 63. Langridge maintains that the vehicle driven by the drunk driver meets the policy's definition of an "underinsured motor vehicle." Specifically, she asserts that paragraph "b" of the definition renders the drunk driver's vehicle "underinsured" as to her. Langridge notes that she is "insured" under the policy and that the drunk driver's liability limits were paid to persons other than her, namely her husband.
¶ 64. State Farm contends that Langridge is attempting to split her husband's bodily injury claim into two in order to obtain coverage under the policy. Although it acknowledges that Langridge could qualify as "the insured" under the plain language of paragraph "b," it argues that the provision must be read in context of the whole policy. Based upon such context, State Farm submits that the only relevant question is whether the drunk driver was underinsured as to Langridge's husband. Because he was not, it reasons, the drunk driver cannot be underinsured as to Langridge.
¶ 65. In concluding that the disputed language of the policy is unambiguous and that it precludes recovery for Langridge, the majority engages in substantial *66extraneous discussion. From the sheer volume of discussion, a red flag arises, suggesting that if it takes that much discussion to conclude that a single sentence in a policy is clear and unambiguous, something is suspect.
¶ 66. The analysis of the majority is suspect with good cause. Although it maintains that the language is "not ambiguous," the majority engages in a lengthy discussion, describing what a court does if the language is deemed ambiguous. Majority op., ¶¶ 43-46. This discussion serves to mask the inadequate reasoning of its conclusion.
¶ 67. At this point, it may be best for the reader to turn back to the three paragraphs of analysis which underpin the majority's conclusion. These paragraphs, 38, 39, and 40, comprise the total analysis set forth in Section D.l, which interprets the pivotal policy provision at issue in this case. According to the majority, "the outcome of this case turns on whether 'the insured' in paragraph 'b' could reasonably refer to Nancy Lan-gridge." Id., ¶ 37.
¶ 68. In paragraph 38, the majority observes that if paragraph "b" had referred to "AN insured" instead of "THE insured," there would be no issue in this case. Although this is true, it is completely beside the point. The language of paragraph "b" is "the insured." While State Farm could have very easily drafted its policy language differently so as to preclude Langridge's claim (e.g., requiring that an insured suffer his or her own bodily injury in order to recover), it chose not to do so.
¶ 69. In paragraph 39, the majority notes that if Langridge were not a named insured, she could make a claim representing the estate under paragraph "a." Again, this analysis misses the mark. All agree that Langridge is a named insured. Her claim of wrongful death is independent of her husband's estate. Thus, the *67only relevant inquiry is whether the plain language of paragraph "b" renders the drunk driver's vehicle under-insured as to her.
¶ 70. Finally, in paragraph 40, the majority asks, "[H]ow can [Langridge] expect an interpretation of the policy that an insured who suffers no bodily injury has an independent claim equal to the claim of a surviving insured who actually suffers bodily injury?" This question, of course, echoes the earlier misinterpretations of the circuit court and court of appeals. State Farm has now abandoned the position that bodily injury is required to state a claim; the majority should do the same.
¶ 71. On its face, State Farm's policy appears to provide coverage for Langridge's wrongful death claim. There is no dispute that she is "insured" under the policy. Rather, the dispute centers on whether Lan-gridge can meet the definition of underinsured motor vehicle under paragraph "b." That paragraph refers to a land motor vehicle whose limits of liability for bodily injury "have been reduced by payments to persons other than the insured to less than the limits of liability of this coverage."
¶ 72. Here, Langridge is "the insured." The limits of liability for bodily injury have been reduced by payments to persons other than Langridge, that is, by payments to her husband for his conscious pain and suffering. Additionally, the limits of liability of the drunk driver have been reduced to less than the limits of liability of the coverage. The policy limits of the drunk driver were exhausted via the payment to Langridge's husband.
¶ 73. I believe that the more reasonable interpretation of the language of paragraph "b" is as stated above. Even if, as State Farm asserts, it is reasonable to interpret "the insured" in paragraph "b" as referring to *68Langridge's husband rather than to Langridge, then we are left with two reasonable interpretations of this policy language. Words or phrases of an insurance policy are ambiguous if they are susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶ 51, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223. If the policy language is ambiguous, we construe it against the drafter. Id. I therefore conclude that Langridge is entitled to coverage under our traditional canons of construction.
¶ 74. In sum, the majority once again invokes the mantra of unambiguous policy language to defeat an insured's reasonable expectation of recovery. Its decision to do so boils down to three paragraphs of weak and unsupportable analysis. I determine that the policy provision at issue is ambiguous and should he construed against State Farm. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 75. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, joins this dissent.